The New South-South Cooperation And Brazilian ‘Soft Power’ In Africa (2003-2013)

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Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War in 1990s, Brazil has exercised its foreign policy in the international system through soft power diplomacy embedded in the concept of development and mainly through technical cooperation. Accordingly, Brazil has promoted international cooperation, multilateralism, diplomacy, democracy to achieve its foreign policy agenda, especially within the context of South-South cooperation. Significantly, the legacy of Brazil's soft power under President Luis Ina’cio 'Lula' da Silva’s regime (2003-10) towards Africa has been the most prominent foreign policy agenda towards Africa under the South-South and continued under President Dilma Rousseff’s regime (2011-2016). Although Brazil had immense contribution to African development, its foreign policy agenda in Africa still faces the challenges of inconsistency, ambiguity and accusations of a new imperial power (neo-colonial actor) targeting African natural resources, mainly energy. This paper therefore attempts to explain the history, challenges and prospects of Brazilian-Africa cooperation using complex interdependency theory.

Keywords: soft power, concept of development, South-South cooperation, foreign policy, technical cooperation

I. INTRODUCTION

Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, Brazil has emerged as a major actor in the international system. This primacy has been achieved through the possession of ‘soft power’ capability. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977:4) in analyzing the concepts of power and interdependence predict a diminishing role of the state and its military power due to emergence of non-state actors and non-military issues in the international system. The Brazilian foreign policy relies heavily on non-military power to achieve its foreign policy goals. The core objective of Brazilian foreign policy since the early 20th century has been the pursuit of 'development' for Brazil and the global South (Africa, Asia and Latin America). This foreign policy orientation has been significant and remained unchanged under President Luis Ina’cio 'Lula' da Silva (2003-10) and President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016).

This paper highlights Brazil's efforts to extend its soft power in Africa by embedding the 'concept of development' into its foreign policy, built on its historical and cultural ties with Africa. It analyses the Brazilian new foreign policy objective of ‘South-South’ cooperation with Africa on the following issue areas: global healthcare, tropical agriculture, vocational training, mining, infrastructure environmental conservation, renewable energy and social protection to demonstrate the utility of South-South cooperation as a foreign policy strategy. This paper also interrogates the epistemological orientation of this strategy in advancing Brazilian national interests in the international system. On the other hand, this strategy is also serving Africa's development interests, although in an unequal relationship.
II. ‘SOUTH-SOUTH’ COOPERATION

In the 1960s, the newly independent Third World states (South) began to strengthen their participation in the United Nations. The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, was an attempt by the Third World states to influence the global agenda without being aligned with the United States of America (USA) and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) during the cold war period. However, the Third World states lacked strong political and economic institutions to guarantee their independence from the former colonial powers and the industrialized powerful North (Western Europe and North America). Nevertheless, the emergence of regional integration and changes in the international system and domestic environment, especially in the post Cold War period, cooperation and interdependency has intensified. In this regard, the Brazilian cooperation with states in the South (Africa, Asia and South America) has gained a fundamental priority in Brazil’s foreign policy agenda. The South-South cooperation thus became a “diplomatic foreign policy strategy”, aimed at elevating Brazil’s role in the international system, by reforming global governance and democratizing international institutions (Amorin, 2010:231).

III. BRAZILIAN ‘CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT’

Brazil has been strategically deploying the “concept of development” in its foreign policy strategy since the early 1960s. However, the past decade, has seen it gain more prominence as an emerging global actor. The foundation of President Lula's foreign policy was based on relative developmental stage of Brazil that dictated the need to strengthen South-South cooperation to enhance its primacy in international politics as a developing state. The main objective of Brazilian foreign policy is therefore focused on achieving “development as goal” and “development as an identity” (Nogueira, 2010:1). Brazil has been using the concept of development as a foreign policy strategy to attract and sustain global partnerships and South-South cooperation towards achieving its national interest. Brazil takes a comprehensive and interrelated approach to its foreign policy to include promoting national development and interdependency among states. One of the greatest strengths of Brazil's strategy in developing states (even if asymmetrically) is the attraction and support for Brazil as a development leader and global power (World Bank, 2009).

IV. BRAZILIAN-AFRICAN HISTORICAL CONNECTION

Brazil and Africa have a long shared common and strong historical, cultural and linguistic legacy emanating from imperialism and colonialism, trans-Atlantic slave trade (1550-1888), underdevelopment and economic alienation. During the 19th century, Brazil was the center of Portuguese empire, making Rio de Janeiro, a nerve center for trade with Africa (Kozloff, 2010). About 40% of the estimated 11 million Africans shipped to the America's were sold in Brazil. Africans from Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique were taken as slaves to Brazil to work on sugar cane plantations. Currently, the blacks and mixed-race population in Brazil account for 50.7% (190 million) of the total population (Paul, 2011; Neil, 2012-21). Thus there exist a valid justification for cultural and traditional solidarity and ‘natural’ partnership between Brazil and Africa due to shared experience of colonialism and post coloniality.

Brazil has a rich history of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism that resonates with African development discourse. Brazil also shares socio-economic challenges and environmental and geographical features. It is a former European colony and has a wide array of natural resources that are also found in Africa. The Brazilian slaves preserved their African culture due to their huge population. They practiced their own music, dance, cuisine and religion in Brazil. Linguistic ties also exist between Brazil and African states where Portuguese is the official language in Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe (Neil, 2012:21). Due to this historical connection, since 1960s, every Brazilian president has visited Africa to strengthen political, diplomatic and economic relations guided by genuine solidarity and less by political and commercial interests (Seibert, 2011).

Paradoxically, despite its dominant soft power, Brazil's foreign policy has traditionally focused on relations with South America, North America and Europe with relatively little involvement in Africa. Unlike China and India, Brazil has for a long time since the end of colonialism in Africa in 1960s failed to formulate and implement an African foreign policy. Nevertheless, the re-emergence and consolidation of Brazil-Africa relations gained a renewed impetus during the reign of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) and President Luiz Iná’cio Lula da Silva (2003-10). Lula revived Brazil's interest in Africa and set it as a foreign policy strategy as part of extending its interest for global influence (World Bank, 2011). In 2012, Lula emphasized the historic debt to Africa. He argued that Brazil should commence the payment of solidarity debt owed to Africa as a result of its huge contribution to Brazilian economy during the Trans-Atlantic slave trade especially in the sugar plantations (Neil, 2012:29; Kozloff, 2010; Harsch, 2004).

President Lula vigorously pursued a foreign policy strategy of strengthening ties with Africa by making many trips in Africa during his eight years rule and increased the number of diplomatic embassies in Africa from 17 to 37 (Neil, 2012:29). After assuming office in 2003, President Lula declared his interest in Africa and immediately issued a Federal Decree that made the study of African history and Afro-Brazilian culture mandatory at all levels of Brazil's national education curriculum and compulsory teaching of Afro-Brazilian and African history in public and private schools (Pham, 2010). Moreover, several Brazilian universities have also started admissions for Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Brazilian culture is widely practiced in Brazil (Kozloff, 2010).

President Lula decreed Africa's weak position in the international system and lack of representation at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which he blamed on the western hegemony (Karpova, 2011). He further stressed that
Brazils not interested in imperial hegemony and exploitation of African mineral resources, but in forging strategic alliances (Kozloff, 2010). President Dilma Rousseff's administration continued the legacy of President Lula's foreign policy in Africa. During her first visit to Africa in October 2011 for the 5th IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) Summit, Brazilian she reaffirmed the Brazilian foreign policy agenda in Africa on the basis of shared colonial experience and South-South diplomacy. She discussed the strengthening and expansion of political, economic and cultural ties with Africa. Her first visit to Africa thus represented a continuation of a strong, longstanding interest of Brazilian foreign policy makers in Africa.

V. EMERGENCE AS A GLOBAL POWER

The origin of Brazilian soft power can be traced from Baron of Rio Branco, the father of Brazilian foreign policy since the 20th century. Branco emphasized the use of non-military power and various forms of diplomacy. He is credited for solving South American border disputes peacefully through the application of diplomacy and international law. Successive Brazilian heads of state have continued and expanded this tradition by emphasizing on other forms of diplomacy, conflict resolution and management mechanisms, peaceful negotiations, respect for international laws and conventions bilateralism and multilateralism approaches to dealing with domestic and issues (Barges, 2009).

The end of the Cold War created opportunities and space for the emergence of new powers like China, India and Brazil. Brazil does not fit into the traditional conception of powerful states (hard power). Since independence from Portugal on September 7, 1822, it has never had nuclear power and strong defense force (Borges, 2009; World Bank, 2011). As a soft power, Brazil's active engagement in international politics has grown and expanded significantly since 1960s due to its economic growth and democratization. Since 1985 after the military dictatorship, Brazil has become a stable multicratical and multietnic society and a strong democracy with regular, fair and free elections based on universal suffrage. Brazil also possesses a strong and attractive cultural heritage in Portuguese language, samba music, arts, cinema, architecture, sports (football) are globally recognized and have dominated the entertainment industry in Africa and the international system. Brazilian language, Portuguese, is the world's 7th most spoken language.

Brazil is now the 5th biggest state, 4th largest democracy and 6th biggest economy in the world with a population of about 210 million, according to the World Bank (2018). Within BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) group of developing states, it is second biggest economy, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $2 trillion behind China with $4.6 trillion (Neil, 201124). Under Lula, Brazil sustained economic growth of 50% per annum. At the same time, in 2008, its overseas foreign investment and exports, including Africa accounted for $45 and $700 billion respectively (World Bank, 2011). The challenges of food insecurity in the 1970s, led to transformation of Brazil's agricultural sector and by 2005 Brazil had become the world's 2nd largest producer of agricultural goods. Presently, it is the 4th biggest food producer and 2nd biggest food exporter of beef, chicken, sugar, orange juice, green coffee and soya beans. Brazil is also 9th biggest oil producer and a leader in alternative renewable-energy technology, especially in biofuel production (Akinola, 2010:44). Brazil also owns 75% of the Amazon rainforest and home to one-sixth of the world’s freshwater reserves, important for global international environmental conservation.

Brazil has achieved greater regional integration and emerged as Latin America's Common Market in South global power. This is evident in the creation of Common Market in South America (‘MERCOSUR’) in 1991 and Union of South American Nations (‘Unasur’) in 2008, developed with the goal of forging deeper economic and political integration in South America by integrating two existing customs unions: MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). Brazil has also increasingly diversified its trade relations in the international political economy and enhanced global governance through its engagement with various economic groupings like Group of 20 (G-20) and Non-State Actors (NSAs). As Brazil projects its economic development and seeks a permanent seat in the UNSC, the successful execution of its current public diplomacy, specifically in sports and aid diplomacy is admirable. As the host of both the football World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016, Brazil had an opportunity to show the world the utility of its emerging power. Further, under President Lula, Brazil intensified its diplomacy and opened 37 new embassies in Africa compared to US’s 44 embassies. Brazilian Multinational Corporations (MNCs) now operates in 21 Francophone and Anglophone African states mainly in mining, oil exploration and tropical agriculture sectors.

Brazil mainly exercises its influence in Africa through the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) or Lusophone. Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe Mozambique have been key priority states for Brazilian-Africa cooperation (Nogueira, 2010:6). However, Brazil's interest is not only confined to former Portuguese colonies. The key aim of Brazilian foreign policy in Africa under President Lula was to mitigate Brazilian vulnerability in the international system by pursuing a more “muscular foreign policy” that also encompasses Anglophone and Francophone Africa driven by the new wave of globalization, new regionalism and historical legacy (Neil, 2012:28).

VI. PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND MULTILATERALISM

President Lula's 'grand strategy' was aimed at promoting and strengthening multilateralism, coalition-building, reforms and democratization in the international system, including the UN in the context of South-South cooperation through Technical Cooperation (TC) on equal partnership and mutual gains. Brazil has been a key player in addressing global human security issues such as nuclear proliferation, poverty reduction, combating diseases, intellectual-property rights and environment and climate change. President Lula's charismatic leadership successfully cultivated formal diplomatic ties with...
every member of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), while pursuing an independent foreign policy and non-alignment with western powers (Brands, 2010:3-4). Brazil has been projecting an image of a benign and neutral leader among developing states. This strategy is carefully designed with the objective of guaranteeing Brazil more projection and favorable leadership and participation in multilateral forums such as World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and achieving its long-standing ambition of securing a permanent seat at the UNSC for itself and the "G4" (Brazil, India, Germany and Japan).

In addition, Brazil has indicated its interest in multilateral relations with Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) and in return invited African states to join MERCOSUR (ECOWAS, 2010). In 2003, Brazil initiated the creation of India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) as a trilateral forum for promoting and strengthening South-South cooperation. Already, IBSA has created a fund managed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) for Poverty Reduction and Economic Development in several states, including Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde in Africa (IBSA, 2004). The IBSA and Brazil-South Africa Business Forum (BSABF) has benefitted South African MNCs through trade and investment opportunities in biofuels, services, tourism, information technology, mining, finance, infrastructure and pharmaceutical sectors; Industrial Development Corporation in South Africa and the Brazilian Development Bank, have signed a cooperation agreement to promote trade and economic relations between South Africa and Brazil (African Development Bank (AfDB), 2011); the TCs between Brazil and South Africa is horizontal and therefore, more cooperative and beneficial to both states; and cooperation has also been implemented through multilateral mechanisms like the South America-Africa Summit.

VII. TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Technical Cooperation (TC) is a key instrument of Brazilian foreign policy. It has been used for promoting South-South cooperation since 1960s based on the principles of solidarity and co-responsibility and detachment from commercial interests, seeking to share Brazilian successes and best practices with developing states. Rather than "developmental assistance" or "foreign/financial aid" Brazil provides TC programs based on scientific and technological development without conditional ties on recipients (Yonemura, 2010; Nogueira, 2010:1). The TC programs are channeled through the Ministry of External Affairs (Itamaraty), Ministry of Science and Technology and its National Council for Scientific and Technological Development and Ministry of Planning’s Department for International Affairs.

The TC involve transferring Brazilian scientific and technical knowledge and expertise gained from its social and economic development experiences in key priority areas to Africa: health, agriculture, environment, infrastructure, technical education, mining, food processing and social protection (World Bank, 2011). These projects are managed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) of Itamaraty. In 2010, the ABC was involved in 240 projects carried out in 58 developing states (Nogueira, 2010:2). Under President Lula, Brazil’s trade with Africa increased between 2000 and 2010 from US$4 billion to US$20 billion (AfDB, 2011). Brazilian aid and technical assistance in Africa increased from $200 million in 2008 to $430 million in 2012. This is done through the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BLADES), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa has also improved from US$69 billion in 2001 to US$214 billion in 2009 (World Bank, 2011; Seibert, 2011).

The Africa-Brazil Cooperation Program (ABCP) on social protection, which is a partnership of the Brazil's Ministry of Social Development, Department for International Development (DFID) and UNDP, has promoted South-South cooperation on research and training on poverty. The program shares Brazil’s technical knowledge on social development strategies, such as Bolsa Família (Family Stipend). This is a part of the Brazilian government's welfare program, Fome Zero (Zero Hunger), which provides financial aid (cash transfers) to poor families to promote schooling, literacy and good health. The program attempts to reduce short-term poverty and long-term poverty. This assistance is seen more as a social and political motivation rather than economic interest (World Bank, 2009).

In July 2010, President Lula reemphasized agriculture as his key foreign policy priority in Africa. Brazil is actively sharing its experience in agricultural development with Africa aimed at achieving the ‘green revolution’ and addressing the challenge of food insecurity. Brazilian experience in tropical agriculture might provide a panacea for unlocking the agricultural potential of Africa which is vital in ensuring future global food security. Brazil has effectively improved agricultural productivity and food security since 1970s with the creation of Embrapa (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation). Its objective was to develop agriculture in the 'wasteland' of Cerrados region, a region similar to the savanna in Africa. Embrapa has achieved the green revolution through domestication of tropical agriculture due to its huge knowledge, expertise and technology in research and development. Since Brazil and Africa share similar geographical and climatic conditions, this success makes Brazil an important and ideal development partner for Africa (Akinola, 2010:45).

The Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Combating Hunger and Rural Development, held in Brasilia, Brazil in May 2010, attended by representatives from 40 African states and 33 Ministers of Agriculture from Africa, demonstrate Brazilian genuine commitment in its proclaimed desire for a green revolution in Africa through partnership rather than a donor (Akinola, 2010:46). Brazilian-African Agricultural Exchange has also registered remarkable progress for Africa through field visits. For example, in 2010, African farmers visited Brazil and were able to learn from a wide range of skills and technology in agricultural productivity, small scale farming and environmental conservation (Neil, 2012).

Further, African-Brazilian agricultural cooperation was strengthened with the launch of “Africa-Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace Initiative”. The objective of the program is to share knowledge between the two regions in partnership with UK Department of International
Development (DFID), World Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (Akinola, 2010:46). Brazil also launched the “Farming First Initiative” for promoting sustainable agricultural development in Africa. According to Dr. Lindiwe Majende Sibanda of the South African based Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN), this partnership demonstrates the practical fulfillment of the South-South cooperation built on strong and equal partnership and not a big brother relationship (Akinola, 2010:46). Moreover, in July 2012, Brazil, Japan and Mozambique signed a trilateral cooperation agreement for financing agro-industrial development in Mozambique. The project has also incorporated the participation of the Brazil Mozambique Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ABC and Brazilian Agri-Livestock Research Agency (Neil, 20 12:29-30).

Lastly, as the leading world producer of biofuel, Brazil has provided $300 million fund to provide loans for biofuel producers in Africa (Neil, 2012:29). Embrapa is offering technical assistance and training to African states and sharing expertise in biofuel production based on African priorities (Akinola, 2010:46). Examples are the bilateral agreement worth $6 billion for biofuel exploration between Mozambique and Brazil in November 2009; multilateral agreement between the European Union (EU), Brazil and Mozambique to develop bio-electricity and biofuel projects in July 2010 and bilateral agreements in Uganda, Senegal, Nigeria, Angola and Kenya (Akinola, 2010:45).

Under President Lula and Rousseff, Brazil has advocated for the formation of “national champions” through diplomatic soft power to enhance its global significance. Brazil sees Africa as a means of diversifying its global export markets, while enhancing FDI and involvement of its private sector and MNCs. This is done with the support of BNDES (World Bank, 2009). Since 2006, BNDES has provided $3.2 billion loan to 65 projects in Angola, of which 34 projects are being undertaken by Odebrecht; in May 2012, BNDES agreed to provide $2 billion to Angola for financing the purchase of Brazilian goods and services; and lastly, BNDES has provided infrastructure development assistance and mining exploration in Angola and Liberia (Neil, 2012:29-34).

The FDI Investment in Africa by Brazilian MNCs is based on commercial interest aimed at securing access to raw materials and new markets for their exports. This is due to relative economic growth of Brazil and Africa (Neil, 2012:22). The strong economic growth currently prevailing in Africa offers opportunities for cooperation, trade and investment between Brazil and Africa. The increased interest for Brazilian investment in Lusophone Africa, particularly, Angola in natural resource exploitation, construction industry and agricultural development represents a renewed commercial interest of Brazil in Africa. Angola and Mozambique have registered strong economic growth that has attracted the biggest Brazilian investment in Africa. Economic growth in Mozambique has averaged 7.2% since 2000 due to massive Brazilian investment in the energy sector. In 2011, bilateral trade between Brazil and Angola was worth $1.14 billion and Brazilian exports to Angola were valued 80 %. Generally, total trade between Brazil and Africa increased from 4 billion in 2000 to $27 billion in 2012 (Neil, 2012:22).

CASE STUDY

Vale (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce), the biggest Brazilian MNC in Africa and the world's biggest iron ore producer, has invested a total of $15-20 billion in Africa in coal mining and rail and port infrastructure. Vale currently has investments totaling $7.7 billion in nine African states and plans to invest more than $18 billion in Africa. It has also invested $20 million in phosphate exploration in Nampula Province in Mozambique (Neil, 2012:29-32). Odebrecht is a key player in the construction, biofuel and electricity industries in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe. It has been active in Angola for the last 20 years with a strong 20,000 workforce. Petroleo Brasileiro, SA, usually known as Petrobras is the world's 8th largest oil run operations in 28 African states. It has vast experience in deep water oil production and biofuel. It has invested production $3 billion in energy and water exploration Africa has been active in Angola since 1979 and has operated in Nigeria and Libya for 14 years and currently has interests in Benin and Ethiopia (Neil, 2012:29-30-31).

Centrals Eletricas Brasileiras SA (Eletrobras), is the world's 9th largest electricity producer and supplier and South America. It is investing $6 billion in hydroelectric power production in Mozambique (World Bank, 2009; Biofuels Digest, 2010). It also intends to invest Manyera Falls hydropower in Morogoro Regions in Tanzania at a cost of $1 billion. Embraer the 3rd biggest commercial plane manufacturer in the world after Boeing and Airbus has invested in the manufacture and supply both civilian and military aircraft in Africa. It has delivered military and civilian aircrafts to Kenya, Mauritania, Angola and Burkina Faso (Neil, 2012:29-33).

VIII. DILEMMA OF BRAZILIAN SOUTH-SOUTH AGENDA

The efficacy of Brazil's soft power in its continuing rise as an emerging global power has faced constraints and generated controversy with critics pointing out that there is much more to Brazil's soft power and its foreign policy agenda and orientation raises many questions, since it still faces the challenges of political, economic and military power both in the domestic and international system. Does Brazil have a long-term strategic vision in the new global order? What does this reordering of the international system mean for Brazil in its domestic, geopolitical and global interests? And can Brazil exercise global primacy and influence based on soft power alone, without the hard power of the US, EU, NATO and other BRICS?

First, Brazilian foreign policy in Africa lacks coherence, consistency and clarity. Although Brazilian government has tried to enhance coherence of TC programs through coordinating institutions, formulation and implementation of these development programs remain fractured, competitive and decentralized. This makes it difficult to understand Brazilian foreign policy and its South-South cooperation agenda for Africa. As the Brazilian MNCs and private investors have increased their presence in Africa and
influencing foreign policy for commercial interests, Brazil may find it difficult to pursue its national interest. Moreover, as the Brazilian society becomes more pluralistic, the NSAs with conflicting agenda are also becoming more visible and influential. Consequently, there is a risk that this will undermine Brazil's international political image of a partner and not a donor. Second, although Brazil tends not to use 'hard' military power, it has militarily interfered in the domestic affairs of its neighbours. For example, the attempted coup in Venezuela (2002); deployment of peacekeeping force in Haiti (2004); support for president Evo Morales in Bolivian crisis (2008); and opposition to coup against President Jose Manuel Zelaya in Honduras (2009). This debunks the widely held view that Brazil only uses soft power in its foreign policy agenda in the regional and international system to achieve its national interests.

Third, scholars have argued that Brazil is driven by 'soft imperialism' aimed at securing new export markets and creating employment for its expanding economy (Visentini, 2009; Seibert, 2011). These concerns have raised uncertainties and challenges with Brazil's relations with Africa. There is no genuine and real desire for Brazil to promote economic development in Africa. It is driven by capitalists imperialism and neocolonialism. In fact, over 80% of Brazil's imports from Africa are mineral products and crude resources mainly oil and gas (AIDB, 2011). Most of Brazil's economic engagement with Africa focuses on a few natural resource-rich states like Nigeria (32%), Angola (16%), Algeria (12%), South Africa (10%) and Libya (7%). Together these states make up 77% of its total trade with Africa (AIDB, 2011). This indicates Brazil's imperialist and neo-colonial agenda of exploiting natural resources and raw materials from Africa and thus perpetuating the current global capitalist system.

Fourth, the Brazilian green revolution might not succeed in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) due to lack of basic necessities like access to power, credit and technical and scientific knowledge. Added to this is the fact that much of the SSA suffers from inadequate transport and power infrastructure that might hinder the transfer of Brazilian success to Africa. Third, Brazil's push for biofuel has raised concern over conversion of arable agricultural land into biofuel production in a region facing food insecurity and hunger. This policy will exacerbate and worsen Africa's food security. Biofuel demand in Africa has fueled land grabbing and protests in Tanzania; Madagascar, Sudan and Ghana. The acquisition of land in Africa by foreign states, including Brazil has attracted widespread condemnation terming them as 'land grabbing' and agents 'neocolonialism'. It has also controversially led to political unrest and instability in states such Madagascar in 2009, following a 99-year land lease by South Korea's Daewoo Logistics for 13 million hectares (Akinola, 2010:46).

Fifth, BNDSE's poor environmental record in South America might create a social and environmental disaster in Africa. Petrobras and Eletrobras have been accused by Greenpeace for engaging in environmental degradation and destruction and this could exacerbate environmental pollution and climate change in Africa especially in infrastructure, water and energy projects (Kozlloff, 2010). Lastly, the political, economic and social marginalization of Brazilians of African descent and mixed blacks by the majority whites is an obstacle to Brazilian South-South cooperation with Africa. Since Africa is predominantly black, one wonders the extent how racial alienation will affect Brazil-Africa relations. Already some Brazilians view investment in Africa as 'wastage' and Africa as a colossal failure that cannot be salvaged (Visentini, 2009).

IX. OPPORTUNITIES AND LESSONS FOR AFRICA

Brazilian-African relations is a win-win situation, viewed as a partnership for 'mutual benefits' as compared to African engagement with traditional western donors’ approach of 'recipient's needs versus donor interests' (World Bank, 2009). Another contrast from the traditional donors and other emerging powers is that Brazil has better understanding of the African development context owing to shared historical legacy and the status of both regions as developing economies. Despite potential challenges, Africa stands to benefit from economic and social development through Brazilian TC and debt relief. Further, Brazil acts as a counterweight for Africa against European Western neo-colonialism and threats of globalization. Lastly, unlike other BRIC members, Brazil is promoting democracy and good governance in Africa by stressing its commitment to human rights and the rule of law.

The biggest lesson Africa can learn from Brazil is the value of enlightened political leadership and economic stability anchored on democracy and good governance. In both the long term and short term, Africa must respond positively by formulating policies and creating opportunities for implementation, utilization and sustainability of Brazilian TC programs; exploiting the South-South cooperation agenda by encouraging dialogue between African multilateral institutions and regional blocs and Brazil; utilizing Brazil's experience, expertise and skills transfer for developing and strengthening vocational educational institutions in Africa; improving agriculture and environmental conservation; promoting social protection and the development of renewable energy; building positive economic, political and cultural ties; utilizing Brazil's experience in green revolution and industrialization to enhance food security and economic development; supporting Brazil in building South-South cooperation for African states to benefit from their knowledge and expertise and skills transfer; and encouraging exchange-tours between African states and Brazil for experiential learning and best practices.

X. CONCLUSION

The emergence of Brazil as a soft powerful state and its influence on the international system is critical. Brazil has a longstanding tradition of its attractiveness due its soft power that promotes international cooperation, multilateralism, diplomacy, democracy to achieve its foreign policy agenda. However, despite the attractiveness and projection of Brazilian soft power, there is a misunderstanding in the South-South cooperation generally and particularly, Brazil-Africa relations. The breadth and depth of the Brazilian concept of development strategy and its application in Africa is still broad and unclear and this calls for further research. On one hand,
Brazil's foreign policy has been emphasizing on cooperation and solidarity with developing states in the South; while on the other hand, there is genuine South-South cooperation and solidarity with Africa. Nevertheless, Brazil's emerging role on the international system means its concept of development is becoming increasingly relevant in international politics. The legacy of Brazil's immense soft power under President Lula’s foreign policy agenda towards Africa continued under President Rousseff who also followed the same tradition of South-South cooperation. Thus as Brazil deepens its presence in Africa, it may be forced to articulate a more overarching domestic challenges to its democratization agenda. In this context, President Lula’s successors must balance Brazil’s, domestic, regional and global foreign policy interests with its internal contradictions of inequality and marginalization, particularly its black African and mixed-race descent population.

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