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On Protection Interventions And Regime Disintegrations

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Abstract: ***Previously, political analysts accentuated internal electoral manipulation, ethnic domination and brutal repression as major determinants of political longevity. Even the most influential publications on political survival highlighted domestic explanatory variables via the selectorate framework. However, with the rise of protection politics, Africa and other highly autocratic regions have become more vulnerable to Western military interventions. How armed interventions impact political stay is considered herein. Selectorate theory is rebuilt to accommodate the effect of intervention on regime – opposition rivalry. According to the reconstructed model, regime survival depends not only on a) national winning coalition size, but also on b) international non-intervention, and c) regime / opposition alliance choice of interveners in cases of intervention. The model is empirically applied to explain the downfall of Gbagbo and Gaddaffi and the survival of Biya and Bouteflika.***

Keywords: ***political survival, new politics of protection, international intervention, Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Cameroon, Algeria***

African democratization since the late 1980s and early 1990s is undermined by incidents of electoral fraud, ethnic voting, ethnic exclusion and repressive violence, often perpetuated by seat-tight incumbents. With the exception of the likes of Soglo in Benin (1991), Monteiro in Cape Verde (1991), Chiluba in Zambia (1991) and Mandela in South Africa (1994), opposition leaders suffered crushing defeats in founding elections. Even after two decades of democratization, apart from the lone case of Kenya mentioned by Lynch and Crawford (2011, p. 279), only in three other countries (Côte d'Ivoire 2010, Senegal 2012 and Somalia 2012) have incumbent leaders endured electoral ejections. Across Africa, political rivalry has for long been dominated by military-backed incumbents and their ruling parties.

However, with the emergence of what Bellamy and Williams (2011) conceptualize as the 'new politics of protection' (NPP), African democratization seems to be mustering new impetus, with power contention tides tilting in favour of opposition figures and parties. In the past, there was general dissonance within the international community on its responsibility to act to protect endangered civilians within sovereign states. In practice, this translated to irresolute UN-sanctioned international interventions. Nowhere did foreign forces intervene without the solicitation or consent of governing authorities within the targeted state, except, as in Somalia, where a national government was absent. In the NPP era, there is international consensus on the responsibility to protect (RtoP) and the international community is resolute about civilian protection (Bellamy, 2011; Bellamy and Williams, 2011; Weiss, 2011).

The questions of interest that arise here concern the implications of NPP for political contestation and leadership longevity in Africa in the twenty-first century: What effect does an NPP intervention have on (violent) political competition between ruling and opposition parties? How does it affect the political survival of aggressive age-old African incumbents? This paper theorizes and explores the impact of Western-led international interventions (and counterfactual non-interventions) on regime – opposition rivalry and incumbent survival in Africa. It postulates that NPP interventions increase the confrontational capacities of opposition groups whilst weakening regime military capabilities when intervention simulates a coalition with the former. In counterfactual cases of non-intervention, the status-quo is conserved, with the regime more than likely to outmuscle the opposition and retain power.

The correlation between intervention and regime collapse is deduced from Realist relative power analysis and

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comparative case study applications. Two exclusive cases of NPP intervention (French/UN action in Côte d'Ivoire 2010/2011 and NATO intervention in Libya 2011) are used to trace-out the negative effect of intervention on survival. These are then contrasted with two parallel (sub-Saharan and North African) cases of non-intervention and regime endurance (Cameroon 2011 and Algeria 2011). Algeria, like Libya, underwent popular protests and government repression, but unlike Gaddaffi in Libya, Bouteflika survived at the helm in Algeria. In sub-Saharan Africa, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire experienced tensely contested elections but unlike Côte d'Ivoire's Gbagbo, Biya successfully retained power in Cameroon.

Comparative analyses would facilitate a comprehension of transformations in survival dynamics. Hitherto, survival scholarship accentuated domestic variables, including, inter alia, resource wealth (Yates, 1996; Ross, 2001, 2004; Jenson and Wantchekon, 2004), winning coalition loyalties (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, 2002, 2003), electoral manipulation (Schedler, 2002; Case, 2006; Howard and Roessler, 2006), ethnic domination (Miquel, 2007), and regime violence (Heger and Salehyan, 2007) to explain regime permanence/regime change. The 'external' was largely ignored and when invoked, as in diversionary theories of political survival, it was mostly treated with bias – as a source of permanence. The 'domestic' remains cardinal for understanding survival mechanics, but its dominance is threatened as NPP crystallizes. In process-tracing how NPP interventions affect political stay, this study significantly lays a foundation for developing more complete theories of political survival integrating external NPP effects.

It proceeds in two parts: First, selectorate theory – possibly the most authoritative theory on political survival – is reviewed and reconstructed to incorporate the realist impact of Western NPP interventions / non-interventions on political longevity. Next, comparative case studies of NPP intervention (Côte d'Ivoire and Libya) and non-intervention (Cameroon and Algeria) are undertaken to illustrate empirically the theorized impact of protection-driven interventions.

RECONSTRUCTING SELECTORATE THEORY: INTEGRATING NPP EFFECTS ON POLITICAL SURVIVAL

Selectorate theory is a succinct encapsulation of Bueno de Mesquita et al's 'logic of political survival' (2003), which they originally outlined in two articles (1999; 2002). It assumes each state leader (L) aspires to retain power perpetually once attained (2003, p. 9). But to effectively do so, he must patronistically allocate a large portion of state resources to his political support base, the winning coalition (W), which could be an armed group, ethnic group, region or more typically a political party to which L is affiliated. From W, members of the ruling cabinet (R) are appointed based on regime loyalty and leadership competence. To safeguard the regime alongside its private benefits, R-appointees are willing to employ repressive force against L's challengers or opposition (O). Heger and Salehyan (2007) project regime violence as a 'strategic choice' made by governing elites to preserve patronage and power.

Small-W coalitions allow for the provision of a bigger pool of private goods, bolstering loyalty to L, and by extension, enhancing regime stay. Conversely, large coalitions constrain patronage thereby mitigating loyalty to and longevity of L. Mathematically put: Small-W = private goods > public goods (longer tenure); Large-W = private goods < public goods (shorter tenure). These equations sanction leaders' policy choices and explain why small coalition-backed autocratic regimes producing corruption, conflict and poverty last longer than broad coalition democratic regimes producing transparency, peace and prosperity.

To effectively provide (private goods) for political survival, L must possess the relevant financial resources. Financial crisis breeds political doom; likewise, resource richness equates regime resilience (2003, p. 26). This fiscal – political connection in selectorate theory is corroborated in rentier theories in terms of the repression and anti-reformation effects of foreign rents (Ross, 2001). Apart from this overlap with rentier theories, selectorate theory exhibits robustness by incorporating wisdom from diversionary theories wherein violent conflicts are projected as 'private goods' purposely supplied to enhance political stay (de Mesquita et al. 2003; 2004). Though applauded 'impressive' (Star, 2005, p. 607), 'robustly supported' (de Mesquita et al. 2008, p. 393) and invoked to explain various phenomena like democratic triumphalism (de Mesquita et al. 2004), corruption (Chang and Golden, 2010), foreign debts (Oatley 2010), revolutions and coups (de Mesquita and Smith, 2010), as well as to explain variations in the effects of foreign aid on policy concessions (de Mesquita and Smith, 2007), and economic sanctions on enforcement outcomes (Lektzian and Souva, 2007), selectorate theory is not without weaknesses.

Clarke and Stone (2008) and Kenedy (2009) identify and redress major methodological problems, especially with regards to de Mesquita et al's measurements of coalition size. More basically, the theory presumes W's loyalty to L is based on private benefits from the latter. From a non-behaviourist stand point, this presumption problematically precludes any moral, religious and ethnocentric influences on decisions to either defect or stay doglike. A similar critique holds on assumptions about L's quest for permanent possession of state power. World Politics has witnessed willful presidential resignations driven not by bankruptcy or a deficit in power retention ambitions but by altruistic and moralistic motivations. Sir Jugnauth's resignation in Mauritius (March 2012) is a recent example. However, in testament to de Mesquita et al.'s supposition, incumbent resignations are relatively rare occurrences.

A more prominent challenge comes with the emergence of NPP. Plausibly, de Mesquita and his co-researchers recognize the relevance of resource wealth to regime survival and along this line acknowledge the positive impact (on survival) of foreign monetary aid where the selectorate is small and impoverished. Strikingly, they fail to explore extensively the possible effects of foreign military intervention on political survival despite 'formal consensus' on RtoP and increased UN focus on protection at the turn of the century (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 826). It becomes even more difficult to ignore selectorate theory's anemic anticipatory power vis-à-vis the 'external' when one recalls the plethora of instances where even egocentric (non-altruistic) interventions resulted in

regime collapse: Anglo-American covert action in Iran yielding Mosaddegh's ouster (1953); CIA involvement in the deposition of Guatemala's Arbenz (1995); and CIA/Belgian military support to overthrow Kasa-Vubu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1965), just to mention a few.

Since de Mesquita et al.'s publications (1999, 2002, 2003), apparently no study has reworked the selectorate framework to explore the impact of external military intervention on political competition/military confrontation between incumbent and challenger (W and O). The following text innovates on selectorate theory to explain why and how NPP interventions potentially result in regime change, or in counterfactual cases of non-intervention, regime resilience. Another variable, the international community (IC), is added to and projected within the selectorate model as an influential player in determining state leadership.

THE 'NOVEL' MODEL

According to selectorate wisdom, O engages in offensive power-claiming whilst challenging the regime's legitimacy and seeking to provide a democratic alternative. Discontented with L's investment in patronage at the detriment of public welfare, O might recourse to rebellion, especially if the regime autocratically restricts political rights. Rebellion triggers repression from government as a function of defensive power-claiming by L and his W/R coalitions. Armed political rivalry potentially yields, or at least raises the risks of extensive inhumane civilian murders on both sides of the political divide. With 'consensus' on RtoP, IC – composed mainly of states, non-governmental organizations, regional and global inter-governmental organizations – reacts to the reality or possibility of ruthless massacres by invoking a necessity to protect. If non-military coercive diplomacy proves unproductive, military measures become ineluctable.

The effect of NPP international interventions on conflict dynamics and power relations between W/R (the regime) and O (the opposition) can be rationally deduced from Realist calculations. International political realism anticipates major powers to emerge victorious in wars or violent conflicts against minor powers as a function of disparities in military capabilities. Deductively, at the domestic level, power contention conflicts potentially end in victory for the side with a relatively larger, better trained, better equipped, better organised and better remunerated army. In autocratic African states, this is often the regular army given large military expenditures for both state-defense and power-retention purposes. By contrast, armed oppositional struggles in Africa are mostly championed by rudimentarily-equipped, albeit well organised guerrilla rebel groups. Except for a few guerrilla success stories mainly in Eastern Africa (see Clapham, 1998), government forces generally tend to dominate power relations. Thus, successive post-independence African presidents have easily retained power by relying on repression.

When foreign powers intervene for protection purposes, the balance of power inevitably tips in favour of 'just' combatants, to the disadvantage of 'vicious' belligerents. Indirect intervention – restricted to equipment supplies – increases the former's military capabilities. Direct foreign military operations have an even greater positive effect on the former's relative capacities. Combined, the capacity of intervening powers and domestic just combatants outweighs that of barbaric belligerents. Hence, armed political conflict outcomes are more than likely to be 'victories', not 'defeats', for just combatants benefiting directly and/or indirectly from foreign forces. Regime soldiers with big pay packages, compared to hit-and-run opposition rebels residing among civilians, have stronger incentives to escalate violence and target civilians, and as such, are more likely to commit war crimes and be labeled inhumane belligerents. It is therefore not surprising that recent international interventions in Africa have been against regime forces.

As IC mobilizes for intervention, L must deal with a dilemma theoretically reminiscent of the prisoner's dilemma (Poundstone, 1992) and the negotiator's dilemma (Sebenius, 1992; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; 1992). He must choose to either cooperate or compete with pro-intervention powers. Competition potentially produces winner-takes-all outcomes while cooperation yields win-win benefits. Opting to compete means adopting zero sum tactics: 'demonizing' O; concealing inhumane acts; holding high reservation points on power retention; minimizing concessions; downplaying interveners' military capacities; threatening, displaying and using armed force. Should L's local and foreign adversaries adopt rival competitive strategies, a precarious impasse is likely to surface with real risks of explosive exchanges and enormous human /infrastructural damages in the host state. On the other hand, choosing to cooperate occasions positive sum tactics: acknowledging O's legitimacy; sharing information in clear language; shifting down reservation points to accommodate power exit possibilities; making costly concessions; dissuading foreign powers from military action; initiating and committing to negotiations with both O and IC.

As with value-claiming negotiators and freedom-seeking prisoners, defensive power-claiming incumbents perceive competition as a more productive strategy although it could in fact prove counterintuitive. It optimally serves L's interest only if IC chooses to cooperate and succumb to L's hardline position. However, prior to intervention, foreign powers might have explored and exhausted less confrontational (diplomatic) avenues to end mass murders. During that diplomatic phase, it can be determined if L intends to cooperate or compete. This significantly introduces a major theoretical difference between classic prisoner's dilemma games void of any direct verbal interactions and the 'leader's dilemma'. Given the possibility of direct dialogue with L, IC can easily establish L's tactical intentions and proceed to strategize accordingly. If, as expected, L evinces an inclination to compete, then foreign powers find it more rewarding to respond with competitive tactics as well. Likewise – as with iterated prisoners' games – cooperation from L induces cooperation from foreign powers.

Isolating competitive zero sum and cooperative positive sum tactics is theoretically possible but in practice the two categories are not mutually exclusive. At least one tactical element of each strategic category is used by either side, concurrently or consecutively. For instance, as shown below in Libya's case, L might maintain high competitive reservation points yet engage in diplomatic dissuasion (albeit a manipulative one) against intervention. So, when applied

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practically, the theoretical divide between competitive and cooperative tactics ceases to be an absolute distinction of 'either or' and becomes a relative continuum of 'more or less' with a balanced mix at the center of the spectrum. This continuum closely resembles distinctions between autocracy and democracy, ethnic and civic nationalism, and distributive and integrative negotiations. Power-defending incumbents and democracy/peace-pursuing IC actors are nonetheless likely to adopt a mix within the competitive end of the scale risking violent confrontations.

To surmise, although L rationally perceives competition to be more politically rewarding, he ends up worse off if foreign militarily superior powers reciprocate with competition. To safeguard power via the competitive route, L's military capacities must surpass that of O and IC combined. This is almost impossible to achieve. Cooperation seems more promising but only to the extent that L can effectively retain loyalty from W/R and outplay O without committing mass atrocities which could attract international attention. Power retention seems much more arduous within this broader international model than in the conventional national selectorate framework. Recent incumbent falls in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya offer affirmative insight.

PROTECTION INTERVENTIONS AND THE DEMISE OF GBAGBO AND GADDAFI

GBAGBO

From day one at the top, Gbagbo exhibited total egoistic commitment towards keeping power in ways not unanticipated by survival theorists, most evidently in his tendencies to invoke Ivoirité for political exclusionary purposes against Northerners and settler immigrants, and to brutally repress oppositional rebellions. On Gbagbo's maiden presidential induction (October 26, 2000) Alassane Ouattara's Muslim followers took to the streets calling for an annulment of the October 2000 presidential vote and for new elections to be executed. Aggrieved by Ouattara's exclusion from contestation, many Ouattara sympathizers had abstained from the elections and thus felt Gbagbo's assumption of office was opportunistic and illegitimate. The international community, led by the UN, US, and AU, concurred and amplified calls for new elections (Onishi, 2000, paragraph 3). Focused on safeguarding power, Gbagbo ignored foreign powers and instead used state security forces, notably the Forces Armées de Côte d'Ivoire or Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FACI) to attack protesters. Barricaded again from parliamentary elections in December that same year, Ouattara supporters ones more matched to the streets with outrage. Gbagbo's regime responded ruthlessly, killing hundreds, and committing various other inhumane acts that are well documented (Onishi, 2000, paragraph 10ff; HRW, 2001, p. 3ff; HRW, 2011b, p. 19).

Popular Northern disaffection with Gbagbo's regime and the latter's unwillingness to expand democratic space occasioned a decade-long militarized wrestle for power. In 2002, mutinous Northern soldiers making up the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire (PMCI) launched an offensive against the regime but were prevented from reaching Abidjan by French forces. Having taken control of the North, PMCI joined forces with three other rebel groups to form Force Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire (FNCI). FACI once again reacted brutally to the attempted coup and perpetuated vile human rights violations (HRW, 2002). Cycles of offensive and defensive power-claiming attacks between the FNCI and FACI plunged the country into a bloody civil conflict. The Linas-Marcoussis peace accords of 2003 removed constitutional restrictions on Ouattara's eligibility for future elections and established a cease-fire zone between the rebel-held North and government-controlled South. UN and French forces were mandated to patrol the zone of peace but that did not deter Gbagbo from attempting to annihilate FNCI insurgency threats. The quest for survival led Gbagbo to violate the truce by unleashing attacks on FNCI in 2004 and in the process, killed nine French peacekeepers and wounded twenty-three others (Sengupta, 2004; Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 831).

The volatile state of politics in the country prevented presidential polls from holding in 2005 when they were next constitutionally due. It was not until 2010 following peace negotiations in the intervening period that Gbagbo convened the electorate. Gbagbo's zeal to keep power manifestly remained as firm as when he first declared himself president in 2000. In line with previous peace agreements, Ouattara was officially permitted to contest and the UN was charged with watchdog and certification responsibilities. Indeed, the polls were historic in terms of voter turn-out (BBC, 1 November, 2010; Bassett 2011); opposition contestation; UN certification (Bassett, 2011) post-election violence and human rights violations (Nossiter, 2010a; Straus, 2011; HRW, 2011b, pp. 26 – 102). Given its wide media coverage, Côte d'Ivoire's 2010/2011 bloody electoral experience possibly remains fresh in most minds. Thus, it is space-saving here to straight away proceed to highlight traditional survival strategies employed by Gbagbo and the counteracting effect of military intervention for the purpose of civilian protection.

Unwilling to relinquish power, Gbagbo defiantly insisted he won the November 2010 runoff despite the country's electoral observatory, the Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI), declaring Ouattara winner. Gbagbo maintained a high reservation point, refusing to cede power, even after the international community endorsed Ouattara. In December 2010, Gbagbo swore the presidential oath of office and went on to nominate a new cabinet. With international backing, Ouattara did same but remained confined to his Golf Hotel refuge protected by UN and FNCI forces. Keen to encourage African democratization by upholding CEI's verdict, various regional and global leaders called on Gbagbo to step aside (Bax and Monnier, 2010). For instance, French president, Sarkozy, described Ouattara's victory as 'uncontestable and certain' (Bax and Monnier, 2010, paragraph 21); He further admonished 'the military and civilian authorities to respect the people's choice and refrain from any initiative that could cause violence' (paragraph 22). US president, Obama, on his part warned: 'the international community would hold those who act to thwart the democratic process and the will of the electorate accountable for their actions' (paragraph 20). Gbagbo's defiance pushed the West African regional organization (ECOWAS) to suspend Côte d'Ivoire from the bloc. Several foreign-mediated negotiation attempts by ECOWAS, AU and the UN proved futile as

Gbagbo chose to hang-on by not cooperating.

Gbagbo's regime became increasingly hostile towards foreign powers, especially France. As observed by Piccolino (2012, 1), the regime sort to neutralize UN and French threats to his survival by weeping up anti-colonial nationalist sentiments. Blé Goudé, then-Minister of Youth and Employment, peculiarly served as Gbagbo's 'Street General' mobilizing Young Patriots to condemn French presence in Côte d'Ivoire. Towards the end of 2010, Gbagbo contumaciously ordered foreign peacekeepers to leave (Tisdall, 2010; Look, 2010; Flood 2010; Nossiter, 2010b) and Interior Minister, Guirieoulou, followed on to intimidate: 'if against our will, they [the UN] want to keep this force in our country, we won't co-operate with them' (BBC, 21 December, 2010). Between January and April 2011, perhaps confident that obdurate defiance would earn him at least a power-sharing deal, Gbagbo unleashed hideous violence against Ouattara supporters (documented in Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 832; Straus, 2011 and HRW, 2011b, pp. 103 – 106) and foreign forces (VOA, 8 April, 2011; Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 836). However, inhumane acts were committed not only by FACI, but also by FNCI (HRW, 2011a and 2011b, pp. 106 – 107), renamed Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) following Ouattara's election victory.

Futile negotiations and Gbagbo's unrelenting contumacy conveyed intentions to compete rather than cooperate with foreign powers. To maximize chances of success on its democracy promotion and civilian protection ambitions, NPP interveners responded in kind (that is, competitively). Thus, instead of leaving as ordered in 2010, the UN passed Resolution 1962 (December 2010) extending its peacekeeping mandate in Cote d'Ivoire. Apart from prolonging its military presence, the UN fortified its forces via a series of other UN Security Council Resolutions: In January 2011, the Council adopted Resolution 1967 deploying 2,000 military personnel to bolster the UN's peace operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) whilst stressing its authorization to the Secretary General's Special Representative 'to use all necessary means to carry out UNOCI's mandate, including protection of civilians' (article 8). Even before the passage of Resolution 1967, the Council had sanctioned an increase in UNOCI's forces from 8,650 to 9,150 (Resolution 1942, September 2010). Also, it had authorized prior to the presidential elections run-off a temporal transfer from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI of up to three battalions of ground soldiers and an aviation unit composed of two military helicopters (Resolution 1951, November 2010). Like the UN, France boosted la force Licorne with an additional 300 contingent (Laing, 2011).

Armed power rivalry between FACI forces and FRCI rebels remained deadlocked until April 2011 when UNOCI and Licorne air assaults on FACI bases in Abidjan crushed Gbagbo's military resilience, exposing the incumbent to rebel capture. On 4 April, 2011, UN forces fired missiles and bombarded a major FACI base harbouring three infantry battalions (Kouassi et al., 2011). UNOCI's spokesman maintained that the attacks sort 'to neutralise heavy weapons' used by FACI against civilians (quoted in Kouassi et al., 2011, paragraph 3). Unable to counter foreign military assaults, several FACI soldiers defected from Gbagbo's desperate survival struggle, leaving only about 1,000 die-hard warriors (Stearns, 2011; Rice, 2011) to resist Licorne helicopter onslaughts on the presidential palace where Gbagbo had taken refuge in a bunker. French air strikes effectively overpowered Gbagbo's remaining FACI loyalists at the presidential residence and paved the way for his arrest by FRCI rebels on 11 April, 2011, terminating Gbagbo's decade-long strong hold on power.

Without UN and French air strikes on Gbagbo's FACI, it was very unlikely Outtara's FRCI would have emerged 'victorious' mindful of the incumbent's hitherto (pre-2010) military investments and dominance. Foreign military action evidently contributed towards tilting the balance of military capabilities in FRCI's favour. The April bombardments were notably condemned by some like former South African leader, Mbeki, and Russian Foreign Minister, Lavrov, as being illegitimately biased against FACI (Plett, 2011; Bellamy and Williams, 2011, 835 – 836). Like FACI soldiers, FRCI rebels were guilty of civilian murders but no foreign military action was directed at the latter. Thus, for critics, UNOCI and Licorne forces overstretched their mandate from one of civilian protection to one of regime demolition. It is not unlikely that this critical perception of UN action in Côte d'Ivoire underlies, at least partially, Russia's current reluctance to support severe sanctions and/or international military action to counter Assad's ruthless violence in Syria. However, apparent bias in UN and French assaults in Côte d'Ivoire was arguably rational and almost inevitable on two grounds: First, on the balance of evidence contained in HRW (2001, 2002, 2011a, 2011b), regime forces committed far more grave crimes against humanity than opposition rebels right from 2000 when Gbagbo assumed power. If FACI posed a bigger threat to civilians, then targeting its military capacities was a plausible pragmatic approach to fulfill its humanitarian protection mandate. Second, more than once, state soldiers offensively attacked foreign diplomats and foreign forces (Rice, 2011; VOA, 8 April, 2011; Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 836), in what seemed to be desperate attempts to enforce Gbagbo's flouted orders requesting UN and French withdrawal from Côte d'Ivoire. Thus, it was to be expected as averred by UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 836), and his Special Representative in Côte d'Ivoire, Young-jin (Kouassi et al., 2011, paragraph 15), that the UN would react militarily to protect its peacekeepers.

Summarily, supplying political survival 'goods' to his Southern support base whilst marginalizing and repressing his Northern challengers effectively helped Gbagbo keep power for up to ten years. However, international resoluteness on humanitarian protection raised colossal power-retention challenges. Recourse to familiar competitive repressive violence occasioned foreign military action against Gbagbo's army, leading to the incumbent's demise. As with Gbagbo, traditional survival tools used by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi for over forty years in Libya evinced ineffectiveness in 2011 when NATO bombarded Gaddafi's aerial power on grounds of human protection.

GADDAFFI

A critical review of Gaddafi's four-decade rule reveals an authoritarian reality of exclusion and suppression that

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remarkably contravened the Colonel's rhetorical promises of inclusion and freedom following his take over. Under Gaddaffi, power was centralized, with the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) serving as an apparatus for legitimization; political opponents were subjected to torture and exile; and only Gaddafi's Arab Social Union was legally allowed to operate as a mass political party. Owing largely to the Colonel's domineering traits, post-monarchical Libya continued to register a decimal score of -7 on the Polity IV scale. But not everything about Gaddafi's rule was reprehensible. Pains of political exclusion were eased by relative popular satisfaction with socio-economic provision by the regime. Libya under Gaddafi was amongst the most prosperous states in Africa economically, with ample revenue allocations towards boosting living conditions (Wafavarova, 2011, 10; Sandbakken, 2006, 145)

As a petro-state, it was hardly any challenge for Gaddafi's Libya to meet the economic demands of its relatively small population. Upon assuming power in 1969, Gaddafi adopted a hostile anti-colonial posture towards the West, thereby radically shifting from King Idris's hospitality to former colonial rulers (Stottlemyre, 2012). Gaddafi's predecessor had rendered very generous operational conditions to foreign oil companies, so much so, that one OPEC analyst described the Libyan Kingdom as 'a real oil paradise for the companies' (cited in Bearman, 1986, p. 29). In conformity with his anti-imperialistic foreign policy, Gaddafi nationalized several company oil holdings, and established the National Oil Corporation (NOC) to regulate Libya's petroleum sector. Increased government control over Libyan oil tremendously boosted Libya's rentier status, allowing for almost complete eradication of taxes by 1981 and an upsurge in public expenditure (Sandbakken, 2006, 145). Tax removals attenuated political pressures for greater accountability and representation in government, thereby safeguarding Libya's autocratic image.

Libya's enhanced rentier status under Gaddafi also facilitated greater expenditure on the military, the Armed Forces of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (henceforth, Libyan Armed Forces, LAF). Before Gaddafi ceased power, the monarchy relied on former colonial powers for its defence and spent less than twenty percent of government expenditure on the Libyan military. When Gaddafi took over, he expanded the LAF, almost tripling its size by 1981, with defence spending surging to about forty percent (Sandbakken, 2006, p. 145). Enormous oil revenue afforded the colonel so much to spare on Libya's military capacities that he initiated and pursued a nuclear weapons program, albeit unsuccessfully. Corroborating Colgan's (2010) thesis on the positive effect of oil wealth on international conflict propensity, Libya under Gaddafi became more belligerent, intervening in Chad in the 1970s and 1980s. Having invested much on Libya's repressive apparatus, crushing the 1984 Libyan National Salvation Front (LNSF) coup attempt was no daunting task.

In the 1980s, dwindling oil prices associated with a global oil glut occasioned an economic crisis for Libyans and a political crisis for Gaddafi: Government expenditure dropped, public sector salaries were frozen, misappropriation and unemployment levels soared, and per capita income plummeted from US$ 11,739 in 1980 to US$ 5,453 by 2001 (Sandbakken, 2006, p. 145). The crisis attenuated acclamation for Gaddafi's previously very productive oil-dependent regime. It was probably to take advantage of the crisis, that, the LNSF chose to attack Gaddafi's Bab Al-Aziziyah government base in 1984. Keen to keep power, the incumbent and his LAF responded to both the failed coup and economic crisis by: a) ruthlessly arresting and killing hundreds of LNSF dissidents; b) intervening militarily in Chad as a diversionary strategy (Ogunbadejo, 1983, p. 154; Gleditsch et al., 2008, pp. 483 – 486); and c) initiating economic reforms redolent of Gorbachev's 'Perestroika' (Vandewalle, 1991).

Political exclusion, violent repression, and diversionary conflicts combined to effectively sustain Gaddafi's incumbency, helping him survive the winds of democratic change of the 1990s and 2000s. Economic reforms, however, failed to return Libya to pre-1980 prosperity levels. At dawn of the twenty-first century, unemployment and corruption levels remained distressingly high. Libya's economic crisis had become so burdensome that Gaddaffi radically sort to disband his administration and disburse oil profits directly to Libyans (The Economist 4 March, 2008). Economic frustration alongside age-old political suppression made Libya liable to mass protests. When the 'Arab Spring' uprisings spread to Libya in February 2011, Gaddaffi unsurprisingly responded with brutal repression, albeit to no avail. NPP-driven NATO-led intervention brought about Gaddaffi's demise.

When the riots sprang, several LAF soldiers defected to form the Free Libyan Army (FLA), a rebel movement associated with the National Transitional Council (NTC) – the oppositional structure that was set up to liberate Libya from Gaddaffi's leadership. Initially, LAF was militarily superior to FLA and did dominate confrontations, ruthlessly crushing armed protests. In March, with assistance from its air force, LAF intensified assaults on civilian demonstrators and FLA rebels, reestablishing government control over Zawiya and other key Western oil cities. However, most of the East, including Ras Lanuf (a strategic oil city) and Benghazi (the region's capital city and rebel heartland), remained under NTC control (Blomfield and Spencer, 2011). As LAF looked to crack-down on Benghazi by mid-March, the international community – spearheaded by the UN, US, UK and France, with 'gatekeeping' support from African and Arab Gulf regional organizations, and acquiescence of quibbling global powers like China, Russia and Germany (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 838) – intervened to prevent further civilian casualties from LAF's air bombardments. More specifically, the UN passed Resolution 1973 (March 2011) permitting member states (like UK and France) who had pushed for robust international action against Gaddaffi 'to take all necessary measures...to protect civilians' (article 4); Libya's airspace was also declared a no fly zone 'to help protect civilians' (article 6).

Though Resolution 1973 and subsequent NATO military action was ferociously condemned as being illegitimate (Bumiller and Fahim, 2011; Savage, 2011; Fisher, 2012), international intervention in Libya reversed the balance of power in FLA's favour. Initial US military operations to destroy Libya's air defense systems were designed to be restricted in 'nature, duration and scope', 'discrete and focused'

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(Fisher, 2012, pp. 176 – 178), but they effectively caused a change in power relations between LAF and FLA. Within a couple of days, US strikes rid LAF of at least one scud missile, several military tanks, and completely crushed LAF's antiaircraft sites, radar facilities and communication centers (Bumiller and Fahim, 2011; Kirkpatrick et al., 2011). US bombardments were so intense, precise and efficient that by early April the Pentagon had terminated operations, leaving French and British forces to patrol Libyan skies. America's European allies continued bombarding Gaddaffi's LAF in the ensuing months. Between August and October, NATO demolished in the Colonel's home town of Sirte several missile launchers, ammunition and rocket launcher storage installations, enabling NTC rebels to capture and kill Gaddaffi. While leveraging civilian protection, NATO assaults left Gaddaffi soldiers vulnerable to FLA onslaughts. NATO assaults on LAF's repressive capacities undermined Gaddaffi's chances of holding on whilst enhancing NTC's take over.

International intervention posed Gaddaffi a competition vs cooperation dilemma. Like Gbagbo, the Libyan leader adopted a mix dominated by zero sum schemes. To start with, he defied Resolution 1970 (February 2011) by deciding to escalate violence whilst denying assaulted towns access to humanitarian aid even after the UN Secretary General personally solicited cooperation (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 840). In another direction, Gaddaffi 'demonized' the NTC and FLA, calling the opposition terrorist groups. This was evident in two letters Gaddaffi sent to Western leaders before and during NATO action in Libya. In the first, he stated: 'We are confronting Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, nothing more' (cited in Kirkpatrick et al., 2011, paragraph 26). Similarly, in the second, he labeled FLA rebels 'AlQuaeda gangs in Benghazi'. Also, Gaddaffi threatened Western powers: 'Libya is not yours. Libya is for all Libyans...You will regret it if you take a step toward intervening in our internal affairs' (Kirkpatrick et al., 2011, paragraph 24 – 25). Even more evident of Gaddaffi's confrontational stance was his resolve to use violence. Following Gaddaffi's death, Al-Jazeera's Abdel-Hamid (2012) revealed a series of regime conversations attesting to this. In one of the recordings, Gaddaffi is heard charging Tayel El Safi, a close Gaddaffi aide in the East, to mercilessly use violence against protesters: '...Smash those dogs, and...Shoot at whoever approaches'.

The Colonel's hardline tactics were nonetheless accompanied by less prominent but startling diplomatic maneuvers. Notably, unsuccessful attempts were made at persuading Dennis Kucinich, US parliamentarian and critic of Western intervention in Libya, to meet Libyan regime officials, including Gaddaffi. More than likely, the intention was to engage Kucinich more intensely in US Congressional opposition to intervention. The Congressman failed to honour the invitations, fearing for his personal security: '...I had several requests to go to Libya...But given that Libya was under attack, it did not seem a promising place to hold meetings' (cited in Harding, 2011, paragraph 6). In another manipulative move aimed at mobilizing world opinion against intervention, Gaddaffi urged his Prime Minister (Al-Mahmoudi) in one of Abdel-Hamid's disclosures to organize mass pro-regime rallies overseas: 'Aren't you preparing a green rally?...Not here. Do it abroad. For us, it's more important overseas. We need to show a green rally with tens of thousands of Libyans'. Most astonishingly, he engaged in sycophancy when addressing the US president in his second letter as 'Mr. Our dear son, Excellency, Baraka Hussein Abu Oumama'.

Gaddaffi's manipulative ploys proved futile in averting intervention due mainly to the prepotency of hardline competitive tactics in his survival tool box. By breaching Resolution 1970, the long-standing incumbent evinced extreme competitive defiance. The international community could only respond to competition with competition – not cooperation – to prevail. Hence, Resolution 1973 was adopted to counter Gaddaffi's contumacy. NATO's enforcement of the 'no-fly-zone' Resolution occasioned military asymmetries in favour of the FLA, facilitating victory over Gaddaffi's LAF. Having spent over three decades engaging in economic provision, political suppression, violent repression and diversionary aggression to safeguard power, Gaddaffi's fall came after only a few months of NPP foreign intervention. Counterfactual cases of non-intervention further affirm the potential negative impact of NPP intervention on incumbent survival.

NON-INTERVENTION AND THE SURVIVAL OF BIYA AND BOUTEFLIKA

BIYA

Paul Biya's Cameroon shares striking similarities with Gbagbo's Côte d'Ivoire in terms of population size; cash crop dependency; French colonial heritage; centralized post-colonial administrative structures; politicized ethnic identities; and long-tenured founding nationalist presidents who lost power not via elections, coups or protests, but by death or resignation. Biya's power ascension in 1982, albeit unanticipated, generated nation-wide euphoria as Cameroonians craved a 'second independence' – from president Ahidjo's ruthless rulership. However, general frustration soon surfaced after Biya displayed greater determination to safeguard power than to supply democracy and prosperity. Demand for democratization in the early 1990s met fierce regime resistance as Biya arrested, prosecuted and jailed many opposition figures pushing for multipartism.

In Bamenda, capital city of the country's opposition, John Fru Ndi defiantly launched – in May 1990 – the Social Democratic Front (SDF) which has since survived as the main opposition party. Government reacted savagely, killing six and injuring several others (Takougang and Krieger, 1998, pp. 104 – 105). University students from the Anglophone opposition region protested the killings but suffered an 'unprecedented degree of violence' from the military and pro-government militias (Konings, 2002, p. 179). Condemnation of the crisis from France, Cameroon's main aid donor, induced the regime to recognize SDF as a legitimate political party. However, when the SDF asked for a National Conference to be held to foster political and socio-economic development, the incumbent objected, stating that a national conference is irrelevant for Cameroon (Takougang and Krieger, 1998, p. 127). The incumbent had watched Major K*érékou* relinquish power to Nicéphore Soglo in Benin's own National

Conference and was presumably keen to avoid Kérékou's fate. Hard-pressed by 'ghost town' strike actions, Biya convened Tripartite Talks, bringing together the regime, opposition and civil society, although, unlike Kérékou in Benin, he retained tight control over deliberations.

Cameroon underwent its first multiparty presidential elections in 1992, after the Tripartite negotiations. Despite widespread fraud, Biya failed to secure fifty percent of the vote but retained power by slightly edging the leading challenger Fru Ndi (Gros, 1995). When the latter protested the results, he was subjected to house arrest and a state of emergency was declared across his regional support base. Having been sternly challenged in the 1992 polls, Biya resorted to electoral gerrymandering as well as informal Anglophone voter restriction in subsequent polls (Albaugh, 2011). Accordingly, the ruling Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) has since won successive elections (1997, 2004 and 2011) by huge margins. In addition to manipulating elections and repressing the opposition, Biya fuels Anglophone marginalization by excluding Anglophones from cardinal ministerial positions (Albaugh, 2011)

As with Ivoirite in Côte d'Ivoire under Gbagbo, politicization of the Anglophone identity in Cameroon elicits frustration and underlies secessionist demands by the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). Anglophone frustration combined with nation-wide grievances over high levels of corruption, unemployment, poverty and general economic misery posed serious threats to Biya's long-term rule in the build-up to Cameroon's 2011 elections. The incumbent was constitutionally ineligible to contest, but in 2008, he amended the constitution and removed restrictions on presidential mandates. Patience for Biya's 2004 – 2011 mandate to terminate metamorphosed to nation-wide riots after the 'constitutional coup' by Biya. The 2008 riots were easily suppressed by the regime. Nevertheless, the opposition looked forward to the 2011 polls as a golden opportunity to unseat the incumbent. Expectations soared even higher after Gbagbo's ouster in Côte d'Ivoire. So intense were oppositional stakes that several observers like Thomas (2010) and security think tanks like the International Crisis Group (2010) predicted violent crisis as had occurred in Côte d'Ivoire. In May 2011, US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, wrote to Biya and obliquely called for transparent elections in Cameroon: 'We look forward to seeing the people of Cameroon exercise their right to vote later this year in a free, fair, and credible presidential election' (Reuters, 2011, paragraph 3). Coming just after US military action in Côte d'Ivoire, Clinton's message further fuelled oppositional optimism for regime change in 2011.

The October 2011 electoral process did not deviate from flawed patterns of the past. Fru Ndi cried foul and claimed victory whilst accusing Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), Cameroon's government-appointed elections management body, of fraud and incompetence (see Clottey, 2011). The incumbent denied deliberate fraud, stating: 'It (ELECAM) is a young organisation…there was no intention to fraud' (Musa, 2011). As post-election tensions crystallized, Biya mobilized and deployed troops across the state to deter any anti-regime uprisings. Eventually, on 21 October, 2011, after days of uncertainty in a de facto state of emergency, Cameroon's Supreme Court declared Biya winner, with well over seventy percent of the ballot. Dissatisfied with irregularities in the 2011 polls, Western leaders stalled on issuing congratulatory messages to the re-elected leader but eventually endorsed him, opting not to intervene in Cameroon as in Côte d'Ivoire. At least three reasons explain non-intervention in Cameroon. First, the opposition in Cameroon went into the polls extremely fragmented, presenting over twenty candidates to challenge Biya, thereby mitigating its chances of victory even in a free and fair ballot. Second, Biya had drawn lessons from Côte d'Ivoire's violent unrest and so swiftly acted to avoid a similar crisis. Notably, prior to the polls, Biya annulled ELECAM powers to proclaim results, leaving the country's age-old regime-loyal Supreme Court with exclusive proclamation powers. This, combined with preemptive nation-wide military presence, ensured Fru Ndi's claims to power did not get legitimate institutional backing of the sort granted by CEI to Ouattara in Côte d'Ivoire. Finally and most importantly, Cameroonians did not heed Fru Ndi's calls to riot, allowing for internationally commended nonviolent electoral outcomes.

While intervention in Côte d'Ivoire reversed power relations to Gbagbo's demise, and Outtara's fortune, non-intervention in Cameroon left power asymmetries between the militarily-backed regime and unarmed opposition intact. Hence, the Cameroonian incumbent was able to successfully retain power. Despite supplying similar survival 'goods' such as corruption, electoral manipulation, ethnic marginalization and violent repression, Gbagbo and Biya experienced different fates following armed NPP intervention in Côte d'Ivoire and non-intervention in Cameroon. In North Africa, a parallel could also be drawn between Gaddaffi's fall in Libya and Bouteflika's survival in Algeria.

BOUTEFLIKA

Abdelaziz Bouteflika became president of Algeria in 1999, inheriting a long-standing crisis between the ruling party, Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the country's Islamist opposition, spearheaded by the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). When multipartism returned in 1989, FLN's post-colonial dominance was sternly challenged and temporally 'eclipsed' by FIS (Zoubir, 1995, p. 109). FIS secured substantial municipal electoral gains in 1990 and was well ahead of FLN in parliamentary elections in 1991. Sensing defeat, the FLN regime suspended elections, installed an unconstitutional body (the Higher State Council) at the helm, banned all Islamist parties including FIS, and established a state of emergency. Frustrated, the opposition militarized politics. Various Islamist militias joined the armed wing of FIS (Armeé Islamique du Salut) to rebel against government, plunging Algeria into a protracted crisis with unprecedented levels of violence and human rights violations (see Bouandel, 2003).

Algeria's civil war posed the biggest threat to Bouteflika's first term. Employing a combination of military confrontational and diplomatic conciliatory strategies, the leader crushed and reintegrated armed dissidents in civil society. Like Gaddaffi, Bouteflika invested heavily on repression, utilizing Algeria's oil wealth to strengthen his

armed forces. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recently identified Bouteflika's Algeria as Africa's largest military spender in the twenty-first century, with twenty percent of African military expenditure. In 2008, Algeria's budgetary allocation to national defense (US$ 5.2 billion) surpassed allocations to other sectors and was the highest in Africa (Perlo-Freeman et al., SIPRI Year Book 2009, p. 200). With its enhanced military capacities and 'Civil Concord' policies, the Bouteflika regime edged its extremist opposition and Algeria 'regained stability' (Tlemçani, 2008, p. 1).

Upon steering Algeria to relative peace, Bouteflika has twice (2004 and 2009) been electorally retained in office, but not without charges of incumbent fraud and constitutional fiddling (Holm, 2005; Bouandel, 2009). In his latter mandates, the incumbent has, in addition to his pursuit of national harmony, focused on attracting foreign investments to heal Algeria's conflict-inflicted economic hardships. However, by 2011 when the 'Arab Spring' stretched to Algeria, levels of unemployment, poverty, food prices and costs of living remained painfully high. As with Gaddaffi, the 2011 protests posed perilous threats to Bouteflika's leadership. However, unlike the former, the latter survived. While the crisis in Libya was 'unexpected' (Bellamy and Williams, 2011, p. 838), it was less astonishing in the case of Algeria given its history of armed Islamist insurrections. Strikingly, Algeria turned out to be 'The Dog That Didn't Bark' (Traub, 2012). Three reasons plausibly explain why the riots in Algeria failed to escalate and produce regime change.

First, when the riots erupted, Bouteflika swiftly executed a number of reforms to avert protest escalation. Notably, the incumbent abolished Algeria's age-old state of emergency; raised civil service salaries and subsidies on basic food commodities; and ratified new pro-democratic constitutional and electoral laws that satisfied key Western officials (Piser, 2012, paragraph 4). Second, Bouteflika had long before 2011 crushed Algeria's armed Islamist groups, thereby mitigating chances of the opposition militarizing protests as had happened in Libya. Accordingly, Bouteflika did not have to respond to the riots with the sort of military intensity applied in Libya. Third, owing largely to Bouteflika's low-key military response, civilian casualties were relatively marginal, averting a need for foreign intervention on human protection grounds. Non-intervention left regime – opposition power dissymmetry in favour of the former, permitting Bouteflika to retain leadership.

Conclusively, this paper has remodeled selectorate theory to accommodate the effects of protection interventions on political survival. The reconstructed model anticipates NPP to significantly alter power balances between conflicting winning/ruling coalitions (the regime) and oppositional groups (the opposition). Traditionally effective autocratic regime survival 'goods' such as ethnic exclusion, electoral manipulation and violent repression become counterproductive within the newer model. Protection interventions targeting regime military capacities (as occurred in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya) potentially yield regime change while non-interventions (as with Cameroon and Algeria) permit regime consolidation, albeit indirectly. To the latter illustrative cases could be added Syria, still under Assad assaults but yet to undergo any firm international sanctions, much less protection operations. Divided opinions in the UN Security Council on how to deal with the Syrian regime undermines international consensus on RtoP and commitment to NPP. However, it is not unlikely that any eventual intervention would yield regime collapse as a by-product of protection operations.

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