

Democratic Consolidation In Ghana: Some Emerging Challenges

George Asekere

Assistant Lecturer and PhD Candidate
(Dip. In Communication Studies, B.A. Hons., Psychology/
Management, MA. Public Affairs, Mphil Political Science),
Department of Political Science Education,
Faculty of Social Sciences Education, University of Education, Winneba

Abstract: This paper examined some emerging threats that have the potential to mar the beauty of Ghana's democracy which is considered to be one of the best in Africa, Sub of the Sahara. The author relied solely on documentary analysis in the form of secondary data. It was found that progress has been made since the return to constitutional rule in 1993 in the form of consolidated electoral democracy. However, emerging challenges such as threats to media freedom, corruption, ethnic politics and the winner-takes-all politics are negating the successes chalked. The article recommends a review of some laws to reduce the executive dominance, enhance media freedom, fight corruption and prevent the deepening of identity politics.

Keywords: Ghana, Democracy, Democratic Consolidation, Corruption, Winner-Takes-All

I. INTRODUCTION

Ghana has since the return to constitutional rule in 1993 made substantial progress in nurturing democratic governance. This is evidenced by the demonstrable willingness to sustain multi-party rule through the conduct of seven successful elections that have generally been described as free and fair by both domestic and international election observers. This has made Ghana's democracy one of the best examples in Africa (Joseph R. a Ayee, 2019). Political party activism is on the ascendency which is a sign that Ghanaians are poised for deepened participatory multi-party democracy. The institutionalization of political parties across the country and the growing interest of the people in intra-party organizations is a further matured sign that the use of democratic process to dictate 'governmental renewal' has come to stay in Ghana (Jeffrey Haynes, 2003, p. 50). The net effect has been the high voter turnout in almost all the seven elections since the beginning of the Fourth Republic (Alidu, 2019; Ninsin, 2017). For instance, voter turnout has been consistently higher, averaging 75 percent while alternation of political power from one victorious party to the other has become the accepted game in town (Ayee, 2015; Ichino & Nathan, 2017).

The positive trend in Ghana's case may be a reflection of the larger picture where democratic rule has increasingly become the acceptable form of governance around the globe while military interference is evidently the old way of doing things (Huntington, 2012). In other words, the euphoria about the growth of democracy and the demise of military rule has peaked. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated on October 30th, 2006 that democracy is a universal right that does not belong to any country or region, and that participatory governance, based on the will of the people, is the best path to freedom, growth, and development. According to Mr. Annan, no nation is born a democracy hence it requires effort and time to build and sustain it. The global call to deepen democracy in all countries, from the Millennium Summit in 2000 through to every UN General Assembly Sessions, has been loud and clear and the response has arguably been positive.

Despite some notable successes, the dividends of democracy have proven more difficult to achieve than many assumed as high profile political corruption, lack of meritocracy, power drunkenness among other things appear entrenched in the developing world (Abrahamsen, 2000; Ichino and Nathan, 2017). The initial steps towards democracy

with the organization of competitive elections, as undertaken in many countries, proved not to be enough to deliver on the high expectations among people for an improvement in their lives (Boafo-Arthur, 2008). Issues such as respect for diversity and pluralism, tolerance, justice, freedom, human rights, and non-violence are universal core values that are embedded in the rich cultural diversity around the globe but these are scarce 'commodities' in most countries, including Ghana (Asah-Asante, 2015). It is therefore worrisome that the 2018 Freedom House Report revealed a rather bleak prospects for democracy. According to the Report, 2017 was the 12th consecutive year of decline in global democracy. Seventy-one countries suffered a net decline in political rights and civil liberties in 2017, with only 35 registering gains with once-promising states such as Turkey, Venezuela, Poland, and Tunisia experiencing a decline in democratic standards (Freedom House, 2018). Some of the challenges in these countries including corruption are not too different from Ghana and other emerging democracies. According to Ghana's first female Chief Justice, Georgina Theodora Woode, the challenges that confront Ghana are many despite the global accolade it has gained as a beacon of democracy in West Africa. She noted that there are critical areas of weakness which threaten the sustenance of democratic governance: Ethnic politics, accountability issues relating to revenue from the Oil and Gas sector, Corruption and Identity Politics.

Ghana has survived the chaos associated with elections in other neighbouring countries like Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali among others not because the Ghanaian system is structurally different or the people have built immunity against violence but largely by divine grace. In fact, Oquaye (2013), opined that Ghana was on the brink of conflict in December 2008 when the opposition NDC complained that it had unveiled a conspiracy between the Electoral Commission (EC) and the ruling New Patriotic Party, NPP, to rig the elections. Based on this allegation the NDC's vigilante group, *Azoka Boys*, invaded the EC Head Office and burnt vehicle tires, smashed vehicle windscreens and chanted war songs (cited in Asekere, 2020). The foreboding doom that clouded the 2012 elections has since been sustained as prayer warriors now congregate for God's intervention during every election year in Ghana largely due to intimidating vigilante groups who preach *do* or *die* during elections (Oquaye, 2013; Asekere, 2020). It is now a known fact that, actions by the major actors in the Ghana's body politic believe that what would make a party win an election is more important than the basic cries of hunger, bad roads, inadequate and deteriorating health and educational infrastructure and insecurity (Alidu, 2019). This phenomenon raises doubts about whether there is a lack of collective understanding of the ideal and practice of multi-party democracy on the part of the governed (Ninsin, 2017) or the government has relented on fulfilling its part of the social contract, because democracy has come to stay.

Scholarship has focused largely on the success story of Ghana, and justifiably so because many countries see Ghana a shining example. However, the declines in democracy in the past, which were blamed on a myriad of issues including corruption, lack of meritocracy, identity politics and lack of media freedom, should be a wakeup call on all stakeholders

not to rest on their oars, at this stage. As a contribution to knowledge, this article examines the impact of corruption, media freedom, the winner-takes-all politics and ethnic politics to Ghana's democratic consolidation.

In terms of scope, the paper briefly reviews political developments between 1981 and 2016. The reason being that the period between 1981 and 1992 laid the foundation that ushered in the Fourth Republic in 1993. The discussion will, however, focus on the Fourth Republic because the paper is interested in developments that have the tendency to taint consolidation of democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

The introductory section is followed by the methodology, a review of the literature on democracy and democratic consolidation and a brief overview of elections between 1981 and 2016. This is followed by discussion on corruption, media freedom, winner-takes-all politics as well as ethnic politics and conclusions.

II. METHODOLOGY

The paper adopted documentary analysis as its approach to understanding the Challenges of Nurturing Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. It is said that all researchers start from the unknown to the known hence researchers usually consult and read existing documents to get themselves acquainted with past and present relevant studies or information (Twumasi, 2001). According to Twumasi, documents such as census data, archival materials, and published data can serve as good sources of secondary data. He argues that if the research objectives and problem warrant the use of existing data, the use of documentary sources may suffice (Twumasi, 2001). This author agrees with the above assertion and chose documentary sources because existing documents on the discourse of democratic rule and the associated challenges, from well-established institutions and peer reviewed articles, abound. The documentary method entails thorough reading and synthesis of existing literature to unearth answers to a researcher's questions (Bell, 2014). As such, the author benefited from historical documents on Ghana's governance including parliamentary reports, media publications and official statements from relevant think tanks.

Finally, the author used political ethnography to observe politically related group activities such as demonstrations, media discussions and unlawful physical confrontations by dissatisfied citizens on the government's overall response to their needs. Political ethnography allows for a close-up and real-time observation of actors in an event or scene, in a contentious manner (Baicocchi & Connor, 2008).

III. DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

A. DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

There is some consensus in the dominant literature that defining democratic consolidation is a daunting task. Minimally, Huntington (1991) has argued that a democracy is deemed to be consolidated when a polity meets the 'two-

turnover' test. What this means is that a government loses an election and the opposition wins and in subsequent elections, loses and hands over to the opposition. For example, in Ghana, the Rawlings led NDC government lost to the Kufuor led opposition in 2000 and in 2008, the Kufuor led government lost to the Prof. Mills led Opposition. Although, Huntington's test is easy to verify, Haynes is of the view that 'it has the vice of not being nuanced enough' (Jeffrey Haynes, 2003, p. 50). He buttressed his point using the example of Japan, where the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remained in office for decades, following the introduction of a democratic political system after the second World War, until 1993 (Haynes, 2003). Based on Huntington's 'two-turnover' test, Ghana's democracy is consolidated while Japan's democracy between 1945 and 1993 was not consolidated despite Freedom House data which describes Japan as 'free' – meaning its democracy was consolidated (Haynes, 2003).

Another criterion that measures democratic consolidation was proposed by scholars such as Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela. In *Issues in democratic consolidation: the new South American democracies in comparative perspective*, they held that democracy is consolidated when the major political actors believe and resort to only democratic process for governmental renewal (Mainwaring et al., 1992). This assertion extends democratic consolidation beyond elections. This means, for example, that if people use state machinery to bulldoze their way into power, report to corrupt practices, such as vote buying or mute media freedom in order to win elections, such cannot be deemed to be democratic process hence the outcome of such elections do not lead to democratic consolidation even if it led to the two turnover test' espoused by Samuel Huntington.

Democratic consolidation is not about what Linz and Stepan refer to as merely dealing with liberalized nondemocratic regimes or with pseudo-democracies or with hybrid democracies where some democratic institutions coexist with nondemocratic institutions outside the control of the democratic state. Stated differently, only democracies can become consolidated democracies hence, a polity must meet the three minimal conditions of *stateness* (only in states can there be a democracy), a completed democratic transition and a government that rules democratically, before it can be regarded as a consolidated democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Linz and Stepan (1996) further argued that democratic consolidation is attained when a polity has a procedural and institutionalized form of democracy with the following: (i) open political competition (ii) several freely competing parties, and (iii) an array of civil and political rights guaranteed by law. In other words, democratic consolidation is hinged on behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional pillars. They also believe political accountability is critical for the ruled to subject the rulers to strict scrutiny (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Behaviourally, democratic consolidation is attained when no significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Attitudinally, democratic consolidation is achieved when the masses trust in democratic

procedures and institutions as the means to govern their collective life with less or no endorsement of anti-democratic systems (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Constitutionally, Linz and Stepan believe that citizens must be subjected to the resolution of conflicts through the use of laws and procedures put in place a part of the democratic process (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Jeffrey Haynes sums democratic consolidation as amounting 'to an institutionalisation of democratic practices and processes. This happens when majority of both political actors and ordinary citizens accept democratically endorsed ways as the only legitimate means of resolving political conflicts (Jeffrey Haynes, 2003). Haynes (2001) noted that a consolidated democracy ought to have a free and resourceful civil society organisation with reasonable levels of political involvements by diverse groups such as women and the youth, the poor and minority ethnic groups. Additionally, there should be inclusive pluralism in party politics and an independent political society. Also, there should be an independent judiciary capable of protecting the freedoms of individual including the media, groups and associational life. Besides, there should be an effective bureaucracy working for a democratic government and an institutionalised economic society that guarantees economic freedom (Haynes, 2001). These suggest that a democracy inundated with corruption at all levels including the three arms of government, stifled press freedom, tainted with winner-takes-all syndrome and identity politics, is likely to have serious deficits in its consolidation process.

B. DEMOCRACY

The concept of democracy has its origin in Greek City-states, especially in Athens. This concept finds meaning in a system of government that accepts democratic principles and its mechanisms including the principle of participation by the people in the running of government at all levels (Dahl, 1982). However, the success of democracy or 'demos', or "the people", "crazy" or "rule" or government became significant in Western political thought since ancient times (Dahl, 1982). Its significance is that it allows citizens' participation in the election of government officials and at the same time makes elected representatives responsible, transparent, and accountable to the ruled (Ogunwa, 2015). A necessary but by not sufficient condition for modern democracy to exist is the conduct of free and fair contested elections that is broadly inclusive (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Deliberative democracy theory suggests that the cardinal challenge in constituting a democratic order borders on how to preserve or protect the liberty of the governed by putting in place adequate checks and balances on those who wield power, apportioning and monitoring same and ensuring its responsible exercise at all times (Miller, 2007). According to Miller (2007, p 325) 'international institutions might contribute positively to the securing of democratic legitimacy and accountability in international governance'. He adds that democratic tenets must insist on progress not necessarily through the use of trepidation, coercion and arbitrary authority but through dialogue and persuasion (Miller, 2007). The preoccupation with democratic governance indicates a particular concern with the challenge of steering (Jeff Haynes,

1993). In both theory and practice, the underlying point of the governance perspective is to relocate politics and administration from the problem of the state to the problem of steering (Miller, 2007). In other words, it is concerned with how to govern, or to steer. Democratic governance may seem technical because, among other things, it is concerned with the mundane mechanisms by which authorities seek to instantiate government (Abrahamsen, 2000).

However, democracy as a system of government has gained considerable ground in the last few decades. According to Stoker (2016), about two-thirds of all the countries in the world have some basic set of democratic institutions built around competitive elections that allow the electorate to choose and remove their leaders. Some countries have struggled to maintain even the basic democratic requirements and in most democracies there appear to be a considerable amount of discontent and disenchantment about the work of politics (Stoker, 2016: 7). Diamond (2003) shared similar views that over the years, democracy has emerged and flourished in many places throughout the world. He argued that the last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the greatest expansion of democracy in the history of the world. According to him, democracy may be an imperfect form of governance but all the other forms of governance are far worse and this surely is a moment for recognizing the benefits that democracy brings despite its shortcomings. In *Defending the bad against the worst*, Mendus, (1993) agreed with Diamond that the time has come to affirm faith in democracy, not a moment for doubting it (Mendus, 1993). These notwithstanding many political scholars and writers have doubted the prospects of democracy in Africa, especially those Stoker (2016) classify as not being able to maintain basic democratic tenets.

Some scholars are, however, of the view that democracy is the key to development in this modern era. In his work on *Advancing Democratic Governance: A global perspective on the status of democracy and direction for international assistance*, Larry (2003) observed that the prospects for development and the potential for development assistance to be effective heavily depend on the quality of governance; the way which public power is exercised, and public resources are managed and expanded. He adds that good democratic government is the key to development and aid effectiveness unless states can be made more responsible, competent, efficient, participatory, open, transparent, accountable, lawful and legitimate in the way they govern (L. Diamond, 2003). Democratic governance can thus be sustained when those who are governed are satisfied with how the powers they have vested in those who govern are exercised lawfully without partiality (L. J. Diamond, 2005; Stoker, 2016).

In a related study on democracy with a focus on Personality and Charisma in the US Presidency dubbed: *A Psychological Theory of Leader Effectiveness*, the authors argued that in an age of complexity, change, large enterprises, and nation-states, leaders are more important than ever (House et al., 1990). However, their effectiveness depends on their personality and charisma and not solely on their control over bureaucratic structures. They used U.S. presidents to test a general model of leader effectiveness that includes leader personality characteristics, charisma, crises, age of the

institution headed by the leader, and leader effectiveness (House et al., 1990). In their findings, the age of the presidency accounted for approximately 20 percent of the variance in presidential needs for power, achievement, and affiliation. Presidential needs and a measure of leader self-restraint in using power, the age of the presidency, and crises accounted for 24 percent of the variance in presidential charisma (House et al., 1990). Age of the presidency, crises, needs, and charisma together predicted from 25 percent to 66 percent of the variance in five measures of presidential performance. The study concluded that personality and charisma do make a difference (House et al., 1990).

In Ghana where the educational level is generally low, one is of the believe that, it is not easy to share the assertion that “for democracy to work, the people need opportunities to engage and understand the messiness and demands of politics” as well as the patience to wait for things to improve (Stoker, 2016: 3). This means, there may be challenges like corruption, ethnicity, winner-takes-all and lack of media freedom in a democracy but patience on the part of the ruled can help to reverse these challenges in the future. In practice, however, democracy remains a difficult concept to fully embrace perhaps because it is not the latent known system of rule in Ghana, hence when the managers of the peoples’ resources are seen in an affluent or flamboyant lifestyle (which does not reflect the tenets of democracy anyway) while unable to address the butter and bread issues of the masses, doubts about the propriety of democracy may arise.

IV. THE JOURNEY FROM 1981-2016

This section looks at events in Ghana’s political landscape between 1981 and 2016. The reason being that the 1981 military rule marked the end of coup d’états since independence and ushered in the Fourth Republic in 1993 with the same personality in charge of state affairs- Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings.

Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings became Ghana's longest-serving military leader from December 31, 1981, until 7th January 1993 when the Fourth Republic officially came into being. Then a Flight Lieutenant in the Ghana Air Force and a militant populist, J.J. Rawlings led the first coup d’état on 4th June 1979, which toppled the Supreme Military Council regime of General Frederick Akuffo, who in a palace coup deposed his predecessor, General Acheampong (Dartey-Baah, 2015, p. 59). The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) constituted itself as the government headed by Flight lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings. The AFRC embarked on what it termed *housecleaning* exercise involving the execution of the top brass of the armed forces, and some high ranking officers including three former heads of state were executed. The AFRC extended this exercise to “the larger society resulting in the most callous brutalization of civilians including women traders” thus making the scale of violence that occurred in this brief AFRC period “unparalleled in Ghana's post-independence political and social experience before 4 June 1979” (Drah, 1993, p. 97). J. J. Rawlings helped to restore the country to constitutional rule by ensuring that scheduled elections took place which brought Dr. Hilla

Limann's administration into power. The democratically elected government of the People's National Party (PNP) under the leadership Dr. Hilla Limann was inaugurated on 24th September, 1979. J. J. Rawlings staged another coup d'état overthrowing the government of Dr. Limann in 1981 thus ushering Ghana into its longest period of military rule till the Fourth Republic of 1993 (Dartey-Baah, 2015, p. 59; Drah, 1993, p. 97).

According to Drah (1993), the masses were arguably not anticipating a violent, unconstitutional change of government hence there was generally an initial lukewarm reaction to the 31st December 1981 coup d'état. The J.J. Rawlings led Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) to indicate its desire to revolutionary transform Ghana which entails a complete transfer of power from few people who govern the ordinary people to participate in the decision making of the country. Among the distinguishing features of the people led participatory democracy were transparency, probity, accountability, and social justice (Oquaye, 1995). In its attempts to materialize this vision the PNDC established organs including the People's and Workers' Defence Committees (PDCs and WDCs), Mobilization quads (Mobisquads) public tribunals and the National Investigations Committee (NIC). Also, a repressive security apparatus- the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI), Civil Defence Organization (CDO), People's Militia, and Commandos-emerged to back the PNDC. Besides "an equally repressive set of laws like the Protective Custody and Habeas Corpus (Amendment) laws appeared in the statute books" which eventually led to the culture of silence in the country (Drah, 1993, p. 100).

Even though political parties were disbanded, the position organized themselves in the form of the freedom movement during the culture of fear and silence. The PNDC reluctantly ceded to calls to return the country to democratic rule following domestic and international pressure. It can, therefore, be said that even though the PNDC used undemocratic means to gain political power, the regime progressively demonstrated that it believed in a liberal democracy (Essuman-Johnson, 1993, p. 192). Eventually, Ghana returned to constitutional rule under the watch of the PNDC beginning with the lifting of the ban on party-political activity May 18, 1992, which was greeted with the emergence of groups aspiring to form political parties. Before the lifting of the ban, the main groupings 'were the Kwame Nkrumah Welfare Society, the Danquah-Busia Club, and the Eagle Club and the Heritage Club'. The National Commission for Democracy (NCD) Report had drawn attention to the fact that even though for a long time the country had seen two political traditions- the Convention People's Party (CPP) and United Party (UP), with the June 4th and 31st December revolutions which evolved as a third tradition constituted by the PNDC and its organs. Interestingly the political parties that emerged were broadly either CPP or PP or PNDC. The parties "were: The CPP groups- National Convention Party (NCP), National Independence Party (NIP), People's Heritage Party (PHP), The UP group - National Patriotic Party (NPP); and the PNDC group- National Democratic Congress (NDC) and Eagle Party" (Essuman-Johnson, 1993, p. 199-200).

A. THE ELECTIONS OF 1992/1993

As indicated earlier, the anti-PNDC struggles resurged between 1986 and 1992 culminating in a democratic system of constitutional government in 1993. The 1992 Constitution under which democratic rule was restored guaranteed various political and civil rights, including the right to form political associations, speak freely, choose who to govern the country, and the right to participate in the governance of the country. The demand of the social movements that struggled against the PNDC rule consistently affirmed the belief of the Ghanaian political class in democratic principles, which ultimately formed the core of their pro-democracy struggles (Ninsin, 2006, p. 3).

According to Ninsin (2006), some of the political parties like the New Patriotic Party (NPP), emerged from an old political tradition that dates back to the 1950s and subscribed to conservative liberalism. Others such as the National Salvation Party were entirely new political entities with no roots in Ghanaian politics and did not have an explicit political ideology (Ninsin, 2006). Some of these new parties came into being because of 'splits emanating from lack of internal democracy' but unfortunately could not stand the test of time due to financial and other challenges (Essuman-Johnson, 1993, p. 201). Three of these political parties, therefore, went into alliance with the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Six others joined the New Patriotic Party (NPP) to form the alliance of opposition parties (Ninsin, 2006: 4). The NDC won the election although it was disputed by the NPP which subsequently boycotted the parliamentary elections in 1993.

B. THE ELECTIONS OF 1996

The eight parties that were formed in 1992 survived to contest the 1996 elections. These are Democratic People's Party (DPP); Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere Party (EGLE); National Convention Party (NCP); People's Convention Party (PCP); National Democratic Congress (NDC); New Patriotic Party (NPP); People's National Convention (PNC); Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP). These parties all contested in the parliamentary election (Ninsin, 2006, p. 4). However, only the New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by John Agyekum Kufuor, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) led by then-incumbent J.J. Rawlings and the People's National Convention (PNC) led by Dr. Edward Nasigri Mahama contested the presidential election. The NDC won and the other contestants conceded defeated (Ninsin, 2006).

C. THE ELECTIONS OF 2000

Seven political parties went into the 2000 presidential and parliamentary election contest (Ninsin, 2006). These parties were the National Democratic Congress (NDC), every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE), the Democratic People's Party (DPP), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Convention People's Party (CPP), the People's Convention Party (PCP) and the Great Consolidated People's Party (GCPP) (Ninsin, 2006). According to Nugent, the NDC, was initially a vehicle for Rawlings' presidential success in the

1992 and 1996 elections but this did not work for the NDC in election 2000 with Vice-President Prof. John Evans Atta Mills (Nugent, 2001). All attempts to win the elections including slogans like "continuity in change" and "progressive change" and the reminder of voters of the Rawlings legacy of peace, stability, security, accountability as well as the provision of socio-economic infrastructure did not wash (Joseph RA Ayee, 2001, pp. 42–43). Instead, the NPP which had as its main slogan 'Development in Freedom' and promised to fight corruption and press freedom, was more appealing to the electorates (Frempong, 2008).

D. THE 2004 ELECTION

From seven political parties in the 2000 elections, the number increased to eight in 2004 but only four contested the presidential elections while eight contested the parliamentary elections. These parties were the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE), the Democratic People's Party (DPP), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the People's National Convention (PNC), the Convention People's Party (CPP), National Reform Party (NRP) and the Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP) (Ninsin, 2006, p. 5). In the presidential election, only four parties were cleared by the Electoral Commission to contest. These were Convention People's Party (CPP), the People's National Convention (PNC), National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP). The incumbent president on the ticket of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) won that election and other contestants conceded defeat (Ninsin, 2006, p. 5).

E. THE 2008 ELECTIONS

In 2008, seven registered political parties met the EC's requirements for the presidential elections. These parties were the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Convention People's Party (CPP), the Democratic Freedom Party (DFP), Democratic People's Party (DPP) and Reform Patriotic Democrats (RPD) and Mr. Kwesi Amofo-Yeboah who contested as an independent candidate (Stiftung, 2010, p. 35). In all, a total of 1060 candidates contested the parliamentary election in the 230 constituencies. Out of the number 964 candidates contested on the ticket of political parties and 96 were independent candidates (Stiftung, 2010, p. 36). The political parties that contested the parliamentary elections were: The Ghana National Party (GNP), Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP), National Democratic Congress (NDC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Convention People's Party (CPP), the Democratic Freedom Party (DFP), Democratic People's Party (DPP) and Reform Patriotic Democrats (RPD). The NDC and the NPP recorded the highest number of candidates; 229 each (Stiftung, 2010, p. 36). The NDC won that election.

F. THE 2012 ELECTIONS

In the disputed elections of 2012 that took the Supreme to adjudicate after eight months of legal tussle, eight people on the ticket of seven political parties contested the presidential

election. These parties were the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the Convention People's Party (CPP), the People's Convention Party (PCP), the Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP), the Progressive People's Party (PPP) and the United Front Party (UFP) Mr. Jacob Osei Yeboah was the only independent presidential candidate. The NDC was declared the winner of the election but the NPP alleged massive irregularities and petitioned the Supreme Court but the apex court dismissed the petition in its ruling delivered by the presiding judge, Justice Williams Atuguba (JSC). He remarked in the final sentence of the ruling which was carried live on all radio and television stations in Ghana... *the overall effect is that the first respondent was validly elected and the petition is therefore dismissed.* All the seven political parties that took part in the presidential election also contested the parliamentary elections. However, only the DNC and NPP attempted almost all the 275 constituencies.

G. THE 2016 ELECTIONS

In less than 78 hours after the 2016 general elections, the Electoral Commission declared Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo, flagbearer of the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) as the winner of the elections. He unseated the incumbent, John Dramani Mahama of the National Democratic Party (NDC) by securing 53.85 percent of the vote while Mr. Mahama garnered 44.40 percent share of the valid votes (Ayee, 2016). However, these figures excluded the results of four constituencies namely Afram Plains North, Upper West Akyem, Sawla-Tuna-Kalba and Tamale Central constituencies which were still being collated. The Electoral Commission Chairperson Mrs. Charlotte Osei stated that the results of these four constituencies, totalling about 120,000 votes were insignificant to change the overall outcome of the elections. The election recorded 68.62 percent turnout. The total number of rejected ballots stood at 1.4 percent (Ayee, 2016).

A litany of factors including corruption, the winner-takes-all syndrome that left many in abject poverty, ethnicity and unemployment were cited for the electoral outcome (Alidu & Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018; Joseph RA Ayee, 2017; A. I. Braimah & Bawah, 2019; R. Gyampo, 2015).

V. DISCUSSIONS

A. CORRUPTION

The concept of corruption is used as a shorthand reference for a large range of illicit or illegal activities (Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, 2002). The term appears so complex to the extent that there is no universally acceptable definition by scholars. The difficulty in arriving at a common definition of corruption is "rooted in legal and political considerations, as well as in varying attitudes and customs in different cultures" (J. A. Ayee, 2016, p. 15). What constitutes corruption in most cultures may be regarded as gifts in other cultures. However, most definitions share a common emphasis that the abuse of public power or position for personal gain, constitute a form of corruption. According to the Oxford

Unabridged Dictionary, corruption is a “perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour”. The World Bank conceptualizes corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain.” This appears similar to Transparency International, a leading NGO in the global anti-corruption effort’s definition: “Corruption involves behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves or those close to them, by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them.

The World Bank’s definition of corruption aptly fits as a framework for corruption in Ghana in all facets of society. Transparency International’s conception of corruption is most suitable for the kind of corruption that most Ghanaians are worried about as depicted in various mediums including social and traditional media, demonstrations and marketplace.

Ghana’s political history between 1979 and 1993, showed that corruption, or allegations of same, played a critical role in the political instability and electoral volatility (Agyeman-Duah, 2005; Joseph R. a Ayee, 2019). Besides, every single military takeover cited corruption as a major justification. It is therefore evident that corruption has the potential to undermine a country’s ability to sustain good democratic governance. In the specific case of Ghana, corruption is gradually eroding public confidence in state institutions, the rule of law, employment opportunities as well as lowered moral values and reduces the motivation to be honest, because it appears everyone given a chance to serve is likely to think of personal gains first. As, Gyimah-Boadi (2002) argues, corruption has stifled initiatives, distorted reality, nourished mediocrity and undermined the merit system of rewards, appointments, and entitlements in Ghana. The popular view in Ghana is that corruption has been accepted as a major national problem that transcends regimes and personalities, as elections continue to be flawed by imperfections, manipulations, unequal access to campaign funds, and state media. This, perhaps, depicts Ghana’s rankings of 40 in 2017, 41 in 2018 and 41 in 2019, by Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International report in 2019.

The election administration body is deemed weak as opposition parties continue to see the Electoral Commission’s actions and inactions as aligned to the wishes of the ruling party (Alidu, 2019; E. Gyimah-Boadi, 2007). Sadly, the Civil Society Organizations, the Media, the Religious and Traditional Bodies, who is supposed to be the voice of conscience, are theoretically enthusiastic but practically weak, divided, polarized along partisan lines, vulnerable to manipulation and are not generally trusted on issues of accountability. According to Gyimah-Boadi (2002), the average civil society body does not adhere to any credible code of conduct or basic rules of corporate governance. “Some are veritable personal empires, without succession plan or meaningful accountability” (Gyimah-Boadi, 2002, p. 3).

There are many types of corruption, but this paper focuses on three which have been discussed relative to the specific case of Ghana (Ayee, 2016, p. 17). First, Petty Corruption which involves favours or cash given in exchange for speeding up private or state transaction. This type of corruption is usually practiced by public servants who may be underpaid

and depend on small rents from the public to feed their families. Second is Grand or Political Corruption. It is a large scale corruption that takes place at the highest levels of government. This may be synonymous with state capture where acts of corruption are perpetuated by first getting the state actors to change the rules of the game such as laws, in their favour. This type of corruption in Ghana manifests through irregularities that occur in public procurement contracts or revenue-collecting rebates with some political cover. The third is Looting, which involves "acts that may be sanctioned or created for political purposes; e.g., the government would place contracts with non-existent organizations, or goods are never delivered” (Ayee, 2016, p. 17). All these types of corruption are prevalent in Ghana.

The causes of corruption are captured in the table below.

(i)	the piecemeal approach of the previous initiatives and lack of action plan to deal with corruption comprehensively and holistically;
(ii)	politicization of corruption by successive governments;
(iii)	failure to name, share and punish persons accused of corruption;
(iv)	failure to implement pieces of legislation, including the Assets Declaration Act to combat corruption largely because of political reasons and therefore corruption has not been made a high risk activity;
(v)	insufficient or selective enforcement of laws within a patrimonial social and political context;
(vi)	loss of national values and and low levels of integrity;
(vii)	selective application of sanctions, if there are any to corruption offenders;
(viii)	absence of a comprehensive legislation on corruption, with corruption dealt with in different pieces of legislation;
(ix)	various institutions combating corruption with no mechanism to harmonize their activities leading to institutional dualism in the fight against corruption;
(x)	lack of political and bureaucratic will and commitment;
(xi)	resource constraints on the part of institutions and therefore making them weak to fight corruption;
(xii)	lack of effective corruption reporting system;
(xiii)	inadequate public cooperation due to lack of an anti-corruption culture;
(xiv)	absence of good record-keeping and poor management practices in public institutions;
(xv)	low or inadequate salaries;
(xvi)	culture of gift-giving;
(xvii)	nepotism and neopatrimonialism; and
(xviii)	lack of effective incentive mechanism.

Source Ayee, 2016, p. 22

Table 1

Article 35 (8) of the 1992 Constitution enjoins the state to ‘take steps to eradicate corrupt practices’ and the abuse of power. Additionally, several anti-corruption policies and institutions have been put in place. For instance, at the legal front, 22 laws were passed between 1960 and 2010. There also exists a Code of Conduct for Public Officers in Ghana (2013), Anti-Corruption Manual of the Ministry of Justice (2009); Guidelines on Conflict of Interest developed by CHRAJ. There are also many anti-corruption state institutions: Bureau of National Investigations (BNI), Economic Crime Unit of the Police Service; Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Auditor-General, Serious Fraud Office (SFO) renamed Economic and Organized Crime Office (2010); Public Accounts Committee of Parliament; Financial Intelligence Centre and the Office of Special Prosecutor. At the societal level, there are many anti-graft bodies such as the Ghana Integrity Initiative, Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) acting as advocacy groups against corruption, the media through investigative journalism and even public education on corruption (Ayee, 2016, p. 38).

Despite all these, corruption is the topmost issue discussed in the Ghanaian media. Governments have since 1993 have been hit by a series of corruption allegations that have evoked pressure from Civil Society, anti-corruption campaigners, opposition parties, the media, and the general

public. In his Annual State of the Nation Address to Parliament, president Akufo-Addo admitted that the war against corruption will not be won overnight, but with political will, it will be won (Akufo-Addo, 2020).

Equally worrisome among the masses is the delay it takes the judiciary to adjudicate corruption cases involving high profile politicians as against ordinary citizens such as petty thieves like those who steal goats. These among, others have gradually eroded public confidence in the state's capacity and commitment to the fight against corruption.

B. CITIZENS AND SPECTATORS

The average Ghanaian will admit that increasingly when election results are declared and a government is constituted, members of the ruling government and those associated with the government are *citizens* while all others become *spectators* (Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi & Prempeh, 2012). This assertion is strengthened by the winner-takes-all politics in Ghana which "connotes an extremely divisive and partisan sub-culture that excludes all other Ghanaians who are not part of the ruling party from national governance and decision making in a manner that polarizes the nation and dissipates the much-needed talents and brains for national development" (Gyampo, 2016, p. 2). The net effect of the winner-takes-all politics is the feeling of marginalization and exclusion from the day to day governance process by those outside the 'citizens' bracket (Abotsi, 2013). In the view of Gyampo (2016), the feeling of marginalization and exclusion from the governance process by those who are not members of the party in power poses a danger to the substance of Ghana's democracy because it breeds apathy, creates divisiveness and result in creating tension, acrimony, and rancour among the masses. Sadly, the worrying phenomenon has been on the ascending and makes the 'spectators' sometimes act in a way that suggests their overt desire to undermine the national interest and sabotage the national agenda to render the ruling government unpopular and be voted out in the next election (R. Gyampo, 2016; Ijon, 2018).

Parliament, which is supposed to be the peoples' representatives, unfortunately, has failed in this task due to excessive partisanship which places the interest of a party on whose ticket one is elected an MP, higher than the constituents, who elected the MP. Sadly, the constitutional arrangement which allows the president to choose the majority of ministers from parliament has worsened the situation (Gyampo, 2016). This has made "MPs who are also Ministers unable to ask colleague ministers questions on the floor of the House as expected. Notably, the ministers/MPs lead, control, direct and influence the other MPs on the majority side. Furthermore, ministers owe collective responsibility for all government decisions and cannot, therefore, criticize the government on the floor of the House. An MP, once elected, owes his/her constituents deliberative and representational duties by standing in their stead in the House. A prior commitment to the executive authority of the State undermines this basic duty (Oquaye, 2013, p. 2). Despite the separation of powers, the constitution ensures the supremacy of the presidency over Parliament. For instance, only the president or minister acting on his behalf has the authority to

practically introduce in Parliament a bill or amendment that might have fiscal consequences (R. E. Gyampo, 2018). Parliamentary oversight of executive conduct and performance is similarly weak. As a result, parliamentary voting on presidential initiatives such as foreign borrowing and investment agreements has tended to proceed strictly along party lines and thus make, the *spectators* feel completely left out as no one serves his or her interest (R. Gyampo, 2015; E. Gyimah-Boadi, 2007).

The constitution of Ghana (1992) vests vastly disproportionate power and control of resources in the hands of the president. Virtually all constitutional and statutory offices, including a senior post in the police as well as other security services and directorships and senior management positions in state corporations, are filled by presidential appointees (R. Gyampo, 2015). Additionally, judges, commissioners of independent constitutional bodies and recently state institutions such as the National Health Insurance Scheme, Ghana Gas Company, National Service Secretariat, among others, hold their offices at the pleasure of the president and the ruling party. To make matters worse, Microfinance and Small Loans Centers and the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority, (rebranded Northern, Southern and Middle Belt Development Authorities), is located in the office of the president. The law also grants the president the power to create, reorganize, and abolish government ministries and departments without going through legislative channels (R. Gyampo, 2015). Also, the Economic and Organized Crimes Office, EOCO, has the authority to investigate crimes relating to financial loss to the state, yet it is the president who appoints the EOCO' executive director and the board (Gyimah-Boadi 2011). In sustaining democratic governance, the power of the president must be reduced to ensure that agencies mandated to investigate and check the executive do so without fear or favour.

The 2020 Audit Report revealed that the state, acting through the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GETFund), offered scholarships to Members of Parliament, Ministers of State, Popular journalists and other people who can fund their education (Graphiconline.com, 2020). This follows recommendations of the Auditor-General after faulting GETFund for not being fair in the award of scholarships to those in need. The Auditor-General accused the secretariat of not instituting a robust selection process, leading to the haphazard granting of scholarships to Ghanaians, to the detriment of those who need them" (Graphiconline.com, 2020). The GETFund Act 2000, Act 581, stipulates that the objective of the fund is to provide financial support for the agencies and institutions under the Ministry of Education, through the ministry, for the development and maintenance of essential academic facilities and infrastructure in public educational institutions, particularly in tertiary institutions. Under these circumstances, meritocracy is believed to be a scarce commodity because a clear distinction between the citizens and spectators is clear.

C. ETHNIC POLITICS

One of the issues that need to be addressed without delay is the polarization of Ghana's body politic along with ethnic

politics. While some scholars have warned against the debilitating consequences of ethnic politics in Ghana (Alabi & Alabi, 2007; Arthur, 2009; Nugent, 2001), others have downplayed its effect on negating Ghana's democratic progress (Appah, 2017; Ayee, 2004). The truth remains that, the negative exploitation of ethnicity by some political actors constitutes one of the major threats to political stability in our country. Sadly, some workers of some state corporation are divided along ethnic lines and accusations and counter-accusations of ethnic discrimination and nepotism are issues publicly discussed during recruitment. Chiefs who are barred from active partisan politics continue to make public comments in support of political parties. The National House of Chiefs is divided when it comes to taking positions on key national issues. For instance, on the issue of a referendum to introduce partisanship at the local level election, this division was manifested. The following was how state media-The New Times Corporation- reported on the issue: "There is a seeming feud within the National House of Chiefs (NHC) over the pending referendum as to whether Ghanaians should vote 'NO' or 'YES', come December 17, 2019. While a statement, jointly signed by the House's President and his Vice, Togbe Afede XIV and Daseebre Kwebu Ewusi, VII, stressed the strong objection against the proposal to amend Article 55(3) of the Constitution to allow political parties to fully participate in the local assembly poll, two of the Paramount Chiefs claim, the statement was not a representation of the entire House" (Ghanaian Times, 2019).

Events that took place in Rwanda, in Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Kenya are fresh in the minds of Ghanaians yet ethnicity remains a problem with family and friends continuing to play central roles in governments in Ghana. Well-meaning Ghanaians continue to call for the urgent need to develop strategies for promoting national integration and peaceful co-existence among Ghanaians, at public fora. This article argues that public educational programs by key governance institutions such as the National Commission for Civic Education and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice must be tailored to forge a deeper.

D. MEDIA FREEDOM

It is not easy to conceive of democratic consolidation without taking cognizance of a vibrant press and a strong party communication system (Alghamdi, 2015). Scholars have tried to justify the positive relationship between the press and democratic practices for decades. Stier (2015) notes that a free press promotes the cause of democracy by acting as a watchdog over governments, and through this role, the press prevents governments from abusing power. Without the press, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain some of the freedoms of the people (Stier, 2015).

Physical attacks on journalists, police brutalities, detentions, have been the most prevalent form of violation in Ghana in the last 10 years (S. Braimah, 2017). In Ghana today, the biggest threat to press freedom, media sustainability and safety of journalists are perhaps the fastest dwindling professional standards, extreme partisanship, and the alarming rate of commercialization that is driving many media outlets to priorities advertising revenues over professionalism (Braimah,

2014). In 2019, the President of the Ghana Journalists Association, Rolland Affail Monney expressed worry over the constant deterioration of press freedom in the country over the past few years. According to him, the gruesome murder of Tiger Eye PI journalist, Ahmed Suale, coupled with a litany of attacks launched on some media personalities, has created an apparent state of insecurity for the practice of journalism in the country (Ghanaweb, 2019).

A brief highlights of attacks on journalist are as follows: Stan Dogbe, a high-profile officer at Ghana's presidency assaulted Yahaya Kwamoa, a journalist with the state Broadcaster-Ghana Broadcasting Corporation in 2015. A staff of the National Health Insurance Authority assaulted Afia Pokua, a journalist with private owned Multi-Media Company - Adom FM in 2014. Baffour Gyan assaulted Daniel Kenu, a journalist with the state owned Graphic Communications Group, publishers of Ghana's leading and most authoritative Newspaper -the Daily Graphic in 2017. In 2014, the Police in Kumasi, Ghana's second largest city, unlawfully arrested and detained Muftaw Mohammed, a journalist with private owned Metropolitan TV. Similarly, 11 security officers made up of 10 police and one (1) soldier assaulted three journalists - Salifu Abdul Rahman, Malik Sullemana and Mrs. Raisa Sambou- all with state owned New Times Corporation, publishers of the - Ghanaian Times Newspaper. Also, unidentified persons murdered Ahmed Hussein-Suale in 2019. Another group of unidentified people threatened Manasseh Awuni Azure with Multi-Media with death in 2019 while Hajia Fati, a prominent member of the ruling government assaulted Ohemmaa Sekyiwaa of Adom FM in 2018 (Media Foundation for West Africa, 2020). These cases, coupled with media commentaries on the dwindling safety of journalists only show that the Media in Ghana is not free to operate. There is no doubt that Ghana's democracy will be undermined if the media is undermined through attacks, threats, and murders.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This work has attempted to demonstrate that in trying to consolidate democratic governance in Ghana, there are both points of convergence and divergence between the myriad of challenges and available prospects that need to be improved. Challenges such as the country's, executive dominance, ethnic politics, dwindling media freedom and the gradual fading of meritocracy due to the winner-takes-all system of governance were highlighted. Also, this work acknowledged the prospects available through progressive electoral democracy and hence make the following recommendations.

The future of Ghana with regards to sustained democratic governance lies in the development of strong and independent institutions of governance. The current system where virtually all state institutions are at the back and call of the government of the day needs a critical review.

The continuous education of the masses is necessary to dissuade any hidden idea that democracy is not, after all, superior to other forms of government. Further, it should be made clear that increasing level of poverty is not a norm of democracy, but a multiplicity of factors including population

growth and global factors. For instance, the global financial meltdown, terrorist attacks, and COVID-19 played a greater role in the financial base of countries, for which democratic deficit cannot be solely blamed.

A sustained education and sensitization on the fact that democracy is not necessarily coterminous with the conduct of elections is highly recommended. It is important to realize that the conduct of elections is just one, of the many processes, albeit, a very important one, by which democratic governance is realized, for which reason free, fair transparent and peaceful elections are essential for the sustenance of good governance and economic development. For this reason, the judiciary must attach the highest premium to the timely and just determination of electoral disputes and corruption cases.

The hybrid constitutional arrangements make the appointment of persons in all state institutions, including the leadership of the independent bodies like the electoral commission, the judiciary, justices of the superior court, anti-corruption bodies and the speaker of parliament, under the executive influence, should be revised.

The state must institute practical and committed mechanisms to monitor and report on the safety of journalists and put in place measures to specifically address violence perpetrated against journalists in the line of duty. Further, the government should investigate all incidents of violence against journalists, including those murdered in the course of their work and prosecute perpetrators.

Additionally, it is recommended that state institutions mandated to handle issues of protection of human rights, abuse of office, investigations of corruption and related matters be resourced and given the legal mandate to enforce outcomes of their findings.

REFERENCES

- [1] Abotsi, E. K. (2013). Rethinking the Winner-Takes-All System. A Constitutional Review Series Roundtable Organized by the Institute of Economic Affairs in Accra on 21st August.
- [2] Abrahamsen, R. (2000). *Disciplining democracy: Development discourse and good governance in Africa*. Zed Books.
- [3] Agyeman-Duah, B. (2005). Elections and electoral politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
- [4] Alabi, J., & Alabi, G. (2007). Analysis of The Effects of Ethnicity On Political Marketing in Ghana. *International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER)*, 6(4) 39-52. <https://doi.org/10.19030/iber.v6i4.336>
- [5] Alghamdi, E. A. (2015). The representation of Islam in Western media: The coverage of Norway terrorist attacks. *International Journal of Applied Linguistics and English Literature*, 4(3), 198–204.
- [6] Alidu, S. (2019). Election Campaign in Ghana's 2016 National Elections. *Ghanaian Politics and Political Communication*, 31.
- [7] Alidu, S., & Aggrey-Darkoh, E. (2018). Rational Voting in Ghana's 2012 and 2016 National Elections in Perspective. *Ghana Social Science*, 15(1), 98.
- [8] Appah, R. O. K. (2017). Voting Behaviour in Elections In Ghana's Fourth Republic: A Study Of The Manhyia South, Ho West And Ayawaso West Wuogon Constituencies [Mphil Thesis]. University of Ghana.
- [9] Arthur, P. (2009). Ethnicity and electoral politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic. *Africa Today*, 56(2), 44–73.
- [10] Asah-Asante, K. (2015). Changing Forms of Political Communication and Voter Choices In Ghana's Elections, 1992-2008 [PhD Thesis]. University of Ghana.
- [11] Asekere, G. (2020). Domesticating Vigilantism in Ghana's Fourth Republic: The Challenge Ahead. *Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences*, 24–39.
- [12] Ayee, Ayee, J. R.A. (2019). Politics, Governance, and Development in Ghana. Rowman & Littlefield.
- [13] Ayee, Ayee, J. R.A. (2016). The Roots of Corruption: The Ghanaian Enquiry Revisited.
- [14] Ayee, Ayee, J. R.A. (2001). Deepening Democracy in Ghana: Politics of the 2000 elections. *Freedom*.
- [15] Ayee, Ayee, J. R.A. (2004). Voting Patterns in Ghana's 2004 Elections'. Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Elections, 82–100.
- [16] Ayee, Ayee, J. R.A. (2015). Manifestos and agenda setting in Ghanaian elections. *Issues in Ghana's Electoral Politics*, 81–111.
- [17] Ayee, Ayee, J. R.A. (2017). Ghana's elections of 7 December 2016: A post-mortem. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 24(3), 311–330.
- [18] Baiocchi, G., & Connor, B. T. (2008). The ethnos in the polis: Political ethnography as a mode of inquiry. *Sociology Compass*, 2(1), 139–155.
- [19] Bell, J. (2014). *Doing Your Research Project: A guide for first-time researchers*. McGraw-Hill Education (UK).
- [20] Bofo-Arthur, K. (2008). Democracy and stability in West Africa: The Ghanaian experience. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.
- [21] Braimah, A. I., & Bawah, A. S. (2019). One Election, Two Victories: Ghana's 2016 General Elections Revisited. *Social Sciences*, 8(5), 234–244.
- [22] Braimah, S. (2017). 7| MEDIA AND ELECTIONS. *Conflict-Sensitive Coverage*, 43.
- [23] Dahl, R. (1982). *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy versus Control*. New Haven.
- [24] Dartey-Baah, K. (2015). Political leadership in Ghana: 1957 to 2010. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 9(2), 49–61.
- [25] Diamond, L. (2003). *Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance*.
- [26] Diamond, L. J. (2005). *Democracy, development and good governance: The inseparable links (Vol. 1)*. CDD-Ghana.
- [27] Drah, F. K. (1993). Civil society and the transition to pluralist democracy. Ninsin & Drah, Eds. *Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic*. Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 72–115.
- [28] Essuman-Johnson, A. (1993). The democratic ethos and internal party democracy: The case of parties in the Fourth Republic. *Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, 192–205.

- [29] Freedom House. (2018). Democracy in Crisis: Freedom House Releases Freedom in the World 2018. <https://freedomhouse.org/article/democracy-crisis-freedom-house-releases-freedom-world-2018>
- [30] Gyampo, R. (2015). Dealing with Ghana's winner-takes-all politics: The case for an independent Parliament. A Publication of the Institute of Economic Affairs, 20(1).
- [31] Gyampo, R. (2016). Dealing with Winner takes All Politics in Ghana: The Case of National Development Planning.
- [32] Gyampo, R. E. (2018). Assessing the Quality of Parliamentary Representation in Ghana. *The African Review*, 44(2), 68–82.
- [33] Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2007). Political Parties. Elections and Patronage—Random Thoughts on Neo-Patrimonialism and African Democratization in Votes, Money and Violence, Uppsala, Sweden.
- [34] Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel. (2002). Confronting corruption in Ghana and Africa (Vol. 4). Ghana Center for Democratic Development.
- [35] Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel, & Prempeh, H. K. (2012). Oil, politics, and Ghana's democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 23(3), 94–108.
- [36] Haynes, Jeff. (1993). Sustainable democracy in Ghana? Problems and prospects. *Third World Quarterly*, 14(3), 451–467.
- [37] Haynes, Jeffrey. (2003). Democratic consolidation in Africa: The problematic case of Ghana. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 41(1), 48–76.
- [38] House, R. J., Spangler, W. D., & Woycke, J. (1990). Personality and charisma in the US presidency: A psychological theory of leadership effectiveness. *Academy of Management Proceedings*, 1990(1), 216–220.
- [39] Huntington, S. P. (2012). The third wave: Democratization in the late 20th century (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma Press.
- [40] Ichino, N., & Nathan, N. L. (2017a). Primary Elections in New Democracies: The Evolution of Candidate Selection Methods in Ghana.
- [41] Ichino, N., & Nathan, N. L. (2017b). Primary Elections in New Democracies: The Evolution of Candidate Selection Methods in Ghana.
- [42] Ijon, F. B. (2018). Winner-Takes-All Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana's Fourth Republic. *Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences*, 1–11.
- [43] Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. C. (1996). Toward consolidated democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2), 14–33.
- [44] Mainwaring, S., O'Donnell, G. A., & Valenzuela, J. S. (1992). Issues in democratic consolidation: The new South American democracies in comparative perspective. University of Notre Dame Press.
- [45] Mendus, S. (1993). Defending the bad against the worse: Education and democracy. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 12(1), 21–31.
- [46] Miller, C. A. (2007). Democratization, international knowledge institutions, and global governance. *Governance*, 20(2), 325–357.
- [47] Ninsin, K. A. (2006). Political parties and political participation in Ghana. KAS.
- [48] Ninsin, K. A. (2017). Issues in Ghana's electoral politics. CODESRIA.
- [49] Nugent, P. (2001). Ethnicity as an explanatory factor in the Ghana 2000 elections. *African Issues*, 29(1–2), 2–7.
- [50] Ogunwa, S. A. (2015). The Challenges of Democracy in Nigeria. *American Journal of Social Science Research*, 1(4), 206–220.
- [51] Oquaye, M. (1995). Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the PNDC in Ghana. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 17(3), 556–573.
- [52] Oquaye, M. (2013). Addressing the imbalance of power between the arms of government—a search for countervailing authority.
- [53] Stier, S. (2015). Democracy, autocracy and the news: The impact of regime type on media freedom. *Democratization*, 22(7), 1273–1295.
- [54] Stiftung, F. E. (2010). Election 2008. Friederich Eber Stiftung, Ghana.
- [55] Stoker, G. (2016). Why politics matters: Making democracy work. Macmillan International Higher Education.
- [56] Twumasi, P. (2001). Social research in rural communities. Ghana University Press.