

Critical Analysis Of The Greentree Agreement Between Nigeria And Cameroon

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Abstract: This paper critically analyses the Greentree Agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon, and evaluates the socio-legal as well as the socio-economic implications of its peaceful settlement. Neglect and subsequent discovery of oil deposits subjected the Bakassi Peninsula to claims and counter-claims for sovereignty, military occupation and recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ's ruling in 2002 in favour of Cameroon, although based on sound historical evidence, faced implementation difficulties. However, following mediation by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, good faith by protagonists, the Greentree Agreement and subsequent instruments, Nigeria completed the withdrawal of its military, police and administration from the Bakassi Peninsula by 14 August 2008. Putting aside disruptive activities by social movements, the entire process could be viewed as a model in peaceful resolution of border conflicts. Implications of the settlement anchor on expenditure-reducing and expenditure-switching effects, wealth-generating effects, and enhanced cross-border activities.

Keywords: Greentree, Agreement, Bakassi, Nigeria, Cameroun

I. INTRODUCTION

The border between Cameroon and Nigeria extending from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea has been a bone of contention between the two territories dating back to 1913. In 1993 Nigerian troops occupied the Bakassi Peninsula. In 1994, after serious incidents of border incursions that provoked shooting, then after many casualties and deaths of soldiers had been recorded on both sides, Cameroon submitted its entire set of border-related disputes with Nigeria to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for adjudication. After examining the case for eight years, the World Court ruled that Cameroon is the rightful owner of the oil-rich Peninsula, basing its argument on the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty which traced the borders between the two colonial powers.

Following intensive diplomatic activities culminating in the 12 June 2006 Greentree Agreement brokered by the United Nations and witnessed/guaranteed by four world powers – Britain, France, Germany and the United States – Nigeria eventually agreed to unconditionally hand over the oil-rich Peninsula to Cameroon. On 14 August 2006 Nigeria

effectively pulled out its military and the Cameroonian flag was hoisted. Two years later (14 August 2008) the remaining Nigerian administration and police left the Peninsula. In this context, few key questions arise: what are the key issues in the Greentree Agreement? What was the principal claim of Nigeria in the Conflict? What are the socio-economic implications of the Greentree Agreement? Who benefits more from the Greentree Agreement? What are the Implications to Nigeria? What are the socio-legal implications for Nigeria? This paper seeks to answer these questions as it critically evaluates the Greentree Agreement.

II. BACKGROUND TO THE GREENTREE AGREEMENT

For over a decade, interest in the Bakassi peninsula enveloped a modern world. Some passive, some active, but whether active or passive, these interests have generated economic and political realities that are being resolved to benefit all interested parties. From fishing environment, to rudimentary habitation, military occupation, ICJ adjudication,

and resolution of title, the Bakassi Peninsula has passed through several phases in its life cycle. For what it is, the Bakassi Peninsula will continue to determine how a modern world manages and resolves her interests sustainably.

Particularly, the agreement consisting of eight binding articles entered into between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of the Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula made provision for recognition of the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula; Nigeria agreeing to withdraw all its armed forces from the Bakassi Peninsula; and Cameroon, after the transfer of authority to it by Nigeria, guaranteeing to Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula the exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms.

The Greentree Agreement was signed between Presidents of the two countries, President Paul Biya of Cameroon and President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. Further, the agreement was signed by representatives of the United Nations, Germany, the United States of America; France and the United Kingdom as witnesses.

Almost a decade down, the fear of war is over, the drive from Cameroonian and Nigerian authorities to improve living standards within their national boundaries are rising. The countries have moved on, but with ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula finally resolved in favour of Cameroon also mean that there is a lot both countries can do and benefit from in the ambit of international cooperation. Peace in the Bakassi region translates to peace and economic development of the Gulf of Guinea, a region with enormous potentials and existing major investments.

According to the then Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, the Greentree Agreement was a great achievement in conflict prevention, which practically reflected its cost-effectiveness when compared with the alternative of conflict resolution. He urged that it should represent a model for the resolution of similar conflicts in Africa and the world at large. Moreover, President Obasanjo had played a leading role in conflict resolution among African states. Experts had noted that it was in the United States' interests to resolve the dispute to provide 'secure operating environment for oil companies' including Exxon-Mobil, which is active in the region (Friends of the Earth 2003).

III. EVALUATION OF THE GREENTREE AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provided yet another legal facility as contained in Article 46(1) where it states: "*A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.*"

Article 46 (2) further presented some clarifications to the above provisions: "*A violation is manifest if it would be*

objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith."

These provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties equally present Nigeria with an option to challenge a violation of its internal procedures for legitimizing treaties/agreement which the Greentree Agreement of 2006 did not observe. In the final analysis, it must be noted that the said Greentree Agreement has nothing practically to do with the ICJ Judgment in terms of its legitimacy or otherwise to have warranted its inclusion by Nigeria in her quest for a revision of the ICJ Judgment of October 10, 2002. Since the said Greentree Agreement came into force in year 2006 which was far back after the Court verdict was delivered it became apparent that Nigeria relaxed tremendously in taking proactive decisions on Bakassi. What Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ required were areas of errors or unknown facts from the Judgment it passed on October 10, 2002 on the case between Nigeria and Cameroon over the disputed sovereignty question of the Bakassi Peninsula. Therefore, we should have been more focused and articulate in our submission/presentation for revision of the said ICJ Judgment of October 10, 2002 which ceded our Bakassi Island to Cameroon. Basically, the preceding paragraphs attempted to situate within some provisions of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties areas of ambiguity for Nigeria to have explored in her quest for the revision of October 10, 2002 verdict which ceded the disputed Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon as provided for in the Court Statute Article 61 (Sub-Section 1 & 5) respectively.

IV. RULING OF THE ICJ AND DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION

Cameroon tabled its border dispute with Nigeria before the ICJ in 1994 following the occupation of the Bakassi territory by the Nigerian troops on 12 December 1993. Cameroon anchored its claim over the ownership of Bakassi on the Anglo- German Treaty of 11 March 1913 when both territories now called Cameroon and Nigeria were under colonial rule. Nigeria tried unsuccessfully to challenge the legal basis of the 1913 Treaty, arguing that the two colonial masters had no *locus standito* cede territories and that the agreement was not ratified by any of the parliaments of the two nations. Nigeria also unsuccessfully maintained that the alleged ceding of the Peninsula by Gowon was not endorsed by the Supreme Military Council, which was the law-making body of the country at the time.

On 10 October 2002, after eight years of deliberations, the ICJ at The Hague decided that Cameroon had sovereignty over Bakassi, basing its decision on old colonial documents. The boundaries in the Lake Chad region were determined by the Thomson-Marchand Declarations of 1929-1930 and the boundary in Bakassi was determined by the Anglo- German Treaty of 11 March 1913. The Court requested Nigeria to quickly and unconditionally withdraw her administration, police and military from the area of Lake Chad under Cameroonian sovereignty and from the Bakassi Peninsula.

The ICJ equally requested Cameroon to expeditiously and without condition remove any administration or military or

police forces which may be present along the land boundary from Lake Chad to the Bakassi Peninsula on territories which, pursuant to the judgment, fall within the sovereignty of Nigeria. The Court fixed the land boundaries from Lake Chad in the north to Bakassi in the south. However, the Court did not specify a definite location off the coast of Equatorial Guinea where the maritime boundary between the two countries would terminate. The immediate reaction was that Nigeria rejected the ruling, and at one point it seemed possible that the dispute would flare into open war, but UN mediation brought the two sides to the table (Friends of the Earth 2003; Sango 2002).

When it became difficult to implement the ICJ ruling, the UN Secretary-General formed the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission on the request of both leaders. The Mixed Commission first demarcated the land boundaries. The development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation monitored by the Mixed Commission included the construction of border markets and roads linking the two countries. All appeared on track – some villages further north and around Lake Chad were exchanged until the handing-over process reached the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula. Two withdrawal timetables were not respected; thousands of Nigerians in the Bakassi Peninsula were not sure where they stood in terms of citizenship and many wanted to remain Nigerians since they had more social and economic ties with Nigeria (Borzello 2004). Nigeria's failure to give Cameroon full control of Bakassi on 15 September 2004 was predicated on the argument that their withdrawal would lead to the collapse of law and order.

In addition, Nigeria submitted that the most democratic manner to decide Bakassi's sovereignty would be to hold a referendum since about 90% of the people on the Peninsula did not want to become Cameroonian (Eboh 2005).

Nigeria claimed that sovereignty of Bakassi was not a matter of oil or natural resources on land or in coastal waters, but rather the welfare and well-being of Nigerians on their land (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2002). There were calls on the Nigerian government by some Nigerians to go to war over the matter. This school of thought argued that 'there is no morality in international relations' and that it is against the national interest of Nigeria in terms of security and economic interest to accept the ICJ's verdict in its totality (Etim-Bassey 2002).

However, other Nigerians cautioned against war – arguing that women and children are the main casualties in time of war. The Mixed Commission's mandate covered the following areas: (1) The demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries; (2) The withdrawal of civil administration, military and police forces and transfer of authority in relevant areas along the boundary; (3) The eventual demilitarisation of the Bakassi peninsula; (4) The need to protect the rights of the affected populations in both countries; (5) The development of projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation; and (6) The reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. They further maintained that 'the principle of good faith' in international relations demands that Nigeria should not disavow her word of honour as evidenced by the Diplomatic Note of 1962 (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor 2006).

There is no doubt that the ICJ has a limited capacity to facilitate enforcement because there is a very weak interplay between passing judgment and binding enforcements. Implementation of rulings of the ICJ is largely dependent on the goodwill of countries in conflict. In situations where the countries involved are outward looking and cherish international credibility, diplomatic pressure can act as a credible tool which can be used to generate incentives for compliance with international obligations.

V. SOCIO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIA

The recent declaration of independence, hoisting of flag and coat of arms by the Bakassi people in Cross River State of Nigeria has far-reaching legal and social implications for Nigeria, as it further amplifies the shaky artificial unity of Nigeria as a united country. The Bakassi issue is strictly an international law matter, as the decision of the *International Court of Justice* (ICJ) has ceded or supposed to have ceded, Bakassi to Cameroon though the process remains inchoate, in law called inconclusive, as certain legal and constitutional steps to give full effect to the ICJ ruling have yet been perfected. The National Assembly has till date been unwilling to effect necessary constitutional changes to give effect to the cession of the Bakassi. The "Greentree Agreement" represents another crucial document of international and local legal significance. The agreement effectuates the cession of Bakassi, arguably subject to the constitution.

Under the international law, it would appear that Bakassi people do have a right of self-determination (see *Pius L. Okoronkwo, "Self-Determination and Legality of Biafra's Secession Under International Law" (2002) Loyola of Los Angeles International and comparative Law Review, at page 63*). Self-determination is the right of peoples to determine their own destiny and form government. This may be due to the desire for freedom from colonial rule, internal domination, among others. Self-determination may also be exercised through the establishment of sovereign independent state, by integration, or association with another state.

Self-determination encompasses five basic characteristics: (1) government according to the will of the people; (2) absence of internal or external domination; (3) the free pursuit of economic, social, and cultural development; (4) the enjoyment of fundamental human rights, and (5) the absence of discrimination on grounds of race, colour, or political conviction. Customary international law has acknowledged self-determination as an inalienable right. The right of self-determination is, therefore, tantamount to the right of freedom from alien oppressors, tyranny, or subjugation from local or foreign forces.

Self-determinism is the doctrinal principle on which right of self-determination is exercised. Though several international instruments recognize the principle of self-determination, certain peoples continue to get enmeshed in socio-political conflict with their parent states in a bid to exercise right to self-determination. This is largely because the scope of self-determination is hardly precise, as no international law instrument defines it precise terms or identifies the categories of peoples to exercise right to self-

determination. In international politics, self-determination contradicts, and appears irreconcilable, with territorial integrity.

Self-determination in the case of Bakassi and other ethnic groups in Nigeria are political agitations. However, the Bakassi issue further re-enacts the argument that Nigerians do not share significant commonalities. Sir High Clifford, a former British Governor-General to Nigeria, observed that Nigerians exist in a “*collection of self-contained and mutually independent Native States, separated from one another, by vast distance, by differences of history and tradition, and by ethnological, racial, political, social and religious barriers*” (Okoronkwo, supra at 66). The late sage, Chief Obafemi Awolowo also acknowledged the fact that “*Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the same sense as there are “English”, “Welsh” or “French”. The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.*” Like the late Chief Awolowo, Sir Ahmadu Bello also noted, that “*Lord Laggard and his amalgamation were far from popular amongst us at that time. There were agitations in favour of secession; we should set-up our own; we should cease to have anything more to do with the Southern people, we should take our own way.*”

The views of early leaders of Nigeria quoted above point clearly at the shaky foundations upon which the unity of Nigeria was negotiated and built. Agitations for secession are as old as the history of the nation, perhaps older. Available records show that every ethnic group had at one time or the other threatened or expressed a desire to separate. One prominent example is the old Biafra. However, self-determination in the case of Bakassi is more of protest against an attempt to foist upon the people a State different from one in which they choose to live. In international law, this is a valid ground for the exercise of right of a people to self-determination. Conversely, it may as well be a ploy to spite the international community that the ICJ decision is not popular with the Bakassi people, as they would prefer to have their own country rather than have foist upon them a new nationality different from Nigeria.

Self-determination in the context of protest against the “Greentree Agreement” and the ICJ decision ceding Bakassi to Cameroon would appear to make sense. Legally, right of self-determination includes right to determine under which government one is subject to. A people may legally and validly exercise the right not to be subject or govern by a particular government or leader. The Bakassi people have continually indicated preference for Nigeria as against Cameroon. Some opinion writers and legal essayists have argued that the decision to transfer Bakassi to Cameroon was reached without the involvement of the effected people. A counter argument has also been put forward that even the entity now known as Nigeria is a foisted choice. This is the foremost arguments of the post-colonialist.

A critical view of the logic of the arguments of post-colonialism shows that they tend to over-emphasize ‘colonialism’ as basis of socio-political problems of Nigeria and other countries. But it would appear that post-colonial arguments have inadvertently failed to balance the impact of

colonialism against factual incidents and locally generated socio-political problems that occurred immediately after independence in a country like Nigeria. It is the writer’s considered view that is no-longer convincing to blame all developmental and economic woes of post-colonial countries on colonialism. In actual fact, it would appear that post-colonial countries like Nigeria and her counterparts in Africa have inflicted other forms of ‘colonialism’ on their fellow countrymen and women, including unborn children, worse than those inflicted by the colonial overlords.

Though the essence of self-determination is to remove a group from the political domination of another group, self-determinism for basis of cessation may sometimes be counter-productive especially when hurriedly deployed as reactionary, political steps. Speaking frankly, ‘fusion’ of different ethnic groups in Nigeria might not be directly responsible for the state of the country’s socio-economic and political problems in view of increasing waves of multiculturalism. The global trend is such that countries and societies are becoming increasingly widely diversified and multi-ethnically oriented. As a nation, Nigeria might have feared worse if tiny ethnic communities were granted statehood like Togo, Sao Tome and Principe and other small, city-like countries.

The fact remains, however, that the Bakassi issue has continued to be a test for the efficacy of international law and institutions in Nigeria, as elsewhere. In its attempt to solve one problem, it has created several others. The peculiar socio-political tension in Nigeria has further complicated the matter. The concern now is that the cycle of the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon does not resurface or escalate Nigeria’s security and political situations due to the nature of the oil-rich Bakassi region. Technically, Bakassi is under Cameroon by virtue of the ICJ ruling. Therefore, for diplomatic or strategic reasons, Nigeria should keep its cool while the Bakassi people revolt against an attempt to forcefully subject them to another country.

The job of the UN and its institutions like the ICJ, is far from complete as far as Bakassi issue is concerned. This is because the overriding purpose of international law is to commit states to use force only as a last resort after the failure or exhaustion of diplomatic and other peaceful means of conflict resolution. Generally, all members of the UN shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations (*See Article 2(4) UN Charter*). In line with the intendment of the words ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘political independence’; the UN Security Council may investigate any dispute or situation that may endanger international peace and security, and may recommend appropriate procedure or methods of adjustment of disputes, particularly those listed in Article 33. It provides: “The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangement, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”

The implementation of “Greentree Agreement” is ordinarily subject to validation by the National Assembly of

Nigeria, and explains why the process for the transfer of Bakassi to Cameroon has been slow, and seemingly unrealistic or doubtful. The position of the Nigerian constitution is that no treaty between Nigeria and any other country has any effect or force of law except to the extent to which the *National Assembly of Nigeria* has enacted any such treaty into law (*Section 12 (1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999*). Legally, this provision excludes Nigeria from liability for non-compliance with international obligations, as these could be excused on ground of domestic legal expediencies. Where the Federal government of Nigeria is unable to comply with international obligations or agreement like the "Greentree Agreement" or ICJ decision, the only remedy might be the imposition of economic or political sanctions, which countries rarely apply in international legal relations unless it becomes absolutely necessary as last resort. This technicality gives the National Assembly power or latitude to step-down the appropriate legal or constitutional frameworks to give effect to the final transfer of Bakassi to Cameroon, on ground of national expediencies, bearing in mind the constitutional role of the National Assembly.

In the final analysis, the declaration of independence by Bakassi is to be viewed from various angles. First, it is the expression of a people's unwillingness to have foisted on them a government they hardly see as legitimate. It is also a way of testing the efficacy of the international law principle and right to self-determination. While this paper does not suggest that Nigeria should be dismembered to allow the various ethnic groups part ways; it would appear a face-saving device for the Federal Government of Nigeria to allow, condone or 'ignore' the recent declaration of independence by the Bakassi people as a better option as against voluntarily yielding Bakassi to Cameroon due to the ICJ decision. In diplomacy, further political options or alternatives are never foreclosed. This might as well be a natural way or resolving the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula, based on a "win-win" or "no-win" situation that may eventually allow the people exercise their right of self-determination initially by independence, and later by association with another state, be it Nigeria or Cameroon.

VI. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAKASSI CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Reflections on the possible socio-economic implications of the Bakassi conflict resolution are anchored on expenditure-reducing and expenditure-switching effects of peaceful settlements, wealth-generating effects of international credibility, cross-border activities enhanced by the new-found confidence and the need for accompanying measures. The handover of Bakassi to Cameroon by Nigeria is a clear example of precautionary diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of border disputes. The two countries are moving in the direction of adoption of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression. Also, the two countries have shown an example of the potential for moving from a culture of reaction to a culture of peace.

Indeed, the economic significance of Bakassi to the region is significant. However, Nigeria's seeming geographic

disadvantage over the Bakassi Peninsula actually holds abundant economic, political, and social benefits for the Giant of Africa. Bakassi in Cameroon's hands equally holds out substantial economic significance to Nigeria even though Nigeria has only a seaward access to Bakassi which could promote the harnessing of Nigeria's maritime potentials in an environment of peace, and at the same time promote Nigeria's naval operations as conflict in the waters and the peninsula become nonexistent. The Cameroonian government being at liberty to manage the natural resources of Bakassi eliminates administrative costs of the peninsula to Nigeria and extends a necessity for beneficial consultative interests.

With the development of Bakassi by Cameroon totally bringing an end to conflict over the peninsula; activities of sea pirates, smugglers, and human traffickers become eliminated as joint Cameroon-Nigeria border patrol steps in. Joint border oil exploration will equally benefit Nigeria while reducing the cost of oil exploration resulting in practical economic cooperation. Overall, economic cooperation with Cameroon will protect Nigerian residents in Bakassi, the larger Cameroon Republic, and all Francophone countries by extension.

VII. EXPENDITURE-REDUCING AND SWITCHING EFFECTS

In an escalating border conflict situation, the countries involved generally spend much more on security and military activities. Such military spending often crowds out social spending on health, education and infrastructure, a practice that negatively affects the welfare situation of the citizenry. As hostilities are scaled down through a negotiated settlement, wasteful military spending is scaled down as well, hence the expenditure-reducing effect of peaceful settlement of border conflicts. At the same time, there are potentials and incentives to switch from military spending to social sector spending, a situation that will enhance the general welfare of the population. In the case of the Bakassi Peninsula dispute settlement between Cameroon and Nigeria, both countries will realise savings in military and associated logistical expenditures. These savings can be more judiciously used to enhance the standards of living of the various populations via infrastructural development that generates income and employment opportunities. The success of these, however, depends on the good faith of the governments in place and the reducing of corruption.

VIII. WHO BENEFITS FROM THE WEALTH-GENERATING EFFECTS

The peaceful settlement of the Bakassi dispute has increased the international credibility of the presidents of Cameroon and Nigeria, as well as that of the economy of both countries. This new-found credibility would act as an incentive to both domestic and foreign investors to invest and create employment opportunities, which will provoke income-generating activities that are badly needed to reverse the dismal socio-economic situation of the bulk of the populations

of both countries. In particular, Cameroon can now valorise her oil deposits and promote modern fishing in the Peninsula, especially at a time when the country is reaping the fallouts of the 2006 completion point of the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative. This will be facilitated both by the peace dividend and the design of accompanying incentives to pull in trans-national oil and fishing companies. The effective exploitation of these resources will improve Cameroon's trade balance, fiscal revenue and resources for her poverty eradication programmes. This is consistent with the three major contributions that investment in oil development is expected to bring to the host country – employment opportunities, foreign exchange earnings, and technology transfer that enhances local capacities (Oruwari and Owei 2005).

IX. CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITIES

Due to historical and ethno-linguistic ties between Cameroon and Nigeria, even during hostilities, trans-border trading did not stop (Konings 2005). It is expected that with the peaceful handing over of Bakassi to Cameroon, fruitful socioeconomic activities between the two countries will be revamped. In this regard, it will be in the interest of both countries if more formal trading arrangements are negotiated, so as to curb smuggling, enhance the competitiveness of home industries and increase tax revenues accordingly. Cross-border activities will be enhanced further if Cameroon and Nigeria push forward their intentions to initiate a number of political and economic confidence-building measures, and to consider the adoption of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between them. To crown it all, the Bakassi story illustrates the crucial role of multilateral measures, such as the potential for dialogue and conflict resolution offered by recourse to the ICJ. The Mixed Commission also represents a remarkable initiative and can be seen as an excellent model for preventive diplomacy and a precious tool for moving from a culture of confrontation to a culture of peace.

Notwithstanding this apparent success story in conflict settlement, a few months before 14 August 2008 – the date Nigerian administration and police were expected to finally pull out from the Peninsula as per the June 2006 Greentree Agreement – a succession of armed attacks suggested that social activities should go on unhampered. Indeed, both nations exchange delegations on a regular basis, and the Presidents customarily send messages of congratulation to each other on festive occasions. This happened even at the peak of hostilities in the Bakassi area. A noted example is the visit of a Cameroon delegation to Nigeria in 1995 'in order to canvass support for Cameroon's membership in the Commonwealth' (Mbuh 2004: 2). These attacks were perhaps meant to undermine the entire process of sustaining the peaceful settlement. However, subsequent to the first attack, Nigeria dispatched a high-level government delegation led by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to Yaoundé to present the condolence of the government and people of Nigeria following the brutal killing of Cameroonian Officers. In addition, Nigerian authorities stated and re-stated their resolve

to respect international commitments on the conflict settlement.

X. CONCLUSION

The treaty, (Greentree Agreement) endorsed in New York, was the follow-up to the ruling in 2002, by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which awarded the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.

The Greentree Agreement between Nigeria and Cameroon has brought some socio-legal as well as socio-economic implications for both Nigeria and Cameroon. The ICJ's ruling in 2002 in favour of Cameroon, although based on sound historical evidence, faced implementation difficulties. However, following mediation by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, good faith by protagonists, the Greentree Agreement and subsequent instruments, Nigeria completed the withdrawal of its military, police and administration from the Bakassi Peninsula by 14 August 2008. Putting aside disruptive activities by social movements, the entire process could be viewed as a model in peaceful resolution of border conflicts. Implications of the settlement anchor on expenditure-reducing and expenditure-switching effects, wealth-generating effects, and enhanced cross-border activities.

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