# Rapid Military Action Against Insurgency And Effective Management Of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) In Mali And Nigeria, 2011-2016

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*Abstract: The number of internally displaced persons in Mali and Nigeria respectively has resulted to humanitarian crisis. Management of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has remained a tough issue to Malian and Nigerian authorities. The rehabilitation and resettlement of IDPs in these countries as well as provision of adequate security for IDPs have continued to pose a colossal challenge. This research work therefore, aimed at investigating inter alia: (i) how effective military action against insurgency facilitated the rehabilitation and resettlement of IDPs in Mali than in Nigeria and (ii) whether provision of adequate security by the national authorities facilitated the protection and safety of IDPs from armed attacks in Mali than in Nigeria. The study adopted ex-post facto (causal comparative) descriptive method, hence relied heavily on secondary sources for data collection and 'human security approach' is employed as a theoretical framework. The paper observed that there are still lacunas in the overall management of IDPs in both countries, but Mali recorded successes more than Nigeria. However, to achieve relative peace in Mali, there is the need to consider devolution of political powers between the north and south to appease the centre of opposition (Tuareg ethnic group) that has over the years felt marginalized. In addition, the Malian government must fully be involved in the management of IDPs instead of playing nominal role. In Nigeria, there is an urgent need to embark on a holistic and well-coordinated approach with the help of foreign nations to effectively engage in technical and military actions in order to completely displace Boko Haram insurgents from their deadly enclaves in Nigeria and beyond. Also, Nigerian government should be more proactive in the reconstruction of destroyed houses of IDPs in their various communities so that they would have confidence to return home, and also develop strong mechanisms to guarantee the protection and safety of IDPs, especially those in IDPs camps.*

*Keywords: State, Internally displaced persons (IDPs), Insurgency, Resettlement, Security.*

## I. INTRODUCTION

Today, it has become a commonplace fact that intra-national armed conflicts, insurgency, communal clashes and other human-induced and natural disasters have continued to impact negatively on the socio-economic and political milieu of independent sovereign nation-states. These phenomena therefore have forced people out of their homes, thereby leading to the displacement of many people. According to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon 2014, displacement remains arguably the most significant humanitarian challenge facing the world (Osagioduwo & Oluwakored, 2016). Accordingly, of the 33.3 million IDPs in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa hosts 15 million, with an

increase of 7.5% between 2013 and 2014. Regrettably, as the number of IDPs continues to increase astronomically, as a result of intra-state conflicts, attempts at management become more challenging for low income countries. This situation manifested in the Biafra War in Nigeria (1967-1970); the liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau (1963-1973); the Casamance Independence Movement in Senegal (1980s till date); the Mauritanian conflict of 1989; the terrible conflict which tore apart the River Mano countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia between 1999 and 2000; the Nigeria-Cameroun Bakassi Peninsula conflict; the post electoral crisis in Ivory Coast (2010-2011); the on-going political crisis in Mali; as well as the on-going Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria – so have natural disasters too numerous to highlight (Osagioduwa & Oluwakorede, 2016).

The Republic of Mali is a multi-ethnic country, with an estimated population of 15.5 million people. As a landlocked country located in the West Africa, Malian economy depends on agriculture. Since the country's independence on September 22, 1960 from France, history has affirmed that there has been chronic tension among various ethnic groups in Mali. In the year 2012, there was an acute eruption of armed conflicts as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) began its insurgency by attacking towns in northern Mali, which caused a great deal of instability throughout the country and the region in particular. Most of the NMLA's members are drawn from Tuareg ethnic group which is the majority ethnic group in the sparsely populated northern region of the country, but makes up only 10% of the overall Malian population (Arish Aid, 2013). It has been argued that people of Tuareg ethnic group have over the years faced socio-economic and political discriminations, which by extension means that they feel marginalized. It is believed that the majority of the Malian government consists of people from the Bambara ethnic group of southern Mali.

Considering years of perceived injustice against Tuareg ethnic group, in 2012 some Tuareg groups advocated for an independent state which includes northern Mali, northern Niger and southern Algeria. In order to have more advantage to strongly confront the government armed forces, the NMLA allegedly united with Islamic armed group, the Ansar al-Dine, whose name stands for 'Defenders of Islam' in Arabic. It was alleged that the mission of Ansar al-Dine was to impose Shariah law on Mali, thereby turning the country into a theocracy. In response to the rapid success of the rebels, several junior Malian officers with support from soldiers angered by the president's handling of the rebellion launched a coup d'état on March 22, 2012 (Westerfield, 2012). According to Westerfield, the military coup disrupted the entire chain of command and caused the U.S. and France to suspend military assistance programs. Bleck and Michelitch (2015) posit that the coup disrupted nearly twenty years of multi-party elections, while armed movements, including those with secessionist and jihadist goals, took over nearly two-thirds of Mali's geographical territory, causing over 400,000 Malians to flee for safety. In the face of this crisis, another armed groups known as Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), swiftly cashed in on the political instability created by the military. The above mentioned groups, the NMLA and Ansar

al-Dine formed an alliance. Eventually they seized control of northern Mali and subsequently declared independence of the region in 2012. Based on the whole scenario, UNHCR (2015) echoed that what started as a secessionist insurrection, later became a terrorism-war, followed by international community military intervention that helped Mali to keep its territorial integrity. Consequently, in January 2013, French military intervention, Operation Sérval, brought northern Mali under the control of its fragile interim government within weeks. In August of that year, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected president and nearly a year later in July 2014, the government and the Tuareg rebels began peace negotiations (Counter Extremism Project, 2016). During this time, the French refocused and expanded their military operation, launching Operation Barkhane to target Islamists in the larger Sahel region.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria, is a federal constitutional republic in West Africa, bordering Benin in the west, Chad and Cameroon in the east, and Niger in the north. With approximately 182 million inhabitants, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the seventh most populous country in the world. The country is a multi-ethnic state. Nigeria has over the years experienced incessant cases of internal displacement of majorly as a result of insurgency. The cause of this alarming situation is not far-fetched in the Nigerian context. Historically, the country has often experienced incidences or crises leading to the displacement of people from their original inhabitations. For instance, intra-ethnic conflicts, flooding, erosion, desert encroachments among others have remained a great challenge facing the country. Sometimes the causes of displacement are complex and often overlapping. According to Ladan (2011), in Nigeria, most of the incidences of internal displacement occur because of violent conflicts with ethnic, religious and/or political undertones. Thousands are annually internally displaced as a result of natural disasters including flooding in the North and West, erosion in the East, oil spillage and development projects in the Niger Delta (South-South) (Laden, 2011).

In Nigeria, the number of internally displaced people is on the increase as a result of Boko Haram insurgency, particularly in the North-eastern Nigeria. Of the total figure of IDPs, the assessment indicates that 13.33 per cent were displaced due to communal clashes, 0.99 per cent by natural disasters and 85.68 per cent as a result of insurgency attacks by Islamists (IOM, 2016). According to IOM (2016) there are 2,241, 484 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria as of February, 2016. According to the report, this figure is particularly based on an assessment conducted from November to December 2015 by the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) team in 207 Local Government Areas (LGA) covering 13 States of Northern Nigeria which are shown figures in the table below. In fact, as IDPs are returning to their habitual residences, others are being displaced, thereby making it difficult to accurately have reliable statistics of IDPs in Nigeria. Since 2011, the population of the north-east of Nigeria States has been affected by the insurgency between Boko Haram and governmental forces (UNICEF, 2014). Thus, the government declared a State of Emergency (SoE) on 14 May 2013 in the three north-eastern states of Borno, Yobe,

and Adamawa and imposed curfews. UNICEF (2014) reported that the large majority of the IDPs are women and children and over 90 percent are accommodated in host families within communities who are themselves poor and consequently putting pressure on already scarce resources. In 2014, the escalating violence caused by the Boko Haram insurgency increased the number of IDPs astonishingly. Boko Haram sect started its operation though in it latent form in 2002. It gradually began to unleash terror on the Nigerian-state in 2009. Since then the group has developed it network beyond, hence posing a colossal threat to Nigeria and its neighbouring states such as Chad, Mali, Cameroon and Benin.

Based on the high level of insurgency that led to internal displacement in Mali and Nigeria respectively, the study intends to achieve the following objectives: To investigate if effective military action against insurgency facilitated rehabilitation and resettlement of IDPs in Mali than in Nigeria. And to examine whether provision of adequate security by the national authorities facilitated the protection and safety of IDPs from armed attacks in Mali than in Nigeria.

## II. CONCEPTUALIZING INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS)

According to the African Union Convention for Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009), the term "Internally Displaced Persons" is defined as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border." Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are citizens of a country who are displaced within the territory of a country as a result of natural disasters such as erosion, desertification, flooding etc. People can also be displaced as a result of human-caused disaster such as civil war, internal armed conflict, terrorism and so forth. In this situation, people are left with the option of fleeing their homes for safety.

According to OHCHR (2007), IDPs are persons or group of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. According to Durosaro and Ajiboye (2011) there are two major components of the IDPs; the coercive or otherwise involuntary character of movement and the fact that such movement takes place within national borders. Some of the most common causes of involuntary movements are armed conflict, violence, human rights violation and disaster (NRC, 2009). Thus, it is important to note that these causes have in common that they give no choice to people but to leave their homes and deprive them of the most essential protection mechanisms, such as community networks, access to services and livelihoods. The second component of the IDPs is the movement within national

borders. Since IDPs remain legally under the protection of national authorities of their habitual residence, unlike refugees who have been deprived of the protection of their state (country) of origin, they are expected to enjoy the same rights as the rest (undisplaced) of the population (Durosaro & Ajiboye, 2011).

When families are displaced they only run for the survival of their children and themselves. It is a situation where the victims face untold economic hardship, psychological trauma and social dislocation. In this regard, they need the assistance of the government and other humanitarian groups that could intervene to cushion the effect of hardship in order to bring succor to the IDPs.

## III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

Human security analysis is adopted. *Mahbub ul Haq* first drew global attention to the concept of human security. Human security perspective is a combination of threats associated with war, genocide, and the displacement of populations (Human Security Research Group, 2010). At a minimum, human security means freedom from violence and from the fear of violence. It is people centered, focusing on the safety and protection of individuals, communities, and their global environment (Human Security Policy Briefing, 2011). *United Nations Development Programmes* (UNDP) report conceptualized human security as providing safety for the people from hunger, diseases, oppression and other chronic threats as well as protecting them from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life (Shiro, 2007).

There are two major 'schools of thought' that attempted to explicate the best practice that could guarantee human security. They are: "Freedom from Fear Approach"' and '"Freedom from Want Approach." These approaches clearly centre on what *threats individuals* should be protected from and over the appropriate mechanisms for responding to these threats. 'Freedom from fear' seeks to limit the practice of Human Security to protecting individuals from violent conflicts while recognizing that these violent threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and other forms of inequities. This approach however argues that limiting the focus to violence is a realistic and manageable approach towards human security. According to this approach, emergency assistance, conflict prevention and resolution, peace-building are prerequisite to human security. 'Freedom from want' on its own point of argument advocates a holistic approach in achieving human security and argues that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease and natural disasters because they are inseparable concepts in addressing the root of human insecurity (UNDP, 1994) and they kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined (Tadjbakhsh, 2007). Different from "Freedom from Fear", it expands the focus beyond violence with emphasis on development and security goals. Though these approaches to human security may appear to be opposites, they are complementary to each other rather than contradictory. After all, each of them emphasizes the security of individuals in society.

Dwelling this security paradigm within the context of the present study is appropriate as it has analytical strength to explain the importance of the security of the people. This, therefore, presupposes that the root cause of displacement as well as the plight of the IDPs should be made national and international agenda. Arguably, the security of the people is in question if issues such as natural and human disasters, terrorism, violent conflicts, insurgency etc that lead to displacement are beyond the capacity of the state to effectively tackle. The human rights and the security of the IDPs are jeopardized when the state fails to facilitate their protection and safety in a manner they (displaced persons) are 'free from fear' and 'free from want' as well as their dignity restored through rehabilitation, reintegration and resettlement.

## IV. COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

At this point the two nations under study are to be analysed using available data in the area of investigation

Mali: Effective Military Action Forced the Insurgents into Hasty Retreat

The collapse of the Malian state and the inability of the armed forces to defend the country and stop the military advances of the separatist rebels and their Islamist allies, coupled with the failure of the deployment of troops from African countries, therefore forced France to act unilaterally, but with the approval of the international community, including Russia, China and African regional actors (Francis, 2013). It was obvious to both local and international observers that Mali was really in a great political and social turmoil, as the seizure and subsequent declaration of independence of northern region by the anti-government group sent a bad signal to national security and unity of the country. Based on this situation, there was the need for an effective and decisive military action. Unfortunately, Mali does not have military capabilities to defeat the insurgents, and therefore sought the assistance of the international community. In the process, France had to intervene as it was believed that the security threat to Mali may likely have multiplier effects on other nations. The most threatening aspect of the whole crisis was the dominant role of various terrorist groups, particularly, Ansar ed-Din (Movement of the Defenders of the Faith) and Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

| Type of conflict | Political and constitutional crisis: military coup | Secessionist crisis: Tuareg rebellion in the north | Islamic jihadists and terrorist groups |
|---|---|---|---|
| Key Players | • Military coup organised by non-commissioned and mid-ranking officers of the Malian armed forces led by Captain Amadou Sanogo that led to the overthrow of the democratic government of President Amadou Toumani Touré and the suspension of constitutional rule <br> • Under international pressure, Sanogo, as military head of state, handed power over to the interim president, Dioncounda Traoré, a former Touré ally | • The National Movement for the Liberation on Azawad (MNLA), with Bila Ag Cherif as secretary-general of its political wing and Mohamed Ag Najim as head of its military wing: a secular Tuareg separatist movement fighting for an independent state of Azawad in northern Mali. Initially the ally of Ansar ed-Din and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), but now oppose Islamic jihadist groups | • Ansar ed-Din (Movement of the Defenders of the Faith) led by former Tuareg rebel leader Iyad Ag Ghaly <br> • Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): North African and Sahel wing of al-Qaeda • MUJAO: an AQIM splinter group committed to the spread of global jihad in West Africa, led by a Mauritanian, Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou <br> • Singed-in-Blood Battalion: an AQIM breakaway faction committed to global jihad, led by Algerian Mokhtar Belmoktar, with strong ties to Ansar ed-Din and MUJAO <br> • Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA): an Ansar ed-Din splinter group now claiming to oppose terrorism and extremism, led by Alghabass Ag Intalla, an influential figure in the strategic city of Kidal and former senior member of Ansar ed-Din |

Source: Norwegian PeaceBuilding Resource Centre Report (2013) www.peacebuilding.no
*Table 2: Malian Crisis: Types of Conflict and Key Players*

In the quest to facilitate the defeat of insurgents, UN Security Council resolution 2085, which was facilitated by France, authorised the deployment of the ECOWAS-led AFISMA intervention force (United Nations Security Council, 2012).

| S/No. | Name of Country | Personnel |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Benin | 650 |
| 2 | Burkina Faso | 500 |
| 3 | Cape Verde | unknown |
| 4 | Chad | 2,000 |
| 5 | Gabon | 900 |
| 6 | Gambia | Unknown |
| 7 | Ghana | 120 |
| 8 | Guinea | 144 |
| 9 | Guinea Bissau | Unknown |
| 10 | Ivory Coast | 500 |
| 11 | Liberia | One Platoon |
| 12 | Niger | 500 |
| 13 | Nigeria | 1,200 |
| 14 | Rwanda | Unknown |
| 15 | Senegal | 500 |
| 16 | Sierra Leone | 500 |
| 17 | South Africa | Unknown |
| 18 | Tanzania | Unknown |
| 19 | Togo | 733 |
| 20 | Uganda | unknown |
| 21 | Total | 7,464 |

Source: Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia (2013) *https://en.wikipedia.org/.*
*Table 3: AFISMA Troops Contributing Countries*

According to Maru (2013), through the report of Al Jazeera Center for Studies, to effectively prosecute the war against insurgency in Mali, the major financial contributions for AFISMA came from the following nations:

- United States (USD 96 million in addition to USD 8 million that was in already in use),
- Japan (USD 120 million including to humanitarian aid),
- EU (USD 75 million),
- France (USD 63 million including expenses of it military intervention),
- AU (USD 50 million),
- Germany (USD 20 million) and
- Bahrain (USD 10 million).
- African countries contributed only 23 percent of the total amount. Leading African contributors include:
- South Africa (USD 10 million),
- Ethiopia (USD 5 million),
- Nigeria (USD 5 million) and
- Ghana (USD 3 million).

The above data therefore show that beyond physical presence of international military forces in Mali, various countries contributed financially to ensure that the war against insurgency was realized.

Operation Serval (French: Opération Serval) was a French military operation in Mali. The aim of the operation was to oust Islamic militants in the north of Mali, who had begun a push into the center of Mali (Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia, 2012). The historic French military intervention has been perceived as the most significant in an attempt to rapidly and decisively end the armed conflict in northern Mali. In justifying the intervention, President Hollande stated that France had no alternative but to intervene and prevent the emergence of a terrorist state that would have serious security repercussions for France and the West (Francis, 2013). In the same vein, the French Defence Minister, Jean-Yves le Drian, stated: "The threat is that a terrorist state will be created near Europe and France ... we had to react before it was too late" (Daneshkhu, 2013). According to Francis, France deployed a powerful military force in Mali, including a well-equipped ground force of 4,000 soldiers and air power that easily pounded the separatist rebels and Islamist extremists into hasty retreat.

| S/No | Country | Contributions of Nations |
|------|---------|--------------------------|
| 1 | Belgium | The Belgian Army deployed two Air Component C-130H Hercules transport planes and two Medical Component Agusta A109 Medevac medical evacuation helicopters along with 80 support personnel to Mali. |
| 2 | Canada | A Royal Canadian Air Force C-17ER Globemaster III deployed to France to assist with the transport of troops and material from France to Mali. |
| 3 | Chad | The Chadian government deployed 2,000 troops: one infantry regiment with 1,200 soldiers and two support battalions with 800 soldiers. |
| 4 | Denmark | A Royal Danish Air Force C-130J-30 Super Hercules with 40 support personnel was deployed on 15 January to Mali. |
| 5 | Germany | Three German Air Force Transall C-160 were deployed to the Malian capital Bamako to help with the transport of equipment. German sent up to 330 German soldiers to provide engineer mentoring, logistical and medical service to the operation as well as one additional A310 MRTT |
| | | air-to-air refueling plane. |
| 6 | Netherlands | Initially, the Dutch government deployed a Royal Netherlands Air Force KDC-10 tanker/transport plane. For its first flight, the aircraft picked up its supplies in France and proceeded to N'Djamena in Chad, where the French military have a logistic support hub. After 14 January 2013, the D8utch began to fly directly into Bamako. Later, the Dutch contribution was increased by an additional KDC-10 tanker/transport plane, four C-130 Hercules transport planes, three CH-47 Chinook transport and Medevac helicopters and one DC-10 passenger plane. |
| 7 | Spain | A Spanish Air Force C-130 Hercules with 50 support personnel was deployed on 18 January to Mali to help with the transport of African-led International Support Mission to Mali personnel. Spain later added a C-295 plane to assist in troop movements in Mali. An additional 30 soldiers were sent on February 13 to protect allied instructors. |
| 8 | Sweden | The Swedish government allowed France the use of the Swedish share of the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability. Therefore, one Heavy Airlift Wing C-17 Globemaster III strategic transport plane was dispatched from the Pápa Air Base in Hungary to France to aid in the transport of materiel and troops to Mali. Also, six Swedish parachute rangers from Fallskärmsjägarna assisted instructors for Mali´s armed forces. |
| 9 | United Arab Emirates | The United Arab Emirates Air Force deployed two C-17 Globemaster III transport planes to aid in the transport of materiel and troops from France to Mali. |
| 10 | United Kingdom | The Royal Air Force deployed two C-17 Globemaster III strategic transport planes of No. 99 Squadron to the French Évreux Air Base on 13 January 2013. The planes transported French armored vehicles to the Malian capital Bamako in what the British are calling Operation Newcombe. On 25 January 2013, the UK Ministry of Defence announced the deployment of a Sentinel R1 surveillance aircraft to support French forces. |
| 11 | United States | The US Air Force established an air bridge between the Istres-Le Tubé Air Base in the South of France and Malian capital Bamako, using up to five C-17 Globemaster III transport planes to ferry French equipment and troops to Mali. Over the course of Operation Serval, up to 5 US KC-135 were deployed to conduct Air Refueling missions with French Mirage and Rafales including an impressive 100 sorties. |

*Source: Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia (2015) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Serval*
*Table 4: Allied Nations and their Contributions against Insurgency in Mali (in alphabetical order)*

The level military sophistication employed by France and her western allies is a pointer to the fact that they really meant business. In addition to France operation Serval led alliance to defeat the insurgents in Mali, the United Nations also formed security alliance of sovereign states. Accordingly, UN resolution reads thus: "The objective of any United Nations operation would be to help the Malian State regain its legitimacy and re-establish its authority across the entire territory in order to provide physical security to all its people and ensure that its territory does not provide a platform for the emergence of threats to itself, its neighbours and beyond" (UN Secretary General in Mill, 2013). There was a direct UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This was to ensure that the insurgents were defeated.

UN Security Council (2013), Resolution 18

authorizes French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities of MINUSMA until the end of MINUSMA's mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, further requests France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali and to coordinate its reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 34 below and decides to review this mandate within six months after its commencement UN Security Council, (2013).

To attain this objective, not less than 28 countries including both developed and developing nations contributed their military personnel in the said UN mission in Mali.

| Country | Military | Police | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bangladesh | 5 | 177 | 182 |
| Belgium | | 1 | 1 |
| Benin | 305 | 5 | 310 |
| Burkina Faso | 667 | 10 | 677 |
| Burundi | | 2 | 2 |
| Cameroon | | 2 | 2 |
| Chad | 1246 | 4 | 1250 |
| Chile | | 1 | 1 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 126 | 1 | 127 |
| Egypt | | 1 | 1 |
| France | 13 | 3 | 16 |
| Germany | | 1 | 1 |
| Ghana | 128 | | 128 |
| Guinea | 149 | 2 | 151 |
| Italy | | 1 | 1 |
| Jordan | | 1 | 1 |
| Liberia | 46 | | 46 |
| Mauritania | 5 | | 5 |
| Nepal | | 1 | 1 |
| Niger | 657 | 1 | 658 |
| Nigeria | 687 | 146 | 833 |
| Rwanda | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Senegal | 510 | 285 | 795 |
| Sierra Leone | 4 | | 4 |
| Sweden | 4 | | 4 |
| Togo | 939 | 153 | 1092 |
| United Kingdom | 1 | | 1 |
| United States | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Total | | | 6294 |

*Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/ statistics/contributors.shtml*

*Table 5: Country Contributions to MINUSMA*

At the end of the day it was widely reported that the insurgency was seriously pursued into hiding. The significant support international community gave to Mali in the face of violent advancement of insurgents is quite commendable, historic and monumental in all ramifications. In fact, if France had not decided to take it upon itself to rescue Mali from the onslaught of the terrorists, there would have been an unprecedented colossal and collateral damage in the country. The territorial integrity of the country would have been dragged through the mud and the centre might not have had the political and military capacity to withstand the insurgents who were determined to capture and introduce Islamic caliphate in the northern Mali. The de-escalation of insurgency in Mali can be strongly attributed to the timely intervention of foreign countries such as France-led alliance, ECOWAS-led AFISMA as well as UN MINUSMA.

## NIGERIA: INADEQUATE MILITARY ACTION PROLONGED LARGE SCALE TERRORIST ATTACKS

In the case of Nigeria, there was no such direct foreign military intervention, as Boko Haram continued to terrorize Nigeria and Nigerians to a point that serious-minded commentators, public analysts and security scholars began to lament on the extent to which Nigerian state had lost part of its territory to the Boko Haram insurgents. Nigeria's former President Goodluck Jonathan was widely criticized during his last year in office for his administration's response to the Boko Haram crisis, which some observers described as ineffective, insufficient, and marred by high-level corruption within the security sector (Blanchard, 2016). Absence of foreign assistance and lack of 'political will' by the President Goodluck Jonathan-led Federal government of Nigeria to decisively confront the terrorists is arguably believed to have combined independently to delay the defeat of Bako Haram sect, and consequently hindered resettlement of IDPs. In fact, the ineffective military action by the Nigerian military was strongly considered to have made the insurgents to seize parts of North-Eastern Nigeria for a long time, especially in 2014 which was the peak of their nefarious violent activities. Up until February, Boko Haram had pushed government forces out of vast swathes of territory in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states after a rapid advance beginning around July 2014. Borno was worst affected, with as much as 70 per cent of the state's territory outside of government control and Maiduguri almost surrounded (NSN Special Report, 2015).

In the midst of the crisis, the former President, Goodluck Jonathan while speaking at an audience with the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa and Central Africa, urged the United Nations to focus more on helping Nigeria with the rehabilitation and reconstruction of persons and communities affected by terrorism in Northern Nigeria rather than deploying an international force to the country (Premium Times, 2015). Egbulefu (2015) observed that the US was among the countries, whose officials openly and severally flayed the Jonathan government over its perception of a lack of will to deal decisively with the Boko Haram insurgency. According to Egbulefu, when US government deployed it military to help Nigeria in the search of the Chibok girls abducted by the Boko Haram, the US

government spelt it out that its military assistance was to be strictly on intelligence gathering and not for logistics or combat. However, in less than two weeks, US withdrew its men in very hazy circumstances claiming lack of confidence on the Nigerian military. In a similar vein, French President François Hollande, ruled out any direct French military engagement as well as any over flights of Nigerian territory (Barluet, 2015). According to Lagneau (2015), France has taken more and more of an indirect role in the conflict in Nigeria, deploying troops to Diffa in Niger to support Nigerien forces, as well as a second detachment to Cameroon. It should be mentioned that the willingness of Chad fight Boko Haram as a result of security threat it posed, Chadian government led regional coalition to fight against group.

It was quite regrettable that the international community never taken the crisis in Nigeria as issue of global importance considering the reluctant attention great powers showcased. It is observed by many that the relationships of Nigeria had with other great powers in the international got frosted as a result of perceived lack of political will to tackle Boko Haram in the country. This ugly situation persisted unabated until the President Muhammadu Buhari administration that came to power in 2015, demonstrated conspicuous 'political will' to confront the sect squarely.

Muhammadu Buhari, who defeated Jonathan in the country's April 2015 elections, centered on pledges to improve the security situation and to tackle corruption in the country. Among his earliest acts in office was to replace the heads of the army, navy, and air force. For example, they moved the army's operational headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri and have deployed more long-range patrols in the region. By many accounts, Nigeria's new head of state, Muhammadu Buhari, has taken a more proactive approach than his predecessor toward countering the group, including by directing new military leadership to conduct more strategically-focused operations and undertaking measures to address security sector corruption (Blanchard, 2016).

Nonetheless, Nigerian government has today made some significant giant strides to restore the integrity of Nigeria. With the help of Chad, Niger and Cameroon as well as technical training of Nigerian forces by the US, it has been reported that Nigeria military in collaboration with Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin has significantly succeeded in displacing Boko Haram from their strongholds in north east. This development therefore gives a strong signal that the rehabilitation and resettlement of IDPs in the north east would be possible in the nearest future, as there is hope in the horizon. Buhari revived regional cooperation that had seemed dead at mid-2015 by paying special attention to neighbours (International Crisis Group, 2016). According to the group, the MNJTF settled into an expanded N'Djamena headquarters, led by a Nigerian general officially in command of all Lake Chad basin operations. In reality, there has been no force integration: the MNJTF is about coordination, and national contingents re-hatted as MNJTF operate primarily in their own country and report to their own capital (International Crisis Group, 2016).

## V. THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE (MNJTF) AND MILITARY ACTION IN NIGERIA

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) between Nigeria, Chad and Niger was set up in 1998 in order to combat transnational crime in the Lake Chad region, but was mostly dormant until 2012, when it was reactivated in order to deal with Boko Haram (European Parliament, 2015). According to the parliament, in order to cope with the spread of terrorism in the region, the Paris Summit of May 2014, which brought together the heads of state of Benin, Chad, Cameroon, France, Niger and Nigeria, and representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and European Union, decided to enhance regional cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram, by means of coordinated patrols and border surveillance, pooling intelligence and exchanging relevant information.

Starting in late January 2015, a coalition of military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began a counter-insurgency campaign against Boko Haram (Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia, 2015). In March 2015, Boko Haram lost control of the Northern Nigerian towns of Bama (Ewokor, 2015) and Gwoza believed to be their headquarters to the Nigerian army (BBC News Africa, 2015). According to BBC Africa, the Nigerian authorities said that they had taken back 11 of the 14 districts previously controlled by Boko Haram. In April, 2015, four Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest were overrun by the Nigerian military who freed nearly 300 females (BBC, Africa, 2015). Accordingly, Boko Haram forces were believed to have retreated to the Mandara Mountains, along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. According to the Office Head, Conflict Prevention and *Risk Analysis Division, ISS Dakar, Théroux-Bénoni (2015),* Nigeria agreed with Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Benin to send a 8,700-strong regional "Multinational Joint Task Force" (MNJTF) to fight Boko Haram which has killed thousands in northeastern Nigeria and is increasingly threatening neighboring countries.

According to the report, Nigerian authorities have previously opposed any foreign troops to help combat Boko Haram on Nigerian territory. However, Chadian troops entered Nigeria from Cameroon and engaged in intense fighting with the militant group in the town of Gamburu. This was possible, within the framework of a bilateral military agreement between Nigeria and Chad, not based on a multinational force operation *(Théroux-Bénoni, 2015).* In relation to the above, as for the AU-authorised MNJTF, it will not be deployed in Nigeria, but along Nigeria's outside borders within neighbouring countries, with the aim of containing the terrorist group's regional expansion.

According to Nigeria Weekly Security Report (2015), Nigerian military and multi-regional security forces continued their offensives against Boko Haram in the north-east, recording a number of significant successes, including the recovery of villages in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprised of troops from neighboring countries, is also enjoying a wave of successes against the insurgents and is increasingly gaining the support of the public and the media (Nigeria Weekly Security Report, 2015). It is identified that the military and civilian task force (CTF) are on top of the situation to ensure that the sect is defeated.

## VI. MALIAN GOVERNMENT WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF UNHCR ENGAGED IN RESETTLEMENT AND REINTEGRATION OF IDP RETURNEES

26,761 households (137,096 internally displaced persons) registered and assessed by IOM in all regions in Mali. 79,843 IDPs in the south and 57,253 IDPs in the north. IDPs' movement toward the northern regions continue, even if they slow down since the beginning of the year. A survey conducted on IDPs in the south and in the north, revealed that 75% of displaced households want to go back to their place of origin, while 21% would like to stay in the place of displacement. 283, 935 returnees (to their places of origin) identified in Gao, Tombouctou, Kidal and Mopti. A survey conducted on IDPs' primary needs, shows that 45% of the IDP households expressed needs in terms of food, 18% in the form of shelter, 13% in terms of employment and 7% for transportation support. A need evaluation conducted in villages in the northern regions revealed needs in terms of foods (71% of assessed villages) and in terms of WASH (14% of assessed villages) (IOM, 2015).

Down from a peak of 350,000 in June 2013, there are currently nearly 200,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) who fled the violence in the north during Mali's 2012-2013 crisis and are still sheltering far from their homes (IDMC Report, 2014). According to the report, tens of thousands have attempted to go back to rebuild but, in many cases, this has been premature and they have been forced to uproot their families once more. In addition to the above observation, while attention understandably turns to the country's north, where the conflict hit hardest, nearly half of the country's IDPs have been left behind in Mali's southern cities. It is observed that the focus on the IDPs in the northern Mali at the expense of the south tends to undermine the right of IDPs resettle to their original homes after displacement. The Malian authorities response to the needs of southern IDPs has been assumed to be inconsistent and insufficient since the beginning of the crisis. This has regrettably forced many displaced Malians to fend for themselves and therefore, exerting enormous pressures on the resources of the communities that absolved them during the crisis period.

*Nevertheless, the perceptions* of improved security in the north Mali resulted in the return of an estimated 361,836 persons to the regions of Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, and Mopti as of August 31, 2014 (US Department of State, 2015). IDPs generally lived with relatives, friends, or in rented accommodations. Most IDPs resided in urban areas and had access to food, water, and other forms of assistance. However, the presumed lopsided arrangement in the management and resettlement of IDPs in Mali calls for attention. Due to relative peace and the presence of foreign military forces in the northern Mali, good number of IDPs is willing to return while many have returned to their original places inhabitation. Today, it is a commonplace fact that there is obvious decrease in the number of IDPs in Mali. There are evidences substantiating this position as shown in the table below.

| Regions | Households | Individuals |
|---|---|---|
| Bamako | 1,734 | 8,501 |
| Kayes | 60 | 153 |
| Koulikoro | 925 | 4,320 |
| Mopti | 998 | 3,747 |
| Segou | 366 | 1,350 |
| Sikasso | 79 | 115 |
| Gao | 4,076 | 11,995 |
| Kidal | 1,345 | 5,213 |
| Timbuktu | 4,571 | 26,526 |
| Total | 1,4154 | 61,920 |

*Source: IOM (2015) September Report*

*Table 6: Number of IDP Individuals and Households in Mali*

### IOM/USAID DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX (DTM) ROUND VIII REPORT OF MALI (2015 DISPLACEMENT HIGHLIGHTS)

✓ 61.621 internally displaced people (12.633 households) recorded and identified by the DTM program in all regions of Mali
✓ 32.038 IDPs in southern and 29.583 IDPs in the northern regions.
✓ IDPs' movements toward the northern regions continue, and a slight upward trend is observed since the beginning of November.
✓ A survey conducted on IDPs in the north and south reveals that 56% of surveyed households want to return to their places of origin, while 43% would like to settle in their place of displacement.
✓ A survey conducted on IDPs' primary needs; show that 51% of households have food needs, 12% of the shelter needs and 6% of needs in terms of non-food article.
✓ 394.655 returnees identified in Gao, Timbuktu, Mopti and Kidal.

According to IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), (2016) internally displaced persons (IDPs) uprooted by the 2012 conflict are continuing to return to northern Mali and the IDP numbers in the rest of the country are decreasing. The number of IDPs nationwide is now 49,883; 19 per cent less than the number reported in November 2015 (61,621), while the total number of returnees has continued to increase since November 2015 from 439,690 to 453,059 (IOM, 2016). Based on IOM report, in the north, the largest number of IDPs is reported in Timbuktu (25,068) followed by Gao (11,731) and Kidal (609). In the south, Bamako continues to host the largest number of IDPs (5,824). After Bamako, the southern region hosting a large number of IDPs is Koulikoro (2,962). It has been assumed that this perceived positive trend is attributed to the improvement of the security situation in some of the areas in the northern regions that were directly controlled by the insurgents. One is therefore arguably believes that the observed positive situation is credited to direct intervention of foreign military forces as well as the signing of the peace agreement between the Federal government of Mali and the anti-government rebel in June 2015.

## VII. THE REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT OF IDPS NOT YET ACHIEVED IN NIGERIA

Despite efforts of the United Nations, its organs and other non-governmental organisations collaborating with the

government of Nigeria to ameliorate the conditions of IDPs and rehabilitate the victims, there are daunting challenges confronting victims of terrorist attacks in Nigeria (Rotimi, 2015). Figures released by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), an offshoot of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), an independent, non-governmental humanitarian organization as of April 2015, ''estimated that about 1,538,982 people that fled their homes in Nigeria were still living in internal displacement camps scattered across Nigeria (Okereke, 2015).

The rehabilitation process in IDP camps members has been very slow. There seems to be a deliberate attempt from the government to ignore these displaced persons; this is evident in several failed, unfulfilled promises made by government and the politicising of the situation of IDPs. Today, the IDP camps are emerging grounds for politicians to score cheap political popularity by visiting to donate scanty items while leaving out long term solutions (Rotimi, 2015).

| Years | Number of IDPs | New Displacement | Causes of Displacement | Returnees |
|-------|---------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------|
| 2011 | 1,200,000 | 65,000 | Armed conflict (Boko Haram) | 30, 000 |
| 2012 | 1,275,000 | 63,000 | Armed conflict (Boko Haram) | Nil |
| 2013 | 1,300,000 | 470,500 | Armed conflict (Boko Haram) | Nil |
| 2014 | 1,075,300 | 975,300 | Armed conflict (Boko Haram) | Nil |
| 2015 | 1,188,018 | 149,357 | Armed conflict (Boko Haram) | Nil |

*Source: IDMC's Global Overview (2011-2015)*
*Table 7: The Increasing Number of IDPs in Nigeria, Causes of Displacement and Possible Returnees*

Based on the above table, the major cause of displacement in Nigeria is violent attacks by Boko Haram insurgents. This situation continued to escalate the number of displacement recorded in the years shown in the table. The report recorded that only 30, 000 persons returned in 2011. This insignificant development could be as result of non-escalation of Boko Haram insurgency in the year mentioned above. After 2011, no returnees were recorded due to the rates in which the sect was notoriously popular in unleashing terror on the lives of Nigerians without effective military resistance or counter attacks. The import of this is perhaps the unpreparedness or lack of strong will to effectively take unwavering military action against the insurgents.

In February 2016, 2,241,484 IDPs identified in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe, Nasarawa states and Abuja through the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) (UNHCR Report, 2016).

## VIII. LOCATION OF DISPLACEMENT

The total number of IDPs identified in Abuja, Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Nasarawa, Plateau, Taraba ,Yobe and Zamfara as of 29 February 2016 is 2,241,484 IDPs (334,608 households). In total 1,920,471 IDPs have been displaced by the insurgency mainly in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.

| IDP locations | IDP Individuals | IDP Households | Average HHs size |
|---------------|-----------------|----------------|------------------|
| Abuja | 15,154 | 2,510 | 6 |
| Adamawa | 132,626 | 19,636 | 6,7 |
| Bauchi | 65,365 | 10,442 | 6,3 |
| Benue | 85,850 | 11,150 | 7,7 |
| Borno | 1,525,404 | 210,293 | 7,2 |
| Gombe | 26,233 | 4,752 | 5,5 |
| Kaduna | 40,688 | 5,687 | 7,1 |
| Kano | 11,853 | 2,315 | 5,1 |
| Nasarawa | 37,953 | 6,701 | 5,7 |
| Plateau | 68,365 | 12,226 | 5,6 |
| Taraba | 45,587 | 8,310 | 5,5 |
| Yobe | 139,550 | 31,908 | 4,4 |
| Zamfara | 46,856 | 8,678 | 5,4 |
| Grand total | 2,241, 484 | 334,608 | 6,7 |

*Source: IOM (2016) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round V1II Report-February, 2016*
*Table 8: Number of IDP Individuals and Households in Nigeria*

IOM DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX (DTM) ROUND VIII REPORT IN NIGERIA (2016 DISPLACEMENT HIGHLIGHTS)

- ✓ 2,241,484 individuals (334,608 households) were identified in Adamawa, Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe, Na- sarawa, Plateau, Kaduna, Kano, Zamfara, states and Abuja.
- ✓ In total, 1,920,471 IDPs captured through the DTM assessments have been displaced by the insurgency (85.70% of the total IDP population).
- ✓ Majority of the IDPs are identified in Borno (1,525,404) followed by Yobe (139,550) and Adamawa (132,626).
- ✓ 54.53% of the IDP population are children and 26.01% are five(5) years old or younger.
- ✓ 92% of IDPs live in host communities while 8% live in camps.
- ✓ 84 Camps and camp-like sites have been identified through the DTM assessments.
- ✓ IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round VIII Report in Nigeria (2015 Displacement Highlights)
- ✓ 1,188,018 IDPs (149,357 households) were identified in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states. (DTM)
- ✓ Another 47,276 IDPs (5910 households) were identified in Plateau, Nasarawa, Abuja, Kano and Kaduna states. (NEMA)
- ✓ Total 1,235,294 IDPs identified in northern Nigeria.

- ✓ The highest number of IDPs are in Borno (672,714 IDPs), followed by Adamawa (220,159 IDPs) and Yobe (135,810 IDPs).
- ✓ Number of IDPs by LGA (States of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe) .
- ✓ The IDP population is com- posed of 53 % women and 47% men.
- ✓ 56% of the total IDP population are children of which more than half are up to 5 years old, while 42% are adults.
- ✓ 92% of IDPs were displaced by the insurgency.
- ✓ The majority of the current IDP population was displaced in 2014 (79%).
- ✓ The IDPs come mainly from Borno (62%), Adamawa (18%) and Yobe (13%).
- ✓ 87% of IDPs live with host families while 13% live in camps.

Considering the comparison between 2015 and 2016 IOM report, it is evidently convincing that as of 2015 people were still displaced as a result of insurgency. The increase recorded in 2016 is a pointer to the fact that rehabilitation and resettlement has not taken place in Nigeria, as number of IDPs has increased significantly.

Though the return of IDPs in Nigeria has not commenced in earnest, it is believed that the federal government of Nigeria has planned to embark on a holistic and well coordinated approach to ensure that IDPs are rehabilitated and resettled back to their liberated communities, though it is assumed by many that Boko Haram has not been totally defeated as the 'Evil Sambisa Forest' continues to be the hide out the sect. Also, transnational operation of the group is a source of worry to many people. However, government has appeared resolute in defeating the sect.

In continuation of efforts to provide relief to residents of liberated communities in the North East, officials of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), North-East have delivered sizeable quantities of food and non-food items to GSS Benishek IDP camp in Kaga LGA. Humanitarian organisations have also stepped up their supplies to existing IDPcamps in the region ahead of plans to relocate IDPs to liberated communities. Consequently, the Federal Government Inter-Ministerial Committee (FG-IMC) on resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the North-East has set conditions for return of displaced persons to their liberated communities. The resettlement of IDPs will only be effected after assessments on the level of stability and socio-economic activities in the affected areas have been conducted (NSRP, 2016).

The strain of caring for the displaced is already taxing the state and community's resources, prompting calls for the reconstruction of destroyed communities and the resettlement of the displaced as soon as possible (*Matfess*, 2015). Though, the rehabilitation and resettlement process has not started in earnest, the Nigerian government and other humanitarian groups have acknowledged the fact that caring and providing for the IDPs is a herculean task. Presidential spokesman, Femi Adesina, quoted President Buhari as saying on April 21, 2016 while receiving the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Samantha Power: the federal government is compiling a comprehensive data on all Internally Displaced Persons and Nigerian refugees with a

view to speeding up their resettlement (Wakili, 2016). According to the report, Buhari told his visitor that the compilation of reliable data on the IDPs and refugees was being handled by designated federal government agencies, the military and other security agencies. According to Adesina "Now we are working on getting a comprehensive data of all the people in the camps so that the government and NGOs will be properly briefed on where and how to support them,'' Buhari said. The president said IDPs, who were into farming before they were displaced by the Boko Haram, would be mobilised and assisted by the Ministry of Agriculture to return to their farms. Nigerian Senate on Tuesday, 2016 directed its Committee on Appropriation to allocate the sum of N10 billion under the Service Wide Vote (SWV) for relocation and resettlement of the IDPs returnees, after expressing worry at the welfare of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. In an effort to see that the rehabilitation and resettlement of IDPs is actualized the Federal Government led by President Muhammadu Buhari disclosed that a committee to rehabilitate infrastructure and resettle Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs, in the North-East geo-political zone will soon be inaugurated *Dangote (Nda-Isaiah, 2016).* The committee, to be led by a frontline statesman, Lt. Gen Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (rtd) will also include Africa's richest man, Aliko.

There are indications that the plan to embark on resettlement of IDPs is achievable considering the recent victories recorded by the Nigerian Army. Based on this, they have changed the face of humanitarian efforts which may result to rehabilitation and resettlement of the IDPs.

## MALI: SECURITY AND SAFETY OF IDPS

It is observed that Malian IDPs mainly live with their host communities who provide shelter for them. This therefore suggests that concentration of IDPs in one place like camps is not practiced in Mali, unlike what is majorly obtainable in Nigeria. Based on this, even though Malian security forces are ill-equipped and lack the capacity to confront the insurgents, IDPs are not mainly targeted by the terrorist group in Mali. Considering this scenario, it is difficult to really determine the extent to which Malian government has provided security for IDPs. However, there are reports that Malian IDPs especially the female IDPs are victims of Gender-Based Violence (GBV), and girls are untimely given out for marriage as a result poverty and hunger.

## NIGERIA: PROTECTION AND SAFETY OF IDPS

It is a commonplace that the vulnerability of IDPs in Nigeria has manifested itself in various dimensions, thereby leading to physical sufferings of the displaced persons. The often insecure nature of camps provided makes IDPs especially vulnerable to subsequent attacks (Kolawole, 2013). Thus IDPs who have been displaced by communal clashes would live with fear and may often go into hiding for fear of being attacked again. Regrettably, IDPs in Nigeria have often faced double jeopardy as the memories of violent conflicts or insurgent attacks that led to their displacement have not been overcome. While their displaced condition they are also faced

with the challenge of being 'free from fear and want.' This therefore poses a great human security danger to the IDPs.

In September 2015, the deadly terrorist group, Boko Haram, in a suicide mission, attacked members of IDPs Camps in Madagali and Yola, killing 12 persons. In one of the attacks, bombs were reported to have been detonated inside a tent at the IDP camp. This among others is security threats faced by members of IDP camps in Nigeria. Yet to recover from psychological trauma from the loss of families, friends and properties, displaced persons are faced with security challenges coupled with a responsibility to protect themselves in their various camps. The inadequacy of security at the IDP camps opens them to attacks from terrorists and armed robbers (Rotimi, 2015).

According to NEMA (2015), a suicide bomber killed at least seven people in a transit camp in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital. According to the sources, the explosive was reportedly detonated by a female suicide bomber evacuated to the capital city alongside other displaced persons from Dikwa local council. In the same vein, suicide explosions by suspected Boko Haram terrorists in displaced persons' camps in North-eastern Nigeria have caused the deaths of hundreds of people (Premium Times, 2016). According to the report, in one of such explosions on February 9, at the internally displaced persons' camp in Dikwa, Borno State, 58 people were killed and 78 injured according to official figures. Regrettably, Nigeria's failure to cater for her own citizens in IDP camps puts to question the commitment of the government to take responsibility for the security and welfare of the people (Rotimi, 2015). In Nigeria, provision of IDP camps is a common practice, as this appears to be the most important measure the government can take to regulate and provide succor to the IDPs. For instance, 8% of IDPs live in the IDP camps (IOM, 2016). Regrettably, IDPs and affected communities have witnessed horrendous human atrocities (Protection Sector Working Group (PSWG), 2015). As a result, psychological trauma the IDPs and their host communities is apparently abysmal. According to PSWG, a major concern is the conduct of security forces, against which allegations of human rights violations have been made. In this scenario the protector has become the predator. It is unfortunate that despite the Government's proclamation to investigate and bring perpetrators to justice, numerous violations continue to be reported (Protection Sector Working Group (PSWG), 2015). In the past few months there has been an intensification of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon, including directly in IDP camps (UNHCR, 2016). In addition to physical violence that takes place in the IDP camps, it has been widely reported that IDP women and girls also face Gender-Based Violence (GBV) whether in camps or in host communities, particularly at night. It is claimed that measures have been taken to reinforce security in and around IDP Camps. According to UNHCR report, the UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Volker Turk, visited Nigeria from 18-22 February 2016, focusing on the insurgency-ravaged northeast. During his meetings with federal and state authorities, Mr. Türk stressed the necessity for Nigeria to further address the protection needs of IDPs particularly with respect to the voluntary character of returns and relocations. In the same

vein, he also expressed the availability of UNHCR to work with the States in the facilitation of tripartite framework for the return and reintegration processes.

Dietrich (2015) reaffirmed that "given IDPs' increased vulnerability including the September 11, 2015 attack on an IDP camp in Adamawa state, IDPs have called on the government to increase security measures in order to ensure their protection and humanitarian personnel in camps. While most of the individuals are fleeing violence, many reported that they are also fleeing a humanitarian crisis defined by food insecurity, loss of livelihoods, insufficient services, and inadequate protection. Considering the level of insecurity in IDP camps, it has been observed that many IDPs had a heightened sense of personal security, and described their self-protection strategies in the camps like this: "We protect ourselves by creating well-fortified and secured camps to safeguard lives and property, conducting aggressive intelligence gathering on activities of insurgents, educating ourselves about humanitarian activities like free medical treatment, and, condemning erring personnel of rape and sexual offences accordingly (Dietrich, 2015)."

## IX. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the study, it is evident that the direct involvement of foreign military forces in Mali provided a sound opportunity for Malian government to regain the northern Mali that was allegedly seized by the insurgents. This situation provided a good opportunity for a good number of IDPs to return back to their places. On the other hand, IDPs in Nigeria are yet to be rehabilitated and resettled. The war against Boko Haram is not yet over. Boko Haram is known to have indiscriminately planted mines around some villages to create fear of return (Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust, 2015). This therefore shows that Mali is more progressive in terms of resettlement of IDPs than Nigeria, though not without recorded challenges. Consequent upon the fact that IDPs in Mali do not really settle in camps but with their relatives and friends, they are not directly vulnerable to attacks by the insurgents or criminals. In the case of Nigeria, as reported, 8% of IDPs lives in camps thereby making it possible for the insurgents to carry out direct physical attacks. Generally, the two countries have similar experience and are faced with humanitarian crisis. It is imperative to note at this point that management of IDPs has not been an easy task especially Nigeria that takes dominant position in IDPs management. Unlike Malian government that plays nominal roles in provision of basic needs of the IDPs.

Despite some of the observations made in the management of IDPs in Mali, the urgent and unwavering efforts to properly manage IDPs both in Nigeria and Mali cannot be overemphasized as the two countries are under the attack of insurgency and also faced humanitarian challenges. The inability to adequately manage IDPs is tantamount to human rights abuse as well as human security challenges. This therefore presupposes that absence of proper management of IDPs would make them prone to social vices, violent conflicts and other several complexities that are antithetical to cordial relationships and sustainable human and national

development. Nevertheless, the management of IDPs should not be left in the hands of any one group. At this point, it is timely desirable that the collaboration of government agencies, NGOs, foreign humanitarian organizations etc should be ensued with the vigour it deserves.

## X. RECOMMENDATIONS

Having observed certain challenges as well as the root cause of insurgency in many countries, particularly Mali and Nigeria, the study provides the following as practicable recommendations.

### MALI

✓ In Mali the suggested solution to the lingering insurgency problem lies in recognizing the fact that the Tuaregs have legitimate political, socio-economic, security, environmental, humanitarian and human rights grievances that should be addressed by the government. Without this, no matter how government attempts to suppress or pacify the ethnic group, there shall be rebellious confrontations against the state in the future.

✓ To achieve this, there is the need to consider devolution political powers in Mali instead of the south colonizing power at the expense of the north. This therefore suggests that the political leadership of Mali should provide a solid framework upon which a favourable federal system could be ensued in order attain sustainable political equation in the country's democratic space.

✓ Though international humanitarian organizations are fully involved in addressing human development crisis in the Mali, particularly in management of IDPs, Malian government should understand that the primary responsibility of the state is to protect lives and property as well as ensuring that law and order are maintained. This therefore means that the government must fully be involved in the management of IDPs instead of playing nominal role.

### NIGERIA

✓ In Nigeria, there is an urgent need to embark on a holistic and coordinated approach with the help of foreign nations to effectively engage in technical and military actions in order to completely displace Boko Haram insurgents from the 'evil' sambisa forest which is believed to be the deadly haven and enclave of the terrorists.

✓ Government should also be more proactive in the reconstruction of destroyed houses of IDPs in their various communities so that they would have confidence to return home.

✓ There should be proper coordination of humanitarian items provided for IDPs so that the scenario in which food and non-food items made for IDPs are diverted to places they are not meant for would discouraged.

✓ Among other things, the forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and Nigeria need to work collectively to stamp out extremist jihadist group instead of states operating on their own accord.

## GENERAL SUGGESTIONS

✓ Both governments of Mali and Nigeria should consider the occurrence and protection of IDPs as being unavoidable. Therefore, each of them should be proactive rather than being retroactive. To demonstrate this, pre-crisis safe areas should be designated for IDPs specifically. This is to ensure that government would be able to respond swiftly in case of any displacement of people. This does not suggest that immovable structures should be erected in these set out areas, but when displacement occurs tents could be erected in order to temporarily accommodate the displaced persons.

✓ The national and state budgetary allocation for displacement in Mali and Nigeria should be given a separate attention from allocation for disaster and/or emergency. This is possible since not all disaster and/or emergency result in displacement. If the separation is made, there is every possibility that more financial allocation would be made available for effective IDPs management in Mali and Nigeria respectively.

✓ Governments of Mali and Nigeria should work hand in hand with humanitarian organizations, stakeholders, NGOs etc to sensitize and re-orient IDPs host communities on the need to be accommodating and hospitable. This is necessary to ensure the safety of IDPs in the host communities as well as discourage situation where people of the communities unduly interfere in the affairs of IDPs. If this is done, the host communities are most likely to be more cooperative with both the IDPs and their managers alike.

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