Kenya’s Electoral Management Dynamics And East Africa’s Regional Security Architecture; Reflections On The 2007 Election

Juma Thomas Otieno
(PhD Candidate – Political Science, Kisii University)
Lecturer – Moi University; Dept. of History, Political Science, and Public Administration

Abstract: Most elections in Kenya since first multi-party elections in 1992 have experienced management problems. The gravest occurrence emanating from electoral management which generated the disputed presidential elections in December 2007. The management dynamics have had much impact in many fronts for internal security architecture and also by extension to the country’s common borders. Such effects include; internal displacement/ refugees, economic losses, security stalemates between neighbouring states, and possible proliferation of arms which make security infrastructure complex thereafter. The 2007 electoral management degenerated the once peaceful country into a near pariah state. To describe the dynamics, the study; examined elections and African conflicts, assessed Kenya’s 2007 electoral management and East Africa Regional (EAR) security, and finally, highlighted elections’ management challenges EAR. Using a case study design and mixed approach method, the paper in its findings confirm by generalizations that dynamisms of electoral management indeed has effects to a country’s security infrastructure (both internal and external) which in a geographical proximity requires interdependence.

Keywords: Election’s Management/ Electoral Management/ Kenya’s Elections/ 2007 Election/ Election’s Dynamics/ Election’s Security/ Electoral Systems/ East Africa/ Regional Security

I. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Kenya’s electoral management has undergone major metamorphosis over time. With initial management majorly controlled by government to the current independent electoral body, the dynamics of electoral management have indeed changed reflectively. The history of elections in Kenya has been full of challenges. The political power games sought to control all political processes almost immediately after independence. This reflects suggestion by Cassandra R. Veney and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2013) and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2009) that Kenya emerged out of colonialism in 1963, after a prolonged liberation struggle, with a political economy marked by the existence of an authoritarian state, uneven regional development, deep social cleavages, and an intolerant political culture sustained by deep historical memories of grievance and injustice. Nationalist ideology both masked and reinforced the inherited political deformities of the colonial state in so far as it mobilized the colonized for freedom while simultaneously seeking to homogenize them in the inflexible ideology of nation-building.

In Kenya, the seeds of democracy sown by the nationalist struggles wilted before the stubborn legacies of the despotic colonial state which its authoritarian postcolonial heir inherited virtually unchanged. The KANU government moved quickly to centralize the state apparatus: regionalism was abolished in 1964; a republican constitution was promulgated, followed by the abolition of the senate two years later. The new ruling class gradually consolidated immense power in the hands of the executive (Veney and Zeleza, 2013). According to Nyanjom (2011), the issues of power politics have been at the epicenter of political play in Kenya including at subsequent elections that followed later in her independence. Within a year of independence, however, the victorious
KANU party government instigated reviews to the constitution that by 1966 had fashioned a unitary government into a de facto single party system. The political rearrangements of power structuring at the dawn of independence were bound to affect Kenya’s elections by extension. Wasserman, Gary (1976) in his article notes the use of electoral politics to frustrate emerging nationalism becoming a citadel of neo-colonialism from militant nationalism. The first led to the dissolution of the opposition Kenya African Democratic Union into KANU within a year of independence; the second manifested itself with the split in KANU two years later with the formation of the Kenya People’s Union. Ochieng’ and Ogot (1996) and Percox (2004) there were strong pressures for both political fusion and fission. Rothchild (1973) agrees with the two viewpoints and thinks they end up being power struggles to fill the vacuum left due to colonialists’ departure.

Gertzel (1970) and Lamb (1974) observe, in subsequent years, the move from Kenya to a de facto one-party state after the KPU was banned in October 1969 bolstered the tendency to coercive fusion, while the proliferation of parties following the emergence of multi-party politics in 1991 saw the resurgence of fission. Broadly speaking, Sandbrook (1975), the struggles between the various factions of the political class between 1964 and 1970 were indicative of the disintegrating alliance that had been formed between the resistive petty bourgeoisie and disaffected masses in the struggle for independence.

Cassandra R. Veney and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2013) suggest that since the 1990s, Kenya, like most African Countries, has undergone a protracted transition to democracy. There are arguably four watershed events in this story: 1992 when the first multiparty elections were held since Kenya had become a one-party state; 2002 when the 40 year reign of Kenya African National Union (KANU) came to an end after the party lost to an opposition coalition; 2007 when the disputed election results triggered the worst outbreak of violence the Country had ever seen since independence; and 2010 when a new constitution was finally adopted.

The above developments raise critical questions about the patterns and processes of transition to democracy in Kenya and the historical and contemporary contexts that have made the transition so problematic, and its likely trajectory. Notable among these include; first there was a quick move by political elites to control political processes through state centralization by the ruling party. Secondly, the ruling regime inherited to their ‘advantage’ authoritarian state in economic structure replacing the colonial brown people. Lastly and very significant to electoral processes is the intolerant political culture. Unlike the pre-election violence of 1992 and 1997, in 2007 Kenya was engulfed by post-election violence. Mueller (2011) asserts the two were connected in so far as in the 1990s the beleaguered Moi regime had orchestrated militia violence against the opposition, which led to the gradual decentralization and privatization of violence that engulfed the Country in 2007-08. The crisis (Owuor, 2009) reflected both the population’s yearnings for democracy and their bitter disappointment in the Country’s weak institutional capacities to deliver a clean election.

In addition, Veney and Zeleza (2013) suggests, clearly, since the dawn of the era of multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, Kenya has experienced many bumps in the road to the construction of a democratic developmental state. Elections have served as important barometers of the challenges and possibilities of this complex and protracted transition. The elections in 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 were a testament to the citizens’ wish for accountability, transparency, and representation, while the accompanying disputes and violence were a testimony to the incapacity of the political class to fulfill such wishes. The scale of the 2007-2008 post-election violence was particularly shocking.

Kenya’s elections like its counterparts in the region have been prone to manageable violence except the 2007 which became a regional security concern. These elections and a few more in Africa seem to point a trend towards regional security because of the experiential cross border effects the Kenyan Post Election Violence (PEV) had. Is it due to increased regionalization? According to Hawke (2013), the election violence from Kenya’s 2007 polling and even the years before are manifestations of the culture of violence and authoritarianism deepened by institutionalized and intensified instruments of power control through regimes to achieve power goals. This position is not different from the earlier stated scholars which I tend to subscribe to. He continues to allude that with the return of multi-party politics in 1991, however, came an intensification of the use of violence in electoral competition.

Another core factor to the Kenya’s electoral political matrix is the rise of ethnicity as a mobiliser of political forces across the country. Across the decade, including the 1992 and 1997 general elections, brutal violence between ethnic groups became normalized as the way in which political competition was to be resolved. The 1997 election saw Moi’s KANU MPs for the areas returned successfully, after around 100,000 non-Mijikenda voters were driven out of their constituencies in preparation. In other areas, it was only until after the 1997 election that the violence began, as communities – particularly the Kalenjin and Kikuyu – sought to punish those perceived to have voted wrongly, which, of course, proliferated reprisal attacks in turn. During a 3-month period from December 1998, for example, 300 hundred were killed in the Rift Valley.

In Ghai and J.P.W (1970.), the elections which produced the first independence government in Kenya were held in May 1963, under the supervision of the then colonial government. Subsequent general elections were held 1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, and 1988. In 1966 what is generally referred to as the “Little General Elections” were held after some 28 members of parliament left the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) to an opposition party named the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) under the leadership of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, who had been Kenya’s Vice-president. Ghai noted that a fresh election was forced before the expiry of the mandated five-year period because a hastily passed constitutional amendment decreed that no MP would continue to have such wishes. The scale of the 2007-2008 post-election violence was particularly shocking.

From these backgrounds dating electoral disharmonies from the onset of the East African states, possibilities of such escalating to conflict is not remote. It could probably have not been viewed as one of the likely causes of earlier independent
conflicts but the social interactions of this issue can imply the ugly scenes that have reminiscent the region’s history silently. In Kenya, the 2007 was just a climaxing of events building over time.

Introspection into Tanzania’s electoral system used currently First Past the Post (FPTP), pluralism where the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councilor Candidate who secures the simple majority of votes is declared to be the winner has remained to build comparatively peaceful atmosphere within and in the region. One may ask whether this is a product of institutional or legal frameworks at work or a foundation of some hidden set system at work. An important point to understand is that different electoral systems exist and these have been used in East Africa. IFES (2014), points that an election system is a method by which voters make a choice between options, often in an election or on a policy referendum. An electoral system contains rules for valid voting, and how votes are fed and aggregated to yield a final result.

The choice of electoral system is one of the most important institutional decisions for any democracy (Reynolds et al, 2005). They say, in almost all cases the choice of a particular electoral system has a profound effect on the future political life of the Country concerned, and electoral systems, once chosen, often remain fairly constant as political interests solidify around and respond to the incentives presented by them. Electoral system choice is a fundamentally political process, rather than a question to which independent technical experts can produce a single ‘correct answer’.

The point raised by Reynolds et al is very contestable because choice of electoral system is one thing but its operationalization is altogether another issue. Why raise this? It is because, a country like Kenya at the time of 2007 elections had moved from governmental to semi-governmental through even a referendum testing but the results were not impressive. Systems by no means are very good especially when handled by the right people within the frameworks that direct systems operations.

Any electoral system should cultivate diversity in the representation and extent of representation in the legislature and that it should be one which is fair to both voters and parties (Haysom, 2003). In discussing Proportional Representation (PR), Elklit (2003: 122), “I see it as an umbrella concept, which is particularly attractive because it is nonspecific, but also because it allows for inclusion of specific systemic elements, which taken alone must detract from proportionality. This is the formal electoral thresholds in Germany and Denmark. These are electoral systems whose main objective is to achieve a reasonable degree of proportionality.”

In a First Past the Post system (FPTP), sometimes known as a plurality single-member district system, the winner is the candidate with the most votes, but not necessarily an absolute majority of the votes. When this system is used in multi-member districts it becomes the Block Vote (BV). Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and the highest-polling candidates fill the positions, regardless of the percentage of the vote they actually achieve. Majoritarian systems, such as the Australian Alternative Vote (AV) and the French Two-Round System (TRS) try to ensure that the winning candidate receives an absolute majority (i.e. over fifty percent). Each system, in essence, makes use of voters' second preferences to produce a majority winner, if one does not emerge from the first round of voting (www.aceproject.org).

There is a growing trend towards elections as a means of representation in Africa. What this portends is that democracy is appealing to many political players. Vorrath asserts that multiparty elections have become frequent events in almost all countries of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). But in 2010 and 2011 an exceptionally high number of elections have been held. By mid-2011 presidential and/or parliamentary elections had taken place in 20 countries. While voting has become a regular occurrence in many of these countries, has it been accompanied by an improvement in democratic quality? Vorrath (2011). The question of quality is what drags electoral management in this thought because silently it is a question of how elections are conducted and their value to democracy.

According to Vorrath (2011), quality has also been called into question by electoral violence and insecurity. Insecurity still seems to be commonly associated with voting in SSA, with eight of the 20 countries witnessing downward security trends in the context of recent elections. A popular line of thought which might be very satisfactory to tyrants in Africa is what (Lindberg 2006) suggests, regular elections, even if flawed and imperfect, improve democratic quality over time. It is anti-quality and not bothered by the outcomes of the imperfect elections. This category of thought out rightly views elections as rubber stamps of illegitimacy thus pointers of their nature to perpetuate insecurity.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

Papp (1994) views international relations as systemically connected. The author in adopting some of these attributes postures that Regional Security Complexities can be visualized and illustrated by a modified Layer Analysis of international relations to connect the study variables; Dependent variable, independent variable, and moderating variable (DV, IV, and MV). In this framework, key participants in elections are citizens (electorates) who through the national institutions – Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and through the bureaucratic state systems express their governance desires in defining a state’s leadership with positivist expectations.

Without this, there can be likelihood of disenfranchisement at all levels of electoral cycle. In election as an activity and event, interests are inherently expressed or implied by state (including all internal dynamics) and non-state actors. Internal dynamics are at the very core to the group of politicians and their political parties. One fundamental expectation of this process is state survival which means security. The expectation comes at best when there is stability. When it is attained, then by extension, regional security is assured hence proper operation of regional systems (which here includes states and inter-state bodies within a region).

In analyzing electoral process, it is notable that security complexities are very inherent. Security complexities range from within the institution that run the elections, the state
institutions, other institutions within the state which are not
government related, and external institutions bound by the
international framework of states. There is somehow
institutional involvement at all levels which attributes to
regional security from this exercise, elections. The stability of
such institutions seem not to be an option for regional security
realization.

Within the mix of Regional Security Complex Theory
(RSCT), therefore, the research attempts to find how such
institutions (local and regional) can be caused to be avenues of
regional security. Is it by securitization/ security community
(institutions) or through non- security electoral institution
within the region? The lines of argument consider issues of
state sovereignty and non- interference principles among state
relations. Similarly, it is important to question sovereignty
amidst in capacity to survive as a state.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK SUMMARY

Source: Researcher, 2016

Figure 1

Included in the Kenya’s electoral management dynamics are;
the model in place, the composition of election’s
management body, the guiding legal frameworks, the human
resource acquisition procedures, the operationalization of core
activities, the relationship with the government due to
budgetary support and security, and its link with external
actors. There are other dynamics that are associated with the
concept ‘Kenya’. It is a big dynamic, since the existential
of Kenya to Kenyans has always and is now more profoundly
about identity groups yearning for their dominance amidst the
other groups. This dynamic has extended to every sector and
electoral management is not isolated. The interactions of these
dynamics whether positive or negative impacts on the EAR
security architecture economically, socially, and politically.
This also affects available interventions; Inter State Security
Structures (ISSS), Extra State Security Structures (ESSS) –
which are found within and externally, and Electoral
Management Body itself (EMB). Again, in normal
circumstances, the moderating variables are meant to affect
both the dynamics as well as the EAR security architecture.

III. METHODOLOGY: STUDY DESIGN AND
TECHNIQUES

The researcher adopted a case study design. This was
applied cross-sectionally using purposive sampling technique
in combination with representative sample generated through
calculations on the basis of confidence level. Researcher
Robert K. Yin defines the case study research method as an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and
in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984).
Purposive sampling can be very useful for situations where
you need to reach a targeted sample quickly and where
sampling for proportionality is not the primary concern.
Through it, you are likely to get the opinions of your target
population, but you are also likely to overweigh sub groups in
your population that are more easily accessible.

IV. ELECTIONS AND AFRICAN CONFLICTS

As far as regional security is concerned geopolitically,
East African Region as a regional block draws different
meanings. East African Region has numerous perspectives in
terms of clustered countries. Among the many perspectives
that exist in description of this region include, first, the
common view which always wants to reflect on the three
traditional East African states of EAC whose existence has
been closely knit by integration and early colonial ties.

The East African Community (EAC) is the regional
intergovernmental organization of the Republics of Burundi,
Kenya, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the
Republic of Uganda, with its headquarters in Arusha,
Tanzania. The Treaty for Establishment of the East African
Community was signed on 30 November 1999 and entered
into force on 7 July 2000 following its ratification by the
original three Partner States – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
The Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi acceded
to the EAC Treaty on 18 June 2007 and became full Members
of the Community with effect from 1 July 2007 (EAC 2014).
The sixth state - South Sudan joined recently, Mayom (2016)
reports, “at their 17th Ordinary Summit held on 2nd March,
2016 in Arusha, Tanzania, the EAC Heads of State received
the report of the Council of Ministers on the negotiations for
the admission of the Republic of South Sudan into the
Community and decided to admit the Republic of South Sudan
as a new member. Again, later on, “President Salva Kiir
Mayardit of South Sudan, and Dr. John Pombe Joseph
Magufuli, President of the united Republic of Tanzania also
Chairperson of the EAC Summit of Heads of State have this
Friday the 15th of April 2016, signed the treaty of accession of
the Republic of South Sudan into the EAC in Dar Es salaam,
Tanzania” reads the communiqué seen by Gurtong.

The second view about the EAR which sometimes refers
to it as Eastern Africa Region constitutes 18 territories
including the island nations in Indian Ocean with Mt.
Kilimanjaro and Lake Victoria as two striking geographical
features. This perspective makes the region very expanded
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development pattern. Conspicuously, this view omits the Sudan states (Sudan and South Sudan) which have had long historical attachments to the definition Eastern Africa. This view includes many South African states in EAR. The third perspective of East Africa Region (EAR), classifies it as, “East Africa is a vast area encompassing the Countries of Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Seychelles, and Comoros. It further states that East Africa is a region with some of the most significant and oldest paleoanthropological (study of early hominids) finds in the world” (Exploring Africa, 2014).

It is important to observe that in as much as IGAD states exclude Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC; the proper EAR in my view should include them. An agreed definition of “East Africa” does not exist, but this report defines East Africa as: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda (Jacobsen, 2013).

Many factors can be attributable to the changing nature of African conflicts. The major one being the collapse of communism and creation of a unipolar system under the United States administration. In essence this means that the political system propagated for practice is democracy thus the normal problems associated with it seem enormous in the local African politics where systems may not want to embrace the democratic culture. This has resulted in so many electoral related conflicts which have more than a single country effect. Perlez (1992) is keen on pointing legacies of Cold War to Africa thus, in many African Countries, an onerous legacy of the cold war is centralized government control, particularly over economic matters, many experts say. In an address in Washington last October, George B. N. Ayittey, a Ghanaian who teaches economics at American University, said that while there was a deep-seated fascination with socialism across the continent, the basic problem of Africa is statism. Whatever the ideological professions of African governments, most -- even so-called capitalist states -- have been characterized by heavy state interventionism, he said. Professor Ayittey said the solution for Africa was a situation in which no individual or group, regardless of religion, race or ideological predilections, can capture the state.

Once avidly wooed by Washington and Moscow with large amounts of economic aid and modern armaments, the impoverished nations of Africa now find themselves desperate for friends. In the late 1980s and early 1990s (Perlez, 1992), superpower rivalry has been replaced by international indifference. Chege (1991) concurs that with the end of the cold war is centralized government control, particularly over economic matters, many experts say. In an address in Washington last October, George B. N. Ayittey, a Ghanaian who teaches economics at American University, said that while there was a deep-seated fascination with socialism across the continent, the basic problem of Africa is statism. Whatever the ideological professions of African governments, most -- even so-called capitalist states -- have been characterized by heavy state interventionism, he said. Professor Ayittey said the solution for Africa was a situation in which no individual or group, regardless of religion, race or ideological predilections, can capture the state.

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A moral question worth asking is whether democracy is really the antidote to peace in most African problems. This may cast questions whether the institutions of democracy are peaceful in themselves. As the American policy of democracy increases through activities like elections so does the level of conflicts also rise. The paradox resulting from the parallelism in which the two rhyme is interesting. Almost explicit to observe in the African context is the connection of democracy wars. These are seen by its failure and now leading to many discontented citizenry as Juma and Oluoch (2013) notes. It thus leads to asking on how democracy through elections will be conducted in order to refocus regional security. In the post-cold war era, a continental shift in terms of the independent era conflicts of coup is really being felt in Africa.

Human Rights Watch (2004) notes that during the 2003 Federal and States elections in Nigeria, at least 100 people were killed and many more were injured. Approximately 600 people were reported killed in the recent election violence in Kenya, following disputes over the results of the December 2007 presidential elections. In Political Insights into African Democracy (2013), Juma and Oluoch highlight the fact that, since the end of the conflicts of coups and bush wars. Two near waves of conflicts are engulfing Africa, Conflicts from elections and Global Urban Uprisings (GUU). They continue to say … the year 2000 to date, almost ten elections have caused conflicts hence causing worries. Why? Because it antagonizes even those perceived peaceful states and upcoming economic giants.

Similarly, (Atuobi, 2008) records that during the August 2007 run-off elections in Sierra Leone, violence erupted following a clash between the supporters of the ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and the opposition All People’s Congress (ACP). Violent attacks were also reported against the supporters of the SLPP when the ACP leader was sworn in as the new Presidents. The persistence of election related insecurities manifest as if they are only found in African continent yet they are global mostly among developing Countries. In Ebert (2001), election-related violence is defined as political violence aimed at the electoral process. It is geared towards winning political competition of power through violence, subverting the ends of the electoral and political process. The erupting election violence or election-related violence is understood as violent action intended towards some people, property or the electoral process, whose main purpose is supposedly an end goal to influence the electoral process before, during or after elections. Election violence can therefore aptly be deduced to take two perspectives – cultural and structural. The view point by Ebert seems to ignore other forms arising from election violence; systemic and institutional. On the other hand he deals with a normally formed opinion on African violence.

The second perception presupposes as Ebert points out the existence of a political culture of thuggery that generally predisposes actors to engage in violence and intimidation during political contests, while the structural explanation suggests that society and politics are organized in a manner that generates conflict. These two perspectives are reinforced by ethnic rivalries and mobilization in politics in most African Countries that have been volatile during elections. There are several factors responsible for election-related violence on the continent, among them structural weakness in election management, and especially the election management bodies; the nature of the electoral system (that is, the winner-takes-all); abuse of incumbency (access to state resources, manipulation of electoral rules); identity politics; heavy-handedness of the security forces during elections; and deficiencies in election observation and reporting (Atuobi
The argument built above exposes the nexus between electoral management and security since the characteristics of Atuobi’s bedrock suggestions are elements that would normally drive disappointed masses to violence. This works so negatively to those who belong to the losing side. Although, even the winning side easily become defensive, a situation that builds confrontation.

Ogwora (2015) observes correctly the existence of security threats, he also want to mean absence of the same which is a contradiction. In fact, from Cape to Cairo and likewise Nairobi to Abidjan comprise electoral tensions namely Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and Congo the period in years notwithstanding. Ogwora, however, rightly points as Atuobi among the many factors for election related violence and link them to, two paramount concepts that he thinks can be used to free Africa from the imbedded crisis. These conceptions he believes are constitutionalism and democracy. Again from him, mention of democracy is talking about election since it is a tool for measuring the practicability and existence of democracy. Moreover, observations by Atuobi indicate that in some countries including Rwanda, Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire, many widespread conflicts were preceded by disputes over the electoral process and election results, among other factors in aggregate.

V. KENYA’ 2007 ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT AND REGIONAL SECURITY

According to Brown (2003) and Fischer (2002) elections provide a legitimate and legal context in which citizens can express their opinions and views. To Reilly (2002) and Reilly (2008) it is a means towards democracy and democratic governance. Elections are viewed in the public discourse as the first step towards developing of democratic institutions and consolidating the democratization process (Kumar 1998:7).

Jeff Fischer (2002) adopts an argument that it is not the electoral process per se that triggers violence, but the breakdown of this process. He does not contest the crucial role that elections have in the democratization process but rather says, “it is difficult to identify any electoral surrogate that has brought about non-conflictive transitions of power with the same consistency” (2002:2) - but again believes that violence is induced by unethical actions that occur during the election cycle and which contribute to the breakdown of the electoral process. In understanding Fischer, the issue about surrogates tell the nature of systems, methods, and technologies which are often borrowed from mature democracies and mostly in the eleventh hour. It is therefore almost certain that incompatibilities are bound to take place out of these in electoral matters. It may be right to suggest that surrogate electoral systems will likely lead to conflicts.

Previous literature on elections and conflict – both in the political science, and peace and conflict research fields according to Höglund, Jarstad and Söderberg Kovacs (2009) were the first to systematically put together conflict-generating factors in a conceptual framework. The authors categorized these factors into three clusters; those related to the actors who participate in the electoral process, the electoral institutions, and the stake of elections. Conflict-generating factors, Höglund, Jarstad and Söderberg Kovacs (2009) included an electoral system that generates the concentration of power which may lead to violence, “weak or politicized electoral management bodies”, failed Security Sector Reforms or lack of “external security guarantees” (2009:548). These groups of scholars fail to raise issues pointing that security is state owned machinery and in election in which a state has interest and electoral body is partially chosen by government such as the constitution of Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), management is bound to raise concerns no matter the outcomes. Institutions are also good but internally weak ones often follow their political patrons’ directions. At this point, thinking of extra state institutions may possibly supplement the internal weaknesses.

Electoral administration is mainly conducted by an electoral management body (EMB). EMBs conduct their activity following several principles: independence, impartiality, integrity, transparency, efficiency, professionalism and service-mindedness (Wall et al. 2006:22). The independence and impartiality of EMBs is often related to the EMB Model - whether or not the EMB is independent, governmental, or mixed; or party-based, expertise-based or both (Wall et. al 2006). Independent and expertise-based models are considered in many parts of the world as the best EMBs for ensuring the independence and impartiality of decisions and actions. Models are very good whether governmental, semi-government, or independent. The role of managers in a great context has a key role in the directions electoral management take; this goes hand in hand with the behavior of the individual managers. Systems must be supported by this people.

In ‘Electoral Disputes Resolution’ by Krieglolar (2011), in Kenya in 2007, one can see the impact of low trust in an EMB and state institutions. In the 2007 election, the casting of ballots went well, but ensuing irregularities (both real and alleged), bad communication strategies and underlying grievances combined to fuel violence. Following the election, rumours spread as allegations and conflicting reports from polling stations suggested that there were irregularities in the results process. From his argument, institutional trust is a derivation of managers’ role thus electoral management issue. Positive role playing leads to lesser conflicts thus high institutional trust. What I know as a conflict scholar is that, there is never a conflict free environment in elections. Unlike Krieglolar’s pre-occupation which was circumstantial, most conflicts begin much earlier, but the post election conflicts and violence tend to overshadow many stakeholders yet they are products of long visible – neglected Pre – Election Conflicts (PECs).

Krieglolar then notes that the EMB, rather than addressing the issues head on then, they just simply announced the results. Worst of all, the EMB revealed it had been pressured to do so, independence was at stake. The public and opposition groups were skeptical of the electoral process already and this confusion fueled anger among opposition supporters. The issues of electoral management addressed in this article surrounds; institutional trust and weaknesses, poor strategies, doctored result processes, neglect, and political patronage which hinders independence. Krieglolar contrasts that
such weaknesses were not evident on the surface of the 2002 election process, yet there were systemic issues and weaknesses that were not resolved with between-elections support.

Election security planning and training are also key to electoral conflict prevention because they can contribute to a system that can better absorb shocks. A coordinated approach between EMBs and the security sector makes a huge difference in the planning and training done within each institution. Forming a joint operations centre manned by both EMB and security officials have proven instrumental in many elections observes Lisa ibid. Lisa highlights the essence of security in managing elections and in perpetuating good electoral practices. An area that weakens electoral management and precursor to conflicts in Africa is how security can be separated from the executive arm of government as far as outcomes of electoral matters are concerned.

Discussing electoral management in relation to security then as some earlier cited literature suggest would then require addressing things to do with;

- Principles of operations and role of managers (Wall et al’, 2006),
- Institutional trust and weaknesses, strengthening of overall operational strategies such as planning and training, good transparent and efficient result dissemination, and operating above political patronage by electoral officers (Krieglar, 2011),
- Having adequate preparation time (Obala, 2012), and
- What I call, “partiality of security” even where electoral body seems to be impartial.

December 2007 presidential election shocked the Country and world. The 2007/8 violence lasted two months, during which time 1,133 Kenyans were killed, over 600,000 driven from their homes and more than 110,000 private properties were destroyed (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2013). It is this wave that later led to the emerging effects to East Africa Regional security. The internal dynamics could not contain the normal life and business. The condition that followed made operations in an interconnected region difficult. The landlocked Countries could not access the Mombasa port with their exports nor reach for their imports, the delays, destructions on transit, cross border populations, and still within the internal displacements.

In a bit of comparative evaluation of the 2007 electoral management and the one that followed, Obala (2012) draws some lines of why the latter didn’t turn into similar fate as the 2007. He observes that as always, elections, as common in Africa and other developing world is winning by all means. Being a political process, using all available means is an acceptable norm except where values are relegated as subjects to be addressed after assumption of leadership, and then the ease of society breaking into conflict is not remote. The preparations included promulgation of a new constitution that set stage for existence of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). This body came into being as confidence restorer after the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) was formed to cause the transition from Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) into also a new constitutional order.

In referring to the 2013 elections he views a marked difference observing Kenya’s next Presidential elections are due to be held in an environment of great uncertainty for lords of impunity and violence. The uncertainty is also on the new political game – that at the same time reduces the attraction to presidency for the resources it holds to the loyalists and sycophants. But also provides ethnic kingpins with the opportunity to operate within a limited sphere predominated by their ethnic groups (Obala, 2012).

Secondly, the other marked difference was that the incumbent president was retiring after having served his last term in office. This meant his hold on the normal institutions of transition could well be low keyed. This scenario necessarily made the 2013 elections full of threats for a Country coming from conflict related to elections. Post-conflict elections are normally very volatile and hence a security concern. Election campaigns in Kenya have often focused on internal issues which often take the nature of ethnic agenda, ethnic grouping, and silent role of government. Amidst emerging complex regional dynamics, there are emerging internal sobering political dynamics (Obala, 2012). These are compounded by synonymous traits in Kenya’s political scene.

Third, to make the 2013 a security concern and very different from the 2007 elections was the number of elective offices that were ushered in by the new constitution’s people’s demand for devolution. And, fourth, this election was being conducted within a short preparation time yet it was a recommendation after the 2007 elections that there is need for adoption of new technology in the subsequent elections. A marked similarity that the 2013 elections possessed which the 2007 had was the characterization of the political climate by a seemingly close contestation of the presidency. The political scene in Kenya is largely split along ethnic lines; at the 2007 election Kibaki mainly garnered the Kikuyu vote while Odinga was largely supported by Luo and Kalenjin groups... Odinga and Kenyatta are from the Luo and Kikuyu ethnic groups respectively. This immediately frames the electoral decision as an ethnic one once again (Cummings, 2012).

The 2013 election could have as well been another security hazard. The potential flashpoints for the 2013 elections are more numerous than in 2007, including many impoverished, remote and rural parts of the Country. The Kenyan National Security and Intelligence Service identified 27 out of 47 Counties as having considerable potential to degenerate into electoral violence (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2013). Finally, in 2013, another institution the judiciary in its rightful role as an actor in elections acted as an arbiter after the IEBC was felt incompetent and through the first Supreme Court sitting, the election outcome was upheld. The role of institutions in enhancing positively security complexities out of elections looks a vital mechanism in transformation of elections regionally.

Kenya’s peaceful elections mean a lot to regional security. The definition of security must not be limited to the traditional view of focusing on external aggression and internal state dynamics but one that looks at economic well being as well and also postulating extra-territorial effects as matters pertinent to an all round definition of security. In one
of his writings, a reknown historian Prof. Amutabi narrates chronologically that Kenya has had elections in 1964, 1966, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. Between 1964 and 1988, the elections were held under KANU. In these elections, ethnic competition was not as pronounced as later became the case in liberalized politics under a multiparty political dispensation, from 1992. After 1992, it became clear that ethnicity mattered in national politics and Kenyans for the first time started to vote on what was clearly ethnic basis (Amutabi, 2009).

It is proper to note an argument not far from this literature that competitions in Kenya’s elections were terse at independence between the two dominant parties KANU and KADU where the latter emerged a supreme majoritarian elite ruling organ. However, first, to pick some notable issues in this citation, one then would link the aspects of competition, multiparty politics, and ethnicity to election security/insecurity since it is during 1992 and after that spillovers of chaotic elections were felt in wide scale. Secondly, the literature points to suppression of electoral conflicts which rightly only needed time to brood and explode at a maturity time not known.

Kenya’s influence in the East Africa region is measured successfully from its contribution to peaceful referendum in South Sudan. Additionally, the young Somali citizens living and studying in Kenya need peace in order for their expectation to greatly influence a future Somalia. This means a peaceful election in Kenya guided by among others an independent electoral commission and a progressive constitution as they watch will have greater impact in influencing the way the Country will move forward and continue affecting positively her neighbours politics and economy.

In confirmation to this, Obala (2012) highlights the critical role of Kenya’s stability to the region thus, the stability of Kenya after the 2012-2013 elections is vital for the entire Sudan’s economic development. Most of the Countries neighbouring Kenya within the larger East African Community (EAC) has interests at stake and will be directly affected by Kenya’s stability or instability after the coming elections. Though his emphasis is pointed to Sudan with the ‘South’ in mind, the strategic importance of Kenya in the region was demonstrated by the demolition of Kenya-Uganda railway line in Kibera in Kenya’s city of Nairobi.

Above all, having led the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process that yielded the CPA, Kenya has a particularly strong interest in the South Sudan. This position is agreeable, one because the Country is an industrial hub to the developing states around, secondly, it is a transport corridor through its airways to such states, and thirdly, it offers an efficient port for export and import business into the region. More so, the reconstruction of the two countries are having nationalities from across Africa among whom Kenyans are part of the human capital present in the capital cities of the two states.

Kenya’s role in the East Africa Region (EAR) remains significant. In the wake of South Sudan struggles to stabilize as a state amidst differences with parent-state, Sudan, it is increasingly becoming clear that a regional arbiter is needed as well as stable regional economic power for closer integration to continue. Kenya’s geo-politics makes these necessary. In general terms, electoral violence in Kenya is not new. At least 4,433 Kenyans have been killed and over 1.8 million people displaced by such violence since 1993 (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2013). The 2007/8 post-election violence was, however, unprecedented.

The 2007 election as earlier stated had much security concerns for the region. It shocked the Country and world, it lasted for two months, many Kenyans were killed, much displacements occurred and loss of private properties (Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, 2013). These properties could in no way belong to Kenyans only. Kenya is a transit route to many East Africa Region (EAR) states, it is also a business destination with many industries to the neighbouring states and a dependent economic state to Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) Countries. The cropping of Post Electoral Violence (PEV) as here indicated above experienced in Kenya from the 2007 elections and the security surrounding it did not just emanate from no basis.

Among triggers were issues around power. President Kibaki came to be challenged by many of his 2002 allies, and he sought re-election in what became a highly controversial election in 2007. Kibaki and his Party of National Unity (PNU) claimed victory in the closely fought elections, an outcome vehemently disputed by the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The fault lines in Kenyan society were exposed when competing political interests overlapped with ethnic differences (The Carter Centre, 2013). The Carter document continues to suggest the historical situations to this. In the Rift Valley, historic grievances against land allocations led to the mass targeting of Kikuyu by the Kalenjin (around 11 percent of the population), who regard the land in the Rift Valley as theirs. In Western Kenya, the Kikuyu also found itself under attack, with many fleeing for fear of their lives.

The 2013 elections left some lessons that can be drawn as paradigms. The EMB managing the Kenya’s 2013 elections together with some observer institutions to the elections lauded the event and activity as having experienced success needed of any good elections. Kenya’s March 4 election ushered in the first elected government under the Country’s new constitution. Hassan and others continue to note that while the election was widely considered to be free and fair, there were a number of challenges that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) encountered, including problems with the introduction of new election technology. The election was widely regarded as credible and peaceful (Hassan, 2013). Is peace absence of war? When it is suggested that elections was peaceful, the conclusion is that there were no security concerns from the exercise. Security threats both local and transcendent occur in peaceful and violent environment as peace does not mean no insecurity.

Early Philosophers like Baruch Spinoza (1632 - 1677) recognized that peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice. In other words peace means presence of justice whether acceptable as is normally required or not. There is need to clarify that peace and security have some meeting point. Whereas peace addresses the issues of justice, security on the other hand elaborates concerns of threats. To this
extent, presence of justice may still entail presence of threats in many ways. For example, how is justice implemented? Who implements it? Which system is followed and its credibility? And also, the character of the implementer. Pertinent is to understand that security surpasses ‘mere existence of peace’ to application of justice.

Therefore, there is accuracy in United Nations PBSO (2012), that, while peace, security, and related governance dimensions (e.g. access to justice, political participation) are relevant at all stages of development, they are critical for Countries affected by high levels of violence, conflict and fragility. The stress of their uniform application is paramount at this point. To Kanter (2009) peace is not simply the absence of war but a state of active engagement and healthy interdependency among different groups of people.

On March 4, 2013, Kenyans participated in a complex election that included voting for the president and deputy president, Deputy Governors, senators, members of parliament and women representatives.

To a large extent, the prevailing peace in Kenya is a result of the many reforms that the Country has undertaken to create credible institutions like the IEBC. Kenyans also trust the reformed judiciary, which has demonstrated its professionalism, independence, and capacity to adjudicate on complex matters, including the presidential election (Kimenyi, 2013). The presence of stable institutions appears to be a very strong element in security enhancement. What needs re-asking is when the effects of electoral management explode, is there preparedness to the resultant securitization?

Thinking election’s dynamics is broadly to look at how history of electoral/culture of electoral, conduct of electoral, and persons/institutions involved in elections associate to influence internal and security regional security consecutively. Election’s management dynamics extend to include the structuring of electoral bodies, how they are constituted, the number of elections held in a day and electoral management body’s capacity, the technological level (its relevance and applicability), and the guiding legal frameworks. In the final analysis, all these form the benchmarks that guide the predictability of elections as a process and event to the behaviour of states as being secure or insecure.

According to Kiwanuka (2015), the dynamics of elections across Africa has been one of the most dramatic changes over the decades. In country after country, people have risked their lives to be able to cast their vote. Elections are virtually the indispensable tool of democracy. Technological use in electoral process also adds to electoral dynamics since their failures and successes diametrically alter the outcomes and resultant effects. Olen Gunnurumwa (2015) observes this as follows, “like Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015, and Ghana in 2012, biometric voter registration and polling-place biometric verification processes were introduced in an attempt to eliminate irregularities that had occurred in previous elections. However, the verification machines broke down in approximately 19 percent of polling stations.”

Electoral composition is known to be the best method to getting a president in several states especially in divided societies. This means that countries have to incorporate multiple institutions in order to manage properly. As Malloch Brown in divided states, successful electoral processes provide a means of channelling social conflict into being respectful and constructive debate. It should therefore have common rules to guide election of authoritative representatives of the people with the ability to serve in executive, legislative and other institutions. The ultimate guarantor of social peace is determined by democratic institutions like elections (Malloch Brown 2003).

Elections give people opportunity of having leaders of their choice social conflict management and decision-making processes thus serving as a loyal opposition. These are aimed at having proper checks and balances. This was not the case in March 1988 general elections as they followed a different direction of mlolongo which replaced the secret ballot. The queue voting system allowed all the competitors that had garnered 70 percent of the nomination considered elected unopposed (Mwaura, 1997). This was political weapon to silence the opposition. The electoral systems were inefficient and led to disputes because of partisanship that later led to conflicts. This posed security challenges across the country but minimally to the East African region. Election’s management should involve competent individuals that are not partisan as well as impartial or aligned to any interest groups. This should not however overrule the political divides as they should be entitled proper representation.

Kenya has had several transformations regarding election management modes dating to independence. For instance 1960s to 1980s witnessed metallic containers called boxes. Wanyande (2007) points out to the political regimes as witnessing multiple of challenges in the quest to democratic political processes. To him, the problem arises from the poor governance institution that lacks accountability and transparency that would interfere with the citizens’ wishes. For example the various changes of the constitution to single party rule. Again he notes that under the one party rule, political competition was done through the ruling party KANU. This allowed for single party electoral system which was government controlled thus a public administration affair. This kind of electoral system would allow for manipulation of the ruling elite. The compromising situation led to illegitimate representatives getting to offices and would not articulate the peoples’ interests.

The 1988 system of mlolongo, the Moi’s regime created the Electoral Commission of Kenya removing Judge Justice Zachaeus Chesoni with his team. The electoral body management has been the result of the various disputed elections that has been witnessed in Kenya. Kagwanja through his writings proposed a voting process that is based on electoral college in relation to the popular vote to avoid the so-called big tribes ganging up to get power and dominate (Kagwanja, 2010). The early 1990s saw Kenya getting into multi party politics from one party rule. This gave room for competition by many political leaders. It led to lots of power brokers that exploited ethnic backgrounds to advance on their agendas. The political pluralism therefore led to suspicion and hostility among communities that led to subsequent conflicts in elections that followed (Kagwanja, 2010).

The efforts to improve on the democratic space led to conflicts in Kenya (Osamba, 2001). The weak institutional framework has been viewed as the result of violence witnessed
after elections in Kenya. It has been pointed out for instance that the ruling class continuously use the control that they have accompanied by the state protection to manipulate governance institutions in their favour (Makau Mutua, 2009). The compromise of electoral bodies like the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) saw unilateral appointment of sixteen members by Kibaki, (Bard, 2009).

The 1992 elections led to several legal amendments through agreements known as Inter Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) in 1997 that aimed at addressing freedoms of assembly, movement and association as well as the re-composition of Electoral Commission of Kenya. It was to allow the opposition group have greater freedom and association. The inability to legislate the process made the implementation be difficult. The IPPG had public members to oversee 1997 and 2002 elections with the representatives cutting across various political divides hence representing certain interests (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The failure to legalise the IPPG led to president Kibaki disregarding it as gentlemen’s agreement. Kibaki’s government unilaterally appointed the Electoral Commission of Kenya led by Samuel Kivuitu which was discredited as not good to oversee an election.

After the sparked conflicts resulting from the results released by ECK, there were efforts to restore peace and the year 2008 saw change in the electoral body to Interim Independent Electoral Commission later changed to Independent Election and Boundaries Commission. These were aimed at ensuring independence and representing political interests without through fair outcomes of political interests. The poor management of conflicts in Kenya has been leading to conflicts with the 2007 an 2008 being the worst ever witnessed scenario. It led to increased prices of goods not only in Kenya but also her neighbours who depend on Kenyan port. For example the cost of fuel increased tremendously overnight and remained high for months.

The PEV would pose a threat to the East African Community because of the role that the Kenyan state has had. The uncompromising stances from Kenya and Uganda in the dispute pose a threat to the dreams of East African Integration that the East African Community is working to realise. Logically, a state entering conflicts with the other would lead to closing of borders (Warui, 2013).

The lack of trust to the electoral systems in Kenya and the inefficiency has contributed to the conflicts that occur thereafter. The aftermath of the 2007–2008 PEV violence is thought to be escalated by the weapons that are brought to Kenya illegally through the porous orders. The ability to engage in such malpractices encourages spontaneity in conflicts and thus posing a threat to the larger East African region only signified by an affected state. Kelley, (2008) however does not support the idea of weapons being purchase and used for the PEV noting that there is no proper justification.

The Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee argue that there is need to develop long term structures for reconciliation purposes so as to address the root causes of conflicts. The various electoral processes if transparently managed will provide a predictable rule bound method for arbitrating political and social conflicts through the selection of representatives or the definitive resolution of questions. Credibly held elections give the citizens consent of the government in power thereby improving the capacity of the state to ensure community security through legitimate authority under the rule of law. It also allows the government opportunity to improve levels of human development through effective governance. It allows the incumbent government opportunity to enjoy support for programs and policies (Malloch, 2003).

Transparency or lack of it portrayed by the electoral bodies has impacts on the neighbouring states. They are likely to lead to the sitting heads of state following suit so that ineffective electoral bodies in one state would be a reflective of another. When the electoral system is not transparent for example, it is likely to affect other bodies in neighbouring states so that conflict rates can increase within the region thus posing security threats.

Malloch (2003) asserts that election processes become catalysts for conflict before, during and after voting day. The tensions that arise in the run-up to election processes can lead to some candidates mobilizing people along extremist lines to win support or seek to weaken or even eliminate opponents in efforts to seek or retain political power. These encourage groups that become a threat to the general security of the state and the region which threatens the regions security. The rules of electoral system thus determine to a large extent the state that will be thereafter as they can either ameliorate or generate conflict (Reilly 2006).

VI. A VIEW OF ELECTION’S MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES IN EAST AFRICAN REGION

Among the many challenges of electoral management in the East Africa region surrounds the conduct of electoral activities in an efficient manner. These activities mentioned here have their challenges too. In evaluating Kenya’s 2013 election, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) Chairman Isaac Hassan underscores the fact that a general election is not an event, but a series of several events. This implies that elections are not completed until a series of post-election activities have been finalized including among others, election litigations, re-runs where applicable and reviews by the election management body. These post-election activities have preoccupied IEBC in the past seventeen months and an account of the 2013 elections would not have been complete without bringing these post-election activities on board (IEBC, 2013).

The postelection evaluation is a very important component indeed within the electoral cycle. However, apart from the issues of litigations and re-runs, efficiency in management need to be practiced so that certain time frames are shortened to give other stakeholders in election a window of breaking anxiety on unclear issues knowing the nature of electoral as a political activity and event. From the Chairman’s foreword message, the report of one election is being released seventeen months after an event.

The Chairman’s statement implies a serious challenge either in human resource capability or some kind of lack of requisite records and to some extent probably lack of finances.
to carry certain activities. Though in this report it sounds as if managing multiple electoral in a single day is daunting, which is true in terms of pressure, unlike the Kenya’s 2007 election it did not have many questions on its management thus proper reorganization can help improve on its processes without necessarily staggering the elections into more than one day. This practice assists in maintaining familiar methods and improving grey areas in such processes and activities rather than overhaul.

Electoral management challenges on the basis of the 2007 electoral management surround three major areas;
- those aligned to electoral management bodies (EMBs),
- those initiated by ethnic related issues,
- those challenges due to corruption and bribery,
- and myriad others.

Out of the generalities obtained pertaining electoral management challenges in Kenya as analyzed above, a number of specific challenges mentioned include; weak electoral laws, Weak democracy, weak institutions, government interference, dictatorship, logistical challenges, uninformed and misinformed citizen/voters, partisanship, corruption, non-independent and financially crippled Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), historical injustices, ethnicity, Lack of leadership integrity, multiple elections, and communication and transport Infrastructure impairments. A good aspect of electoral management always reflects on how the outcomes are received by the different actors/stakeholders in an election. From the above, the comparison seems to point some decline in the autonomy and neutrality of Kenya’s electoral management as opposed to Ghana’s. Such growth patterns also point to electoral legitimacy. The higher the level of legitimacy, the higher the level of perceived autonomy, and neutrality. This will reflect a high level of acceptance of election results. This pattern links over the years with the effectiveness of Kenya’s electoral management. The fact supports the outcome and effects that came out of the 2007 election which was at its worst.

According (Nambiema, 2012) in comparing performance of Kenya’s electoral management (an activity of Election’s Management Body) and that of Ghana over ten years 1991-2002, in five areas of; funding, appointment of staff, trust, tenure, and performance, Ghana leads Kenya in almost all areas. In this case the level of autonomy, nonpartisanship and professionalism of EMB members is highly correlated with the quality of electoral services.

Some weaknesses that cripple election’s management in East Africa Region is the role of security. EAC (2011), states the role of security forces in elections as;
- Security forces should maintain a neutral role in the provision of election security.
- Security forces should be regulated by a code of conduct contained in the electoral law, and their behavior should not intimidate voters.
- The EMB should meet regularly with the security forces to discuss issues relating to national security during the election period, and any other logistical assistance that may be required.
- Special provision should be made for the security forces to vote in their duty stations on the polling day.

A problem which may translate into a weakness and which arise out of the fact that states despite integrations may in the foreseeable future remain main actors in international relations suffice. The roles in themselves are conflictual in terms of to whom should the security of the state be answerable to, their Commander-in-Chief (C-i-C) who is seeking re-election or an institutional Chairman who seeks their service from the bureaucracy under the C-i-C. This re-surfaces in terms of the conflict of traditional security vis’ a vis’ non-traditional security which Buzan and Waever identify in their Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Whereas as in EAC neutrality is a principle, one wonders whether it is practicable in its unitary components – the states. In some of these states, security role during elections have automatic intervening roles.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The conduct of this study begun with a pre-test that was carried out in three cities prior to the research centered on the following items in finding whether; Kenya's 2007 election’s management affected East Africa Regional (EAR) security, and knowing the extent of the effects of Kenya’s 2007 election’s management to the East Africa Regional (EAR) security. The analysis outcome of indicated that Kenya’s electoral management affected East Africa regional security. According to the findings of the pre-study, the effects of Kenya’s 2007 election violence were mainly economical, displacements of people, tension, and creating environment for lawlessness. The extent to which this electoral management affected East Africa regional security was great.

The research in seeking to rate the causes of election’s violence in order to form a platform on electoral management issues found from the respondents that among the causes highlighted, politicians and electoral management were the most likely causes of the 2007 election’s violence. Other causes of election’s violence in Kenya over time and the 2007 one specifically include; political feuds, roots in ethnic rivalries, and struggle for ancestral lands.

The election results according to these findings were just the catalyst and not the immediate cause of the conflict, thus a trigger. To some, still, the introduction of multi-party politics in the 1990s was a cause. It has been observed that Kenya’s violence has a 5-year life cycle with elections serving as the incubators. There were known and unknown causes, visible and invisible causes of Kenya’s election’s violence in 2007. The 5 year cyclic nature of election’s violence in Kenya is a trend that needs adequate measures in so far as elections management is concerned. Taking into account what Collier et al. (2008) suggests that having experienced conflict in the recent past is a good predictor for future conflict.

The major causes can be classified as; Institutional faults, historical injustice, and natural sociological tendencies. In this classification, the institutional faults are those that arise from what institutions ought to do and would include; election’s malpractices, electoral mismanagement, rigging, disputed results, biased political appointments, and bad politics. There are other causes to election’s violence in Kenya such as monoethnic dominance. Though insignificant cause, the
According to the study, the impact of electoral management in general is internal and external. It interferes with people’s habitation leading to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), it leads to economic destruction and loss of property, and worst of all it leads to loss of life. Peripherally yet very important, there is a breakage of social fabric of trust in any synchronized society no matter the degree of its synchronization. Cross border spillovers have great effects in weakening the power and strength of states, and enhances their internal and external insecurity and this is serious now to Countries which are progressively trying to build a cohesive regional regimes in Africa.

Largely due to the electoral management in Kenya in 2007, the East Africa region was affected in several aspects; the transport and communication sector was also adversely affected by the violence culminating from among others the destruction of the Nairobi-Kampala railway at Kibera which disrupted supplies to western parts of the Country and Uganda, forcing re-routing to already insecure roads. Thus states that rely on Kenya as a trade (export and import) routes suffered greatly.

The above statement therefore prompts the question of what constitutes security of states. In my thinking, security of states is anchored on three main areas; economic stability, social stability, and political stability. The interplay between these three will determine security and in adjacent states it determines regional security. So to suggest, the greater part of East Africa region suffered security due to the electoral management in Kenya in 2007. This is a more generalized view because each aspect mentioned has other dynamics in terms of security. The social and political for example can be attributed to forced human migrations fleeing hot spots of election violence.

From among different selected parts of electoral activities and processes, the findings from the data collected indicate that announcement of results, voting, and pre-election parts of election management respectively are prone to affect security most. This means that election period and pre-election period in an election cycle contribute much to security issues.

The different components comprising the three periods in an electoral cycle are;

- In the election-period, there are issues to do with setting of legal frameworks, registration of voters, inspection of voter registers both by voters and other stakeholders, and voter and civic education.
- The election period involves nomination processes, campaign period, voting, and result transmission.
- Post-election period on the other hand normally involves election audit and evaluation leading to confirmation or faulting of results submitted.

The study reveals that the electoral management of 2007 in Kenya affected all aspects of life; the socio-eco-political areas in different nearby states. Keter (2015) reports in the Star Newspaper that, seven hundred and twenty Kenyans who took refuge in Uganda during the 2007-08 post – election violence are packing their bags to return home today. The return of such a number is enormous to the economy at once in addition to problems associated with returning immigrants.

The issue of integrating them is another social dilemma. To the hosting states, it is possible that the social, political, and security impacts of refugees will remain a menace long after Kenyan refugees will have left.

As a result of refugees generally, Kirui and Mwaruvie (2012) note the fact thus the security dynamics in a refugee settlement are complex because of the spillover effects from refugees’ home Countries and the varied interests of both UNHCR, as a refugee agency, and host government as a law enforcement agency. It reveals that refugees and the host community often conflict over resources, systems of governance and other varied interests. Despite the imminent departure and return programme being in place, Jacobsen (2002) posits that refugees impose a mixed variety of negative effects to host Countries but it also embodies a significant flow of resources in the form of international humanitarian assistance, economic assets and human capital. In other words the departure of refugees also leaves some economic gaps to their immediate environment and handlers at different levels which require coping.

The electoral management had other challenges too in economic terms. More than 80% of Uganda’s imports pass through the port of Mombasa, as do almost all of Rwanda’s exports. An estimated amount of about $43 USD million got lost to Ugandan business that rely on Kenya for exports and imports because of the delays, destruction of goods and slowed production caused by the Kenyan crisis.

Summarily, the study finds that previously Kenya’s electoral have not had serious effects to the neighbouring states which indicate that the magnitude of 2007 electoral management reflects an area of policy currently both to the Country and her neighbours. The challenges of electoral management in the East Africa region surround the conduct of electoral activities in an efficient manner. Efficiency in management need to be practiced so that certain time frames are shortened to give other stakeholders in election a window of breaking anxiety on unclear issues. The long delays either in releasing post mortem reports or even announcing results of an election can be costly.

Electoral management challenges on the basis of the 2007 electoral management in Kenya surrounded three major areas;
- those aligned to electoral management bodies (EMBs),
- those initiated by ethnic related issues,
- those challenges due to corruption and bribery,

In generalization, key specific challenges that need consideration for intervention include; weak electoral laws, Weak democracy, weak institutions, government Interference, dictatorship, Logistical challenges, uninformed and misinformed citizenry/voters, partisanship, corruption, non-independent and financially crippled Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), historical injustices, ethnicity, Lack of leadership integrity, multiple elections, and communication and transport Infrastructure impairments. Some of these may be the responsibilities of other stakeholders such as government and political parties.

“All of the IIEC Commissioners were candidates for a second term. Despite Ahmed Isaack Hassan’s appeal for more continuity, only he and two IIEC Commissioners were retained in the IEBC. Hassan would later opine that this lack of continuity had adversely affected the organization of the
2013 elections” (Fouere, Mwangi, and Ndeda, 2015:234). Although continuity is such an important element in electoral management as it does to other organizations, if the right people with right resolve are nominated or selected to carry a worthwhile task for their country, often good results are expected. Hassan notes continuity as an end in itself not considering its other demerits too. Of course many Kenyans always once appointed or chosen to serve in organizations become colossus and synonymous with such organizations at times to their disadvantage. An element of continuity that probably can be depicted from Hassan is that having a synchronized team to push objectives and plans they had laid over the short rigorous period was necessary for good results in 2013 elections.

The research identifies what looks like a long-term solution but can easily be classified as civic education which the study suggests as initiating election’s curriculum in schools/education system. Additionally, the suggestion of discolouring the high offices (Presidency/Prime Minister’s office as appropriate) to reduce stakes, and legislation of a regional observer mission in the East Africa region to deal with eventualities from elections among geographically adjacent states. As a researcher I have a different viewpoint on discolouring the high offices because, several other countries have very broad power stakes on such offices but they don’t lead to interference in electoral management nor leading to favoured temporal constitutional changes about their regimes. Stronger high offices well protected by constitutions are better placed in foreign policy posturing of a Country. Rather, dealing with such in countries with corporate nationalism (multiethnic/ multinational states) might require political system that gives consideration to inherent rights of the linguistic groups like federalism which Ronald Ngala called majimbo in Kenyan context.

According to Sharamo and Ayangafac (2011), the main variables that will determine Africa’s capacity to confront emerging security challenges and response to these threats such as the emergence of food crises, poor service deliveries, organized crime, drug and human trafficking, unconstitutional changes of governments and electoral violence are not only need for pro-growth policies, but also redistributive policies anchored on positive relationships between human and regime security, or a positive alignment between political incentives and good economics. From their argument conclusions can be drawn that point major aspects of security threats to Africa where electoral management is inclusive.

Some weaknesses that cripple election’s management in East Africa region is the role of security stated but never followed. EAC (2011), states the role of security forces in elections as:

- Security forces should maintain a neutral role in the provision of election security.
- Security forces should be regulated by a code of conduct contained in the electoral law, and their behavior should not intimidate voters.
- The EMB should meet regularly with the security forces to discuss issues relating to national security during the election period, and any other logistical assistance that may be required.

✓ Special provision should be made for the security forces to vote in their duty stations on the polling day.

A problem which may translate into a weakness and which arise out of the fact that states despite integrations may in the foreseeable future remain main actors in international relations suffice. The roles in themselves are conflictual in terms of to whom should the security of the state be answerable to, their Commander-in-Chief (C-i-C) who is seeking re-election or an institutional Chairman who seeks their service from the bureaucracy under the C-i-C. This re-surfaces in other ways as the conflict of traditional security vis’ a vis’ non-traditional security which Buzan and Wæver identify in their Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper generates some recommendations as follows;
First, there is need redefine the role of Commander-in-Chief (CiC) who is an electoral candidate through legal frameworks to avoid interference in elections. Secondly, the security issues raised in this study so far were internal and external to Kenya and this means the handling should reflect this complex nature. This research recommends that those which are internal require policies which are adequate to the concerned state. Those external by nature may require stronger regional institutions being formed which have power to intervene.

Third, in overcoming challenges to do with politicians and government as causes to electoral mismanagement and alternately violence, there is need for civic education is necessary to empower Kenyans politically, as well as to restore faith in and ensure understanding of political processes. Fourth, according to (Bekoe, 2011), high rates of youth unemployment is a vulnerability to coercion and violence as witnessed in 2007 and 2008, thus investment in youth-related programming should be increased (particularly with regard to economic opportunities and sense of inclusion in the political process).

Fifth, recommendations on the basis of causes of election’s violence would require dealing with what Adeagbo and Iyi (2011) call hidden political feuds, the violence roots in ethnic rivalries and struggle for ancestral lands. This research found the expression monoethnic dominance (ethnicity as a means to subjugate other nations) the best terminology to sum the problem of ethnicity in Kenya. A solution to the problem and cause of endemic cyclic conflict found in ethnicity and monoethnic dominance can be found in attainment of federalism system of governance for multinational (multiethnic) states of Africa.

Sixth, there should be a very deliberate effort to settle historical injustices in Kenya such as land because this research finds the causes which often look as immediate causes of election’s violence such as the politicians and electoral management and government as just triggers.

Seventh, as much as many thought that announcement of results and voting affected the regional security most, the researcher has a different view that the second option comparatively which is pre-election parts of election management are responsible to affecting the regional security.
most. This is an indicator of where emphasis of managing this cycle of violence can start from. In other words adequate legal frameworks, properly conducted registration of voters, inspection of voter registers both by voters and other stakeholders, and voter and civic education will turnaround the rest of the electoral cycle wheel. With the technologies now in place, electoral stakeholders need to ensure they play a role in audit of electronic gadgets at some moments closer to the election’s day in relation to the master register.

Finally; first, Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) as an institution need empowerment for proper functioning. This entails being guided by set legal frameworks, logistical aspects, and financially capacity. Secondly; the human resource making the staff should be competitively sought by following right set qualifications. Further to this punitive policy measures should be put in place to target individuals for own irresponsibility and non-balkanization of institutions for individual faults. Thirdly; there is need to strengthen the practice of democratic principles. Lastly; the role of citizenry in electoral management and politics in general need to be enhanced through raising literacy levels, civic education and sensitization, and where possible considering relevant governance areas such as elections and integrity should be inculcated among school going citizens for future changes.

An observation by Vorrath (2011) points the view that too often in the past, political repression and exclusion have sown the seeds for subsequent instability and conflict, which concurs with findings in this research.

**VIII. CONCLUSIONS**

It is evident from this study that electoral management dynamics affect the East Africa regional security in different ways. The dynamics of electoral management include those arising from the constitution of Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), the conduct of elections which includes both the process and event within the electoral cycle, the managers of electoral bodies and the interaction between the EMBS and the external actors. Electoral management in normal circumstances through the ideal view is supposed to make election work for the betterment of both the politicians seeking representation and the citizens who participate to be represented by enhancing democracy but in some situations depending on how it is conducted it breeds conflict thus creating insecurity.

**REFERENCES**


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